I think (on “philosophical” grounds) that quantum entanglement probably has a role in the brain, but if the microtubules are involved, I think it’s far more likely that each microtubule only contains one or a few logical qubits (stored as topological quantum information, entanglement that resists decoherence because it is wound around the cylinder, as in the Kitaev code).
Penrose is quite willing to say that a quantum computer accessing that natural noncomputable dynamics could have the same capabilities as the human brain.
Hmm, we’re still talking past each other. I’m saying I don’t believe any quantum weirdness is behaviorally relevant to the human brain or simulations thereof.
Just ordinary analog and digital computer chips, like in ordinary consumer electronics. Nothing special but the neural architecture and learning rules set up by the genome, and the mundane experience of life.
Right, and I disagree with the usual computational theory of mind (at least with respect to “consciousness” and “the self”), according to which the mind is a kind of virtual state machine whose microphysical details are irrelevant. There are sorites problems and binding problems which arise if you want to get consciousness and the self from physically coarse-grained states, which is why I look for explanations based in exact microphysical properties and irreducible complex entities instead.
I think (on “philosophical” grounds) that quantum entanglement probably has a role in the brain, but if the microtubules are involved, I think it’s far more likely that each microtubule only contains one or a few logical qubits (stored as topological quantum information, entanglement that resists decoherence because it is wound around the cylinder, as in the Kitaev code).
Hmm, we’re still talking past each other. I’m saying I don’t believe any quantum weirdness is behaviorally relevant to the human brain or simulations thereof. Just ordinary analog and digital computer chips, like in ordinary consumer electronics. Nothing special but the neural architecture and learning rules set up by the genome, and the mundane experience of life.
Right, and I disagree with the usual computational theory of mind (at least with respect to “consciousness” and “the self”), according to which the mind is a kind of virtual state machine whose microphysical details are irrelevant. There are sorites problems and binding problems which arise if you want to get consciousness and the self from physically coarse-grained states, which is why I look for explanations based in exact microphysical properties and irreducible complex entities instead.