In one sense, this is trivial. I have to take you into account when I do something to you, just like I have to take rocks into account when I do something to them. You’re part of a state of the world. (It may be the case that after taking rocks into account, it doesn’t affect my decision in any way. But my decision can still be formulated as taking rocks into account.)
In another sense, whether I should take your well-being into account depends on my values. If I’m Clippy, then I shouldn’t. If I’m me, then I should.
Otherwise you are using morality to mean hedonism.
Hedonism makes action-guiding claims about what you should do, so it’s a form of morality, but it doesn’t by itself mean that I shouldn’t take you into account—it only means that I should take your well-being into account instrumentally, to the degree it gives me pleasure. Also, the fulfillment of one’s values is not synonymous with hedonism. A being incapable of experiencing pleasure, such as some form of Clippy, has values but acting to fulfill them would not be hedonism.
Whether or not or you morally-should take me into account does not depend on your values, it depends on what the correct theory of morality is. “Should” is not an unambiguous term with a free variable for ” to whom”. It is an ambiguous term, and morally-should is not hedonistically-should, is not practically-should....etc.
If the correct theory of morality is that morally-should is the same as practically-should, then “whether or not you morally-should take me into account does not depend on your values” is false.
What you morally should do to me has to take me into account, and vice versa. Otherwise you are using morality to mean hedonism.
In one sense, this is trivial. I have to take you into account when I do something to you, just like I have to take rocks into account when I do something to them. You’re part of a state of the world. (It may be the case that after taking rocks into account, it doesn’t affect my decision in any way. But my decision can still be formulated as taking rocks into account.)
In another sense, whether I should take your well-being into account depends on my values. If I’m Clippy, then I shouldn’t. If I’m me, then I should.
Hedonism makes action-guiding claims about what you should do, so it’s a form of morality, but it doesn’t by itself mean that I shouldn’t take you into account—it only means that I should take your well-being into account instrumentally, to the degree it gives me pleasure. Also, the fulfillment of one’s values is not synonymous with hedonism. A being incapable of experiencing pleasure, such as some form of Clippy, has values but acting to fulfill them would not be hedonism.
Whether or not or you morally-should take me into account does not depend on your values, it depends on what the correct theory of morality is. “Should” is not an unambiguous term with a free variable for ” to whom”. It is an ambiguous term, and morally-should is not hedonistically-should, is not practically-should....etc.
Unless the correct theory of morality is that morally-should is the same thing as practically-should, in which case it would depend on your values.
A sentence beginning “unless the correct theory is” does not refute a sentence including ” depends on what the correct theory ”....
If the correct theory of morality is that morally-should is the same as practically-should, then “whether or not you morally-should take me into account does not depend on your values” is false.
Whether or not morality depends on your values depends on what the correct theory of morality is.