You are talking about what I would call a phenomenological, or “philosophical-in-the-hard-problem-sense” consciousness (“phenomenological” is also not quite right the word because psychology is also phenomenology, relative to neuroscience, but this is an aside).
“Psychological” consciousness (specifically, two kinds of it: affective/basal/core consciousness, and access consciousness) is not mysterious at all. These are just normal objects in neuropsychology.
Corresponding objects could also be found in AIs, and called “interpretable AI consciousness”.
“Psychological” and “interpretable” consciousness could be (maybe) generalised in some sort of “general consciousness in systems”. (Actually, Fields et al. already proposed such a theory, but their conception of general consciousness surely couldn’t serve as a basis of ethics.)
The proper theory of non-anthropocentric ethics, shall it be based in some way on consciousness (which I’m actually doubtful about; I will write a post about this soon), surely should use “psychological” and “interpretable” rather than “philosophical-in-the-hard-problem-sense” consciousness.
You are talking about what I would call a phenomenological, or “philosophical-in-the-hard-problem-sense” consciousness (“phenomenological” is also not quite right the word because psychology is also phenomenology, relative to neuroscience, but this is an aside).
“Psychological” consciousness (specifically, two kinds of it: affective/basal/core consciousness, and access consciousness) is not mysterious at all. These are just normal objects in neuropsychology.
Corresponding objects could also be found in AIs, and called “interpretable AI consciousness”.
“Psychological” and “interpretable” consciousness could be (maybe) generalised in some sort of “general consciousness in systems”. (Actually, Fields et al. already proposed such a theory, but their conception of general consciousness surely couldn’t serve as a basis of ethics.)
The proper theory of non-anthropocentric ethics, shall it be based in some way on consciousness (which I’m actually doubtful about; I will write a post about this soon), surely should use “psychological” and “interpretable” rather than “philosophical-in-the-hard-problem-sense” consciousness.