Yet it seems odd, to say the least, to discount the well-being of people as their velocity increases.
Is it some kind of non-sequitur? How is it related to positive discounting?
if you decline to condemn them to death, how are they different from other “residents” in the distant future?
Probably because some are more real and others are less so.
if you decline to condemn them to death, how are they different from other “residents” in the distant future? Probably because some are more real and others are less so.
Can you explain in more detail what you mean by this?
It’s pretty reasonable to care about the live people you know more than about some from potential future generations.
Is it some kind of non-sequitur? How is it related to positive discounting?
Probably because some are more real and others are less so.
Can you explain in more detail what you mean by this?
It’s pretty reasonable to care about the live people you know more than about some from potential future generations.