I think the examples used here are absolutely terrible, and I think they indicate a fundamental flaw underlying this theory. Basically, what you call “irrational” in this context, I’d call “rational but dishonest about its motives.”
The purpose of having US troops in an area is not to make the locals happier. I don’t see much of a reason military leadership should care about local opinion except insofar as it advances their actual objectives. This is true in both the sense that a mugger shouldn’t care about his target’s feelings, and a parent shouldn’t care exclusively about a child’s opinions. Which is the more apt analogy is immaterial; the argument here does not provide evidence that there is any major realization to make.
Similarly, as I realized talking to a US ambassador, food aid has relatively little to do with helping people. US food aid is basically the American government giving money to American food producers. Incidentally, food is shipped to third-world countries, where it may have a positive or negative effect. Yes, there may be other ways for agricultural producers to get money—but they pursue those. There isn’t much of a better way to get this particular money—unless you’ve got some articulable theory how ending such subsidies would help the agricultural industry. Remember, it also allows them to nip future competition in the bud by providing zero-cost products. This isn’t a case of failed rationality; it’s a case of perfectly functional rationality with a sinister motive.
I realize there is some risk of this being a perfectly general counterargument—there’s always some function for which a given action is rational—but its application here is precise. There are clear and obvious motives that are different from those analyzed, and those motives are being pursued relatively efficiently.
For the military, you assume that the purpose of troops is significantly related to doing what the locals want. If that were the case, there wouldn’t be too much sense in deploying troops in a foreign nation. Moreover, this example assumes that military action against US troops is the will of the general populace, without actually substantiating that theory. Basically, this isn’t an example of being mistaken. The response being used may be ineffective (and if that’s the limit of your point, I agree—it’s just rather confused by the surrounding statements), but the idea that the rational response somehow involves leaving—which I feel is heavily implied—is, from a game-theoretic perspective moronic.
I think the examples used here are absolutely terrible, and I think they indicate a fundamental flaw underlying this theory. Basically, what you call “irrational” in this context, I’d call “rational but dishonest about its motives.”
The purpose of having US troops in an area is not to make the locals happier. I don’t see much of a reason military leadership should care about local opinion except insofar as it advances their actual objectives. This is true in both the sense that a mugger shouldn’t care about his target’s feelings, and a parent shouldn’t care exclusively about a child’s opinions. Which is the more apt analogy is immaterial; the argument here does not provide evidence that there is any major realization to make.
Similarly, as I realized talking to a US ambassador, food aid has relatively little to do with helping people. US food aid is basically the American government giving money to American food producers. Incidentally, food is shipped to third-world countries, where it may have a positive or negative effect. Yes, there may be other ways for agricultural producers to get money—but they pursue those. There isn’t much of a better way to get this particular money—unless you’ve got some articulable theory how ending such subsidies would help the agricultural industry. Remember, it also allows them to nip future competition in the bud by providing zero-cost products. This isn’t a case of failed rationality; it’s a case of perfectly functional rationality with a sinister motive.
I realize there is some risk of this being a perfectly general counterargument—there’s always some function for which a given action is rational—but its application here is precise. There are clear and obvious motives that are different from those analyzed, and those motives are being pursued relatively efficiently.
For the military, you assume that the purpose of troops is significantly related to doing what the locals want. If that were the case, there wouldn’t be too much sense in deploying troops in a foreign nation. Moreover, this example assumes that military action against US troops is the will of the general populace, without actually substantiating that theory. Basically, this isn’t an example of being mistaken. The response being used may be ineffective (and if that’s the limit of your point, I agree—it’s just rather confused by the surrounding statements), but the idea that the rational response somehow involves leaving—which I feel is heavily implied—is, from a game-theoretic perspective moronic.