what would its probability of valuing any one specific thing like “unaugmented humans” end up being ?
Vanishingly small, obviously, if we posit that its pre-existing value system is effectively uncorrelated with its post-augment value system, which it might well be. Hence my earlier claim that I am unconvinced that a “sufficiently augmented” human would continue to value unaugmented humans. (You seem to expect me to disagree with this, which puzzles me greatly, since I just said the same thing myself; I suspect we’re simply not understanding one another.)
we could probably obtain some clues by surveying the incredibly smart—though merely human—geniuses that do exist in our current world, and extrapolating from there.
Sure, we could do that, which would give us an implicit notion of “vastly augmented intelligence” as something like naturally occurring geniuses (except on a much larger scale). I don’t think that’s terribly likely, but as I say, I’m happy to posit it for discussion if you like.
it’s unclear what value they would put on such data, if any. [...] I don’t think that my own, personal memories of my own, personal infancy would differ greatly from anyone else’s [...] IMO it is likely that an augmented mind might think the same way about ordinary humans. Once you’ve seen one human, you’ve seen them all, plus or minus some minor details...
I agree that it’s unclear.
To say that more precisely, an augmented mind would likely not value its own memories (relative to some roughly identical other memories), or any particular ordinary human, any more than an adult human values its own childhood blanket rather than some identical blanket, or values one particular and easily replaceable goldfish.
The thing is, some adult humans do value their childhood blankets, or one particular goldfish.
You seem to expect me to disagree with this, which puzzles me greatly, since I just said the same thing myself; I suspect we’re simply not understanding one another.
That’s correct; for some reason, I was thinking that you believed that a human’s preference for the well-being his (formerly) fellow humans is likely to persist after augmentation. Thus, I did misunderstand your position; my apologies.
The thing is, some adult humans do value their childhood blankets, or one particular goldfish.
I think that childhood blankets and goldfish are different from an infant’s memories, but perhaps this is a topic for another time...
Vanishingly small, obviously, if we posit that its pre-existing value system is effectively uncorrelated with its post-augment value system, which it might well be. Hence my earlier claim that I am unconvinced that a “sufficiently augmented” human would continue to value unaugmented humans. (You seem to expect me to disagree with this, which puzzles me greatly, since I just said the same thing myself; I suspect we’re simply not understanding one another.)
Sure, we could do that, which would give us an implicit notion of “vastly augmented intelligence” as something like naturally occurring geniuses (except on a much larger scale). I don’t think that’s terribly likely, but as I say, I’m happy to posit it for discussion if you like.
I agree that it’s unclear.
To say that more precisely, an augmented mind would likely not value its own memories (relative to some roughly identical other memories), or any particular ordinary human, any more than an adult human values its own childhood blanket rather than some identical blanket, or values one particular and easily replaceable goldfish.
The thing is, some adult humans do value their childhood blankets, or one particular goldfish.
And others don’t.
That’s correct; for some reason, I was thinking that you believed that a human’s preference for the well-being his (formerly) fellow humans is likely to persist after augmentation. Thus, I did misunderstand your position; my apologies.
I think that childhood blankets and goldfish are different from an infant’s memories, but perhaps this is a topic for another time...
I’m not quite sure what other time you have in mind, but I’m happy to drop the subject. If you want to pick it up some other time feel free.