Morality” centrally refers to a set of beliefs and practices only attested in humans,
...Morality does also apply to non-human organisms, for example close human relatives such as chimpanzees and why not alien life on other planets or future successors to humans?
A) centrally=/= only.
B) You are blurring the distinction between moral agents and moral patients.
Ethical fitnessism is not founded on the behaviour of non-human organisms.
So why did you bring in the example of the predator?
No, [muggers] probably value something that can be cashed out in fitness promoting terms, like continued survival, or enhanced attractiveness based on resources.
Exactly!Ethical fitnessism is more intuitive than any other established moral theory, since it is practiced more, not only by other animals, but by humans to, not only in prehistoric times, but in modern times as well.
Well, you can certain get a more widely practiced morality out of defining mugging as moral...but the cost is defining mugging as moral
All contractarianism is necessarily based on self-interest.
For some value of self interest. Switching from a near mode, low time preference notion of morality, to a far mode, high time preference form of self interest is a step forward in morality.
Traditional contractarianism is based on the self-interest of living humans. That is why it is criticised for disregarding future human generations
I don’t see that. Concern for future generations is a widespread value, so it is bound to be written into contracts.
and even other animals.
Fitnessist contractarianism is based on the Darwinian self-interest, which is the intrinsic value of ethical fitnessism. Therefore it does not disregard future generations.
And other animals?
Of course the practice of ethics has a function! But ethics per se does not.
So why did you bring in the example of the predator?
The example of the predator and the quarry illustrates the nature and origin of self-interest and of conflict between incompatible moral values. Above all, it illustrates the indexicality of ethics.
Well, you can [certainly] get a more widely practiced morality out of defining mugging as moral...but the cost is defining mugging as moral
We are certainly not defining mugging as moral. The idea is not to make your morals as practised as possible, but to make morals realistic, adapted and possible to practice. Ethical fitnessism is well practiced and gives guidance in all situations. Hedonistic utilitarianism, for instance, suffers greatly from being practically impossible to practice.
And other animals?
Since humans share behavioural genes with other animals they are also taken into consideration in fitnessist contractarianism, unlike the case in traditional contractarianism.
The issue of “ethics per se” is by no means especially complicated nor unimportant. There flourishes a common misunderstanding that the function of ethics is to make people behave better, that ethics serves a purpose. On the contrary, the case is that ethics gives you the meaning of ‘better’. Ethics gives the purpose. When you have worked out what the purpose is, and what better means, you can work out how you want people to behave. This distinction is crucial because many people never seem to have actually understood the normative ethical problem. How ought I to behave? How ought I to behave when I am all alone? How ought I to behave if I so am the last human alive? Not “What may I do?”, but what ought I to do? Instead they think that ethics only is concerned with which rules society should enforce and which moral indoctrination people should be subjected to. This reconnects to Sam Harris and his Moral Landscape Challenge. Harris does not see the intrinsic, only the instrumental. But please, everything is not the decision method; the rightness criterion is also to be considered. In this discussion thread contributors seem to take ethics in itself for granted and to be focused on the social and universalizable function of ethics. But please, hold your horses! How did we just get passed the first and central problem? Not only Sam Harris writes as if ethics per se is to be neglected and by-passed.
The example of the predator and the quarry illustrates the nature and origin of self-interest and of conflict between incompatible moral values. Above all, it illustrates the indexicality of ethics
The indexicality of ethics isnt an ucontentious fact: rather, its a contentious implication of fitnessism, which is itself contentious. Indeed, some would reject fitnessism over the indexicality issue.
We are certainly not defining mugging as moral.
Although it is fitness-enhancing enough...
The idea is not to make your morals as practised as possible, but to make morals realistic, adapted and possible to practice. Ethical fitnessism is well practiced and gives guidance
.....but how does it guide, if you can refuse to accept fitness-enhancing acts as moral?
There flourishes a common misunderstanding that the function of ethics is to make people behave better, that ethics serves a purpose. On the contrary, the case is that ethics gives you the meaning of ‘better’.
Is “better” a vacuum needing to be filled? I can defined better in the most obvious way, in terms of preferences, and the purpose of ethics in terms of maximising preferences.
A) centrally=/= only.
B) You are blurring the distinction between moral agents and moral patients.
So why did you bring in the example of the predator?
Well, you can certain get a more widely practiced morality out of defining mugging as moral...but the cost is defining mugging as moral
For some value of self interest. Switching from a near mode, low time preference notion of morality, to a far mode, high time preference form of self interest is a step forward in morality.
I don’t see that. Concern for future generations is a widespread value, so it is bound to be written into contracts.
And other animals?
I don’t see what you mean by ethics per se,
The example of the predator and the quarry illustrates the nature and origin of self-interest and of conflict between incompatible moral values. Above all, it illustrates the indexicality of ethics.
We are certainly not defining mugging as moral. The idea is not to make your morals as practised as possible, but to make morals realistic, adapted and possible to practice. Ethical fitnessism is well practiced and gives guidance in all situations. Hedonistic utilitarianism, for instance, suffers greatly from being practically impossible to practice.
Since humans share behavioural genes with other animals they are also taken into consideration in fitnessist contractarianism, unlike the case in traditional contractarianism.
The issue of “ethics per se” is by no means especially complicated nor unimportant. There flourishes a common misunderstanding that the function of ethics is to make people behave better, that ethics serves a purpose. On the contrary, the case is that ethics gives you the meaning of ‘better’. Ethics gives the purpose. When you have worked out what the purpose is, and what better means, you can work out how you want people to behave. This distinction is crucial because many people never seem to have actually understood the normative ethical problem. How ought I to behave? How ought I to behave when I am all alone? How ought I to behave if I so am the last human alive? Not “What may I do?”, but what ought I to do? Instead they think that ethics only is concerned with which rules society should enforce and which moral indoctrination people should be subjected to. This reconnects to Sam Harris and his Moral Landscape Challenge. Harris does not see the intrinsic, only the instrumental. But please, everything is not the decision method; the rightness criterion is also to be considered. In this discussion thread contributors seem to take ethics in itself for granted and to be focused on the social and universalizable function of ethics. But please, hold your horses! How did we just get passed the first and central problem? Not only Sam Harris writes as if ethics per se is to be neglected and by-passed.
The indexicality of ethics isnt an ucontentious fact: rather, its a contentious implication of fitnessism, which is itself contentious. Indeed, some would reject fitnessism over the indexicality issue.
Although it is fitness-enhancing enough...
.....but how does it guide, if you can refuse to accept fitness-enhancing acts as moral?
Is “better” a vacuum needing to be filled? I can defined better in the most obvious way, in terms of preferences, and the purpose of ethics in terms of maximising preferences.