Thanks for your nice comment. I re-read the post and the previous posts much more carefully got slightly better understanding: The discussion is about belief as group-identification (which is renamed to belief-as-attire by the second paragraph). I took “something you have in common with others, that allows identification with a group” as a description of the term but you have used that as a prediction that it makes about people with this property.
It also predicts that non-group-identifying improper beliefs, when professed, will not be as passionate as group-identifying ones.
That is probably enough to make it falsifiable, since we could construct experiments to measure that.
Furthermore, a “description of a category or class of reasons-people-believe-in-things,” as you put it, would qualify as a belief, “People believe in certain things for such-and-such reasons,”
In my understanding there is no explanatory power in this text: it’s not offering any explanation as to why people would hold a belief as attire rather than as cheering, anticipation-controlling or any of the other categories described. All we get is a description of or criteria for recognizing belief as attire.
In my understanding there is no explanatory power in this text: it’s not offering any explanation as to why people would hold a belief as attire rather than as cheering, anticipation-controlling or any of the other categories described. All we get is a description of or criteria for recognizing belief as attire.
This is by and large correct. The fact that people hold beliefs as attire does not say anything as to why they do so. What’s being explained is the question, “Why do people believe such-and-such things?” and the explanation is “to identify with their group.” “Why do people hold beliefs that connect them to their groups?” is a separate question, and the answer probably lies in evolutionary psychology.
Thanks for your nice comment. I re-read the post and the previous posts much more carefully got slightly better understanding: The discussion is about belief as group-identification (which is renamed to belief-as-attire by the second paragraph). I took “something you have in common with others, that allows identification with a group” as a description of the term but you have used that as a prediction that it makes about people with this property.
That is probably enough to make it falsifiable, since we could construct experiments to measure that.
In my understanding there is no explanatory power in this text: it’s not offering any explanation as to why people would hold a belief as attire rather than as cheering, anticipation-controlling or any of the other categories described. All we get is a description of or criteria for recognizing belief as attire.
This is by and large correct. The fact that people hold beliefs as attire does not say anything as to why they do so. What’s being explained is the question, “Why do people believe such-and-such things?” and the explanation is “to identify with their group.” “Why do people hold beliefs that connect them to their groups?” is a separate question, and the answer probably lies in evolutionary psychology.