I expect most people have some older relative or friend who they feel has added some wisdom to their life
Interesting, I expect this to not be the case...but my confidence in my expectation is weak.
If I offered you partial immortality—immortality for just part of you—how rough an approximation of “you” would you be willing to accept?
I think this question hides a pretty fundamental assumption. That assumption being whether or not we can talk coherently about “a rough approximation of ‘you’”.
If I’m missing 90% of my memories but with no hit on my IQ, I’d definitely accept that. But I’m not even sure the distinction between memories and IQ makes any sense. Would I accept coming back with 60IQ? Well, I don’t think most people with 60 IQ want to die, so yes.
I think the only thing I can say with certainty is that if the state I come back in feels like it has some continuity with the current me and this future state does not want to exist, then I do not want to come back in that state.
I’m not even sure how coherent it is to say that last bit. For example, if you are to ask me what my wishes are if I was to develop Alzheimer’s...I’m not positive that I have any claim over the disposition of this future being who shares some sort of continuity of physical existence with the me of now. To make claims about what should or should not be done to me at that point feels a little wrong. On the other hand, I am forced to make guesses at what future states of me would prefer the me of now to do so that I can make decisions about what to do now.
Is it possible to exist in a state where it’s impossible to make decisions about whether or not I want to exist in that state while at the same time it making any difference whether or not I exist in that state? A rock, as far as I know, cannot make such decisions, but then I don’t think it makes any difference if the rock exists or not. A worm doesn’t seem to be able to make any decisions in a manner that has any important weight to me, and I don’t think it makes any difference if it does or doesn’t exist. A me with an IQ of 60 seems like it can make decisions about whether or not it exists. When it comes to a state of me with no ability to decide whether or not I want to exist...I have no idea whether that me should or should not exist. I also have no idea if that state of me is coherent to call a state of me.
Anyway, I’m just typing out a stream of thoughts without any coherent philosophy backing them. Which isn’t to say that I haven’t attempted to tackle the question, I’m just not smart enough to come to a satisfying answer.
Interesting, I expect this to not be the case...but my confidence in my expectation is weak.
I think this question hides a pretty fundamental assumption. That assumption being whether or not we can talk coherently about “a rough approximation of ‘you’”.
If I’m missing 90% of my memories but with no hit on my IQ, I’d definitely accept that. But I’m not even sure the distinction between memories and IQ makes any sense. Would I accept coming back with 60IQ? Well, I don’t think most people with 60 IQ want to die, so yes.
I think the only thing I can say with certainty is that if the state I come back in feels like it has some continuity with the current me and this future state does not want to exist, then I do not want to come back in that state.
I’m not even sure how coherent it is to say that last bit. For example, if you are to ask me what my wishes are if I was to develop Alzheimer’s...I’m not positive that I have any claim over the disposition of this future being who shares some sort of continuity of physical existence with the me of now. To make claims about what should or should not be done to me at that point feels a little wrong. On the other hand, I am forced to make guesses at what future states of me would prefer the me of now to do so that I can make decisions about what to do now.
Is it possible to exist in a state where it’s impossible to make decisions about whether or not I want to exist in that state while at the same time it making any difference whether or not I exist in that state? A rock, as far as I know, cannot make such decisions, but then I don’t think it makes any difference if the rock exists or not. A worm doesn’t seem to be able to make any decisions in a manner that has any important weight to me, and I don’t think it makes any difference if it does or doesn’t exist. A me with an IQ of 60 seems like it can make decisions about whether or not it exists. When it comes to a state of me with no ability to decide whether or not I want to exist...I have no idea whether that me should or should not exist. I also have no idea if that state of me is coherent to call a state of me.
Anyway, I’m just typing out a stream of thoughts without any coherent philosophy backing them. Which isn’t to say that I haven’t attempted to tackle the question, I’m just not smart enough to come to a satisfying answer.