I used to be a Popperian falsificationist. I changed my mind after reading about Solomonoff induction. I don’t remember exactly which post it was, but it made me accept that even if two theories cannot be differentiated by falsifiable predictions, we have good reason to prefer the simpler theory.
In Poppers wider Phil Of Sci it is perfectly possible to criticise a theory for being too complicated. The main
point is against justification, positive support, not in favour of falsification as the only possible epistemic procedure.
I used to be a Popperian falsificationist. I changed my mind after reading about Solomonoff induction. I don’t remember exactly which post it was, but it made me accept that even if two theories cannot be differentiated by falsifiable predictions, we have good reason to prefer the simpler theory.
In Poppers wider Phil Of Sci it is perfectly possible to criticise a theory for being too complicated. The main point is against justification, positive support, not in favour of falsification as the only possible epistemic procedure.
Interesting. I read all the same posts and they didn’t sway me much.