What I’m saying is that when you say the word “ought”, you mean something. Even if you can’t quite articulate it, you have some sort of standard for saying “you ought do this, you ought not do that” that is basically the definition of ought.
I’d object to this simplification of the meaning of the word (I’d argue that ‘ought’ means lots of different things in different contexts, most of which aren’t only reducible to categorically imperative moral claims), but I suppose it’s not really relevant here.
I’m pretty sure we agree and are just playing with the words differently.
There are certain things one ought to do—and by ‘ought’ I mean you will be motivated to do those things, provided you already agree that they are among the ‘things one ought to do’
and
There is no non-circular answer to the question “Why should I be moral?”, so the moral realists’ project is sunk
seem to amount to about the same thing from where I sit. But it’s a bit misleading to phrase your admission that moral realism fails (and it does, just as paperclip realism fails) as an affirmation that “there are things one ought to do”.
The fact that some other creature might instead want to know the answer to the question “what is 6*7?” (which also has an objectively true answer) is irrelevant.
How does that make “what is 2+3?” less real?
Similarly, how does the fact that some other beings might care about something other than morality make questions of the form “what is moral? what should I do?” non objective?
It’s nothing to do with agreement. When you ask “ought I do this?”, well… to the extent that you’re not speaking empty words, you’re asking SOME specific question.
There is some criteria by which “oughtness” can be judged… that is, the defining criteria. It may be hard for you to articulate, it may only be implicitly encoded in your brain, but to the extent that word is a label for some concept, it means something.
I do not think you’d argue too much against this.
I make an additional claim: That that which we commonly refer to in these contexts by words like “Should”, “ought” and so on is the same thing we’re referring to when we say stuff like “morality”.
To me “what should I do?” and “what is the moral thing to do?” are basically the same question, pretty much.
“Ought I be moral?” thus would translate to “ought I be the sort of person that does what I ought to do?”
I think the answer to that is yes.
There may be beings that agree with that completely but take the view of “but we simply don’t care about whether or not we ought to do something. It is not that we disagree with your claims about whether one ought to be moral. We agree we ought to be moral. We simply place no value in doing what one ‘ought’ to do. Instead we value certain other things.” But screw them… I mean, they don’t do what they ought to do!
“what is 2+3?” has an objectively true answer. The fact that some other creature might instead want to know the answer to the question “what is 6*7?” (which also has an objectively true answer) is irrelevant.
I’d object to this simplification of the meaning of the word (I’d argue that ‘ought’ means lots of different things in different contexts, most of which aren’t only reducible to categorically imperative moral claims), but I suppose it’s not really relevant here.
I’m pretty sure we agree and are just playing with the words differently.
and
seem to amount to about the same thing from where I sit. But it’s a bit misleading to phrase your admission that moral realism fails (and it does, just as paperclip realism fails) as an affirmation that “there are things one ought to do”.
What’s failing?
“what is 2+3?” has an objectively true answer.
The fact that some other creature might instead want to know the answer to the question “what is 6*7?” (which also has an objectively true answer) is irrelevant.
How does that make “what is 2+3?” less real?
Similarly, how does the fact that some other beings might care about something other than morality make questions of the form “what is moral? what should I do?” non objective?
It’s nothing to do with agreement. When you ask “ought I do this?”, well… to the extent that you’re not speaking empty words, you’re asking SOME specific question.
There is some criteria by which “oughtness” can be judged… that is, the defining criteria. It may be hard for you to articulate, it may only be implicitly encoded in your brain, but to the extent that word is a label for some concept, it means something.
I do not think you’d argue too much against this.
I make an additional claim: That that which we commonly refer to in these contexts by words like “Should”, “ought” and so on is the same thing we’re referring to when we say stuff like “morality”.
To me “what should I do?” and “what is the moral thing to do?” are basically the same question, pretty much.
“Ought I be moral?” thus would translate to “ought I be the sort of person that does what I ought to do?”
I think the answer to that is yes.
There may be beings that agree with that completely but take the view of “but we simply don’t care about whether or not we ought to do something. It is not that we disagree with your claims about whether one ought to be moral. We agree we ought to be moral. We simply place no value in doing what one ‘ought’ to do. Instead we value certain other things.” But screw them… I mean, they don’t do what they ought to do!
(EDIT: minor changes to last paragraph.)
I just want to know, what is six by nine?
“nobody writes jokes in base 13” :)