One option, to head off getting into commitmentraces with each other over splits, is to precommit to dividing the value pie according to your notion of fairness.
Umm, that doesn’t head off a commitment race, it just tries to win it. If the counterparty has pre-precommitted to some split you don’t like, all your precommittment does is to prevent a trade that would benefit you both.
All of these ideas have an unstated assumption of repeated games, where you can, over time, adjust the offers you get. If your counterparties don’t cooperate (they’re different each time, or have no memory, or are just better at modeling their trade partners than you are at modeling them, or otherwise are more powerful than you), you simply have a worse life than if you’d accepted the split.
Expand on that a bit—I think it’s more of a meta-DT model, and applies less to CDT (because CDT doesn’t even acknowledge the equilibrium) than other DTs that take a more expansive view of decision-contingent outcomes.
Umm, that doesn’t head off a commitment race, it just tries to win it. If the counterparty has pre-precommitted to some split you don’t like, all your precommittment does is to prevent a trade that would benefit you both.
All of these ideas have an unstated assumption of repeated games, where you can, over time, adjust the offers you get. If your counterparties don’t cooperate (they’re different each time, or have no memory, or are just better at modeling their trade partners than you are at modeling them, or otherwise are more powerful than you), you simply have a worse life than if you’d accepted the split.
That’s a very CDT model.
Expand on that a bit—I think it’s more of a meta-DT model, and applies less to CDT (because CDT doesn’t even acknowledge the equilibrium) than other DTs that take a more expansive view of decision-contingent outcomes.