Sure, I can imagine a future for which that’s true. Ditto suffering, mortality, and qualia. The others are a bit beyond my imagination, but I suspect if I sat down and worked at it for a while I could come up with something.
Sure, I can imagine a future for which that’s true. Ditto suffering, mortality, and qualia.
The difference is that those wishes have to be contrived and would be considered insane (or confused) by local standards. Corporeal existence is something that that people with current human values are likely to consider a luxury in plausible transhuman circumstances.
I can imagine a future in which the default mode of existence for most people is incorporeal (say, as uploads), and being downloaded into a physical body is a luxury. I can imagine a future in which the default mode of existence for most people lacks subjective experience (again, say, as uploads which mostly run “on autopilot,” somewhat like a trance state, perhaps because computing subjective experience is expensive relative to computing other behavior), and being run with subjective experience is a luxury. (I don’t presume p-zombiehood here; I expect there to be demonstrable differences between these states.)
Neither of those strike me as requiring insanity or confusion. Whether the corresponding scenarios are contrived or plausible I’m not prepared to argue; they don’t seem differentially one or the other to me, but I’ll accept other judgments. (If your grounds for believing them differentially contrived are articulable, I’m interested; you might convince me.)
Suffering and mortality, I’ll grant you, require me to essentially posit fashion, which can equally well (or poorly) justify anything.
Sure, I can imagine a future for which that’s true. Ditto suffering, mortality, and qualia. The others are a bit beyond my imagination, but I suspect if I sat down and worked at it for a while I could come up with something.
The difference is that those wishes have to be contrived and would be considered insane (or confused) by local standards. Corporeal existence is something that that people with current human values are likely to consider a luxury in plausible transhuman circumstances.
Hm.
I can imagine a future in which the default mode of existence for most people is incorporeal (say, as uploads), and being downloaded into a physical body is a luxury. I can imagine a future in which the default mode of existence for most people lacks subjective experience (again, say, as uploads which mostly run “on autopilot,” somewhat like a trance state, perhaps because computing subjective experience is expensive relative to computing other behavior), and being run with subjective experience is a luxury. (I don’t presume p-zombiehood here; I expect there to be demonstrable differences between these states.)
Neither of those strike me as requiring insanity or confusion. Whether the corresponding scenarios are contrived or plausible I’m not prepared to argue; they don’t seem differentially one or the other to me, but I’ll accept other judgments. (If your grounds for believing them differentially contrived are articulable, I’m interested; you might convince me.)
Suffering and mortality, I’ll grant you, require me to essentially posit fashion, which can equally well (or poorly) justify anything.