Although of course there are scenarios where it applies, the assumption that information increases people’s perceived utility is unjustified in most normal social interactions.
I have several times had access to information that could dramatically change someone’s perception of a situation, and been told by others—including, in some cases, the person themselves—that it would be morally wrong to reveal the information to them.
I think their viewpoint is that although they might realize that their ultimate utility would be greater if they accepted disturbing information, they like to control when and how they confront that information. In most situations, people can obtain all the information they want without much effort, and if they don’t have information, it is usually by choice. Therefore, they feel violated when somebody imposes information on them that they have not sought out.
So, if somebody actively and clearly seeks specific information, I would feel just as bad for concealing as lying. However, if I don’t know that somebody wants information, I feel I must consider carefully whether I will—in their view—harm them by revealing it. It seems likely, to me, that our moral reflexes evolved in this sort of social information context rather than one where truth often had direct adaptive value.
Although of course there are scenarios where it applies, the assumption that information increases people’s perceived utility is unjustified in most normal social interactions.
I have several times had access to information that could dramatically change someone’s perception of a situation, and been told by others—including, in some cases, the person themselves—that it would be morally wrong to reveal the information to them.
I think their viewpoint is that although they might realize that their ultimate utility would be greater if they accepted disturbing information, they like to control when and how they confront that information. In most situations, people can obtain all the information they want without much effort, and if they don’t have information, it is usually by choice. Therefore, they feel violated when somebody imposes information on them that they have not sought out.
So, if somebody actively and clearly seeks specific information, I would feel just as bad for concealing as lying. However, if I don’t know that somebody wants information, I feel I must consider carefully whether I will—in their view—harm them by revealing it. It seems likely, to me, that our moral reflexes evolved in this sort of social information context rather than one where truth often had direct adaptive value.