The first question—there’s no reason in the QM sequence to suspect that simulated humans would not be able to think or act rationally. The phenomenon of rationality is well-screened from the implementation layer of the universe.
Sim-EY would be correct about that implementation layer of his universe that screens off all the lower levels. That is, his statements about the universe are true of the simulation, which, as far as he can tell, is all there is. His words have valid referents. And indeed, MWI would be correct in that domain.
That there is another implementation layer out there that isn’t quantum… eh so? We’re perfectly screened from it, so that’s not what we’re talking about.
there’s no reason in the QM sequence to suspect that simulated humans would not be able to think or act rationally. The phenomenon of rationality is well-screened from the implementation layer of the universe.
My point exactly, QM (and hence the QM sequence) is not needed for rationality training.
Sim-EY would be correct about that implementation layer of his universe that screens off all the lower levels. That is, his statements about the universe are true of the simulation, which, as far as he can tell, is all there is. His words have valid referents. And indeed, MWI would be correct in that domain.
You lost me with the last statement. MWI would be correct in what domain? The simulated one? Hardly, it’s all classical and digital.
My point exactly, QM (and hence the QM sequence) is not needed for rationality training.
Total non-sequitur. The QM sequence was a case study. You don’t need to understand QM to be rational, but to get where he was going, he needed to use something as an example.
MWI would be correct in what domain? The simulated one? Hardly, it’s all classical and digital.
The implementation of the simulation is classical digital. The simulated world is quantum, just like you said.
In two simulations I ran once, the ‘world’, such as it was, was an FCC lattice each containing one of 2 kinds of atom, or vacuum, and the dynamics were ruled by a Monte Carlo algorithm.
It had two separate implementations, with very different MC engines. One was in Fortran77 and used the Metropolis algorithm; another was in C++ and used the Bortz-Kalos-Lebowitz MC algorithm. Both of these had effects on how dynamics progressed. They would be detectable by examination of the state of the world.
But which computer I chose to run it on would not. I put it on a Solaris machine; I put it on a Linux machine. the results were bitwise identical.
If you scale this notion up into the point that it could contain agents, and let these two swap save-files every so often, an agent inside could in principle tell which program was running at that time. But no agent could tell whether I’d changed from a Solaris box to a Linux box. So, the Metropolis vs BKL distinction is an element of their physics. The Solaris vs Linux distinction is not.
Accordingly, if we’re in a simulation, and the simulation is pure quantum, but it’s implemented in classical computers, it’s not wrong to say MWI is correct. The referent is the implementation of quantum mechanics in those classical computers.
Accordingly, if we’re in a simulation, and the simulation is pure quantum, but it’s implemented in classical computers, it’s not wrong to say MWI is correct.
OK, I think I understand and mostly agree. Though I would make a weaker, interpretation-agnostic statement: “it’s not wrong to say QM is correct”. I don’t think that it invalidates my original point, however, that it is likely possible to simulate human-like agents discussing rationality using, say, Newtonian physics, and such agents will have no need for QM.
Again, my (and others’) long-standing point has been that the QM sequence as a case study is not a good one. Given that the same rationality-related arguments can likely be made in a world without QM, and that the MWI discussion sparks too much controversy that detracts from the point (whatever it might be), it stands to reason that a different case study would serve this goal better (it can hardly be worse).
If the case-study pertained to banana custard stands, certainly rationality-related arguments would be devisable in a world without banana custard stands.
That aside—MWI being controversial is a fair point, which is why I didn’t have anything to say about it in the post with the simulation analogy. I suppose I should have explicitly acknowledged that then, so you would not feel the need to raise it again. Sorry about that.
The first question—there’s no reason in the QM sequence to suspect that simulated humans would not be able to think or act rationally. The phenomenon of rationality is well-screened from the implementation layer of the universe.
Sim-EY would be correct about that implementation layer of his universe that screens off all the lower levels. That is, his statements about the universe are true of the simulation, which, as far as he can tell, is all there is. His words have valid referents. And indeed, MWI would be correct in that domain.
That there is another implementation layer out there that isn’t quantum… eh so? We’re perfectly screened from it, so that’s not what we’re talking about.
My point exactly, QM (and hence the QM sequence) is not needed for rationality training.
You lost me with the last statement. MWI would be correct in what domain? The simulated one? Hardly, it’s all classical and digital.
Total non-sequitur. The QM sequence was a case study. You don’t need to understand QM to be rational, but to get where he was going, he needed to use something as an example.
The implementation of the simulation is classical digital. The simulated world is quantum, just like you said.
Ah, I see. Yes, it was a case study, just not a good one, given the controversy that distracts from the point. There are better examples.
I don’t follow. What’s the difference between the implementation and the simulated world?
In two simulations I ran once, the ‘world’, such as it was, was an FCC lattice each containing one of 2 kinds of atom, or vacuum, and the dynamics were ruled by a Monte Carlo algorithm.
It had two separate implementations, with very different MC engines. One was in Fortran77 and used the Metropolis algorithm; another was in C++ and used the Bortz-Kalos-Lebowitz MC algorithm. Both of these had effects on how dynamics progressed. They would be detectable by examination of the state of the world.
But which computer I chose to run it on would not. I put it on a Solaris machine; I put it on a Linux machine. the results were bitwise identical.
If you scale this notion up into the point that it could contain agents, and let these two swap save-files every so often, an agent inside could in principle tell which program was running at that time. But no agent could tell whether I’d changed from a Solaris box to a Linux box. So, the Metropolis vs BKL distinction is an element of their physics. The Solaris vs Linux distinction is not.
Accordingly, if we’re in a simulation, and the simulation is pure quantum, but it’s implemented in classical computers, it’s not wrong to say MWI is correct. The referent is the implementation of quantum mechanics in those classical computers.
OK, I think I understand and mostly agree. Though I would make a weaker, interpretation-agnostic statement: “it’s not wrong to say QM is correct”. I don’t think that it invalidates my original point, however, that it is likely possible to simulate human-like agents discussing rationality using, say, Newtonian physics, and such agents will have no need for QM.
Well, yes, but I don’t see how that has anything to do with the QM sequence.
Again, my (and others’) long-standing point has been that the QM sequence as a case study is not a good one. Given that the same rationality-related arguments can likely be made in a world without QM, and that the MWI discussion sparks too much controversy that detracts from the point (whatever it might be), it stands to reason that a different case study would serve this goal better (it can hardly be worse).
If the case-study pertained to banana custard stands, certainly rationality-related arguments would be devisable in a world without banana custard stands.
That aside—MWI being controversial is a fair point, which is why I didn’t have anything to say about it in the post with the simulation analogy. I suppose I should have explicitly acknowledged that then, so you would not feel the need to raise it again. Sorry about that.
BTW, I hope you are not the one who immediately downvotes almost all my QM-related posts.
I am not. I have a batch of −1 posts elsewhere on this page myself, and I trust you’re not behind them.
edit: oh come ON. How could this get upvoted? sheesh people. Maybe this could have been done in PM, but if it should have, then nail us both for it.
Just checked… No, not a single one is mine, though I did upvote a couple earler.