It seems to me that there is some tension in the creed between (6), (9), and (11). On the one hand, we are supposed to affirm that “changes to one’s beliefs should generally also be probabilistic, rather than total”, but on the other hand, we are using belief/lack of belief as a litmus test for inclusion in the group.
(9) is a values thing, not a beliefs thing per se. (I.e. it’s not an epistemic claim.)
(11) is one of those claims that is probabilistic in principle (and which can be therefore be updated via evidence), but for which the evidence in practice is so one-sided that arriving at the correct answer is basically usable as a sort of FizzBuzz test for rationality: if you can’t get the right answer on super-easy mode, you’re probably not a good fit.
It seems to me that there is some tension in the creed between (6), (9), and (11). On the one hand, we are supposed to affirm that “changes to one’s beliefs should generally also be probabilistic, rather than total”, but on the other hand, we are using belief/lack of belief as a litmus test for inclusion in the group.
(9) is a values thing, not a beliefs thing per se. (I.e. it’s not an epistemic claim.)
(11) is one of those claims that is probabilistic in principle (and which can be therefore be updated via evidence), but for which the evidence in practice is so one-sided that arriving at the correct answer is basically usable as a sort of FizzBuzz test for rationality: if you can’t get the right answer on super-easy mode, you’re probably not a good fit.