I expect that’s correct, but I’m not sure your justification for it is correct. In particular it seems obviously possible for the following things all to be true:
A thinks her group is better than others.
A’s thinking this is obvious enough for B to be able to discern it with some confidence.
A never explicitly says that her group is better than others.
and I think people who say (e.g.) that atheists think they’re smarter than everyone else would claim that that’s what’s happening.
I repeat, I agree that these accusations are usually pretty strawy, but it’s a slightly more complicated variety of straw than simply claiming that people have said things they haven’t. More specifically, I think the usual situation is something like this:
A really does think that, to some extent and in some respects, her group is better than others.
But so does everyone else.
B imagines that he’s discerned unusual or unreasonable opinions of this sort in A.
But really he hasn’t; at most he’s picked up on something that he could find anywhere if he chose to look.
[EDITED to add, for clarity:] By “But so does everyone else” I meant that (almost!) everyone thinks that (many of) the groups they belong to are (to some extent and in some respects) better than others. Most of us mostly wouldn’t say so; most of us would mostly agree that these differences are statistical only and that there are respects in which are groups are worse too; but, still, on the whole if a person chooses to belong to some group (e.g., Christians or libertarians or effective altruists or whatever) that’s partly because they think that group gets right (or at least more right) some things that other groups get wrong (or at least less right).
I do imagine that the first situation is more common, in general, than the second.
This is entirely because of the point:
But so does everyone else.
A group that everyone considers better than others must be a single group, and probably very small; this requirement therefore limits your second scenario to a very small pool of people, while I imagine that your first scenario is very common.
Sorry, I wasn’t clear enough. By “so does everyone else” I meant “everyone else considers the groups they belong to to be better, to some extent and in some respects, better than others”.
Ah, that clarification certainly changes your post for the better. Thanks. In light of it, I do agree that the second scenario is common; but looking closely at it, I’m not sure that it’s actually different to the first scenario. In both cases, A thinks her group is better; in both cases, B discerns that fact and calls excessive attention to it.
but, still, on the whole if a person chooses to belong to some group (e.g., Christians or libertarians or effective altruists or whatever) that’s partly because they think that group gets right (or at least more right) some things that other groups get wrong (or at least less right).
Well, if I belong to the group of chocolate ice cream eaters, I do think that eating chocolate ice cream is better than eating vanilla ice cream—by my standards; it doesn’t follow that I also believe it’s better by your standards or by objective standards (whatever they might be) and feel smug about it.
Sure. Some things are near-universally understood to be subjective and personal. Preference in ice cream is one of them. Many others are less so, though; moral values, for instance. Some even less; opinions about apparently-factual matters such as whether there are any gods, for instance.
(Even food preferences—a thing so notoriously subjective that the very word “taste” is used in other contexts to indicate something subjective and personal—can in fact give people that same sort of sense of superiority. I think mostly for reasons tied up with social status.)
I expect that’s correct, but I’m not sure your justification for it is correct. In particular it seems obviously possible for the following things all to be true:
A thinks her group is better than others.
A’s thinking this is obvious enough for B to be able to discern it with some confidence.
A never explicitly says that her group is better than others.
and I think people who say (e.g.) that atheists think they’re smarter than everyone else would claim that that’s what’s happening.
I repeat, I agree that these accusations are usually pretty strawy, but it’s a slightly more complicated variety of straw than simply claiming that people have said things they haven’t. More specifically, I think the usual situation is something like this:
A really does think that, to some extent and in some respects, her group is better than others.
But so does everyone else.
B imagines that he’s discerned unusual or unreasonable opinions of this sort in A.
But really he hasn’t; at most he’s picked up on something that he could find anywhere if he chose to look.
[EDITED to add, for clarity:] By “But so does everyone else” I meant that (almost!) everyone thinks that (many of) the groups they belong to are (to some extent and in some respects) better than others. Most of us mostly wouldn’t say so; most of us would mostly agree that these differences are statistical only and that there are respects in which are groups are worse too; but, still, on the whole if a person chooses to belong to some group (e.g., Christians or libertarians or effective altruists or whatever) that’s partly because they think that group gets right (or at least more right) some things that other groups get wrong (or at least less right).
I do imagine that the first situation is more common, in general, than the second.
This is entirely because of the point:
But so does everyone else.
A group that everyone considers better than others must be a single group, and probably very small; this requirement therefore limits your second scenario to a very small pool of people, while I imagine that your first scenario is very common.
Sorry, I wasn’t clear enough. By “so does everyone else” I meant “everyone else considers the groups they belong to to be better, to some extent and in some respects, better than others”.
Ah, that clarification certainly changes your post for the better. Thanks. In light of it, I do agree that the second scenario is common; but looking closely at it, I’m not sure that it’s actually different to the first scenario. In both cases, A thinks her group is better; in both cases, B discerns that fact and calls excessive attention to it.
Well, if I belong to the group of chocolate ice cream eaters, I do think that eating chocolate ice cream is better than eating vanilla ice cream—by my standards; it doesn’t follow that I also believe it’s better by your standards or by objective standards (whatever they might be) and feel smug about it.
Sure. Some things are near-universally understood to be subjective and personal. Preference in ice cream is one of them. Many others are less so, though; moral values, for instance. Some even less; opinions about apparently-factual matters such as whether there are any gods, for instance.
(Even food preferences—a thing so notoriously subjective that the very word “taste” is used in other contexts to indicate something subjective and personal—can in fact give people that same sort of sense of superiority. I think mostly for reasons tied up with social status.)