Ah… I think I get it. You want to play with intuitions, and see which premises would have to be proved in order to >end up with monotheism via set theory.
I don’t think it would be possible to get around the point of defining God in terms of set theory.
Well now, here’s a devious approach, which would probably appeal to me if I ever needed to make a career as a philosopher of religion.
Let’s suppose a theist wants to “prove” that God—by his favourite definition—exists. For instance he could define a type G, whereby an entity g is of type G if and only if g is omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good and so on, and has all those characteristics essentially and necessarily. Something like that. Then the theist finds a set of premises P, with some intuitive support, such that P ⇒ There is an uncaused cause.
And then he adds one other premise “Every entity that is not of type G has a cause” into the recipe to form a new set P’. He cranks the handle, and then P’ ⇒ There is an entity of type G. Job done!
Just in case someone accuses him of “begging the question” or “assuming what he set out to prove” he then pulls out the modal trick. He just claims that it is possible that P’ is true. This leads to the conclusion that “It is possible that there is an entity of type G”. And then, remembering he’s defined G so it includes necessary existence (if such a being is possible at all, it must exist), he can still conclude
“There is a being of type G”. Job done even better!
The modal trick reminds me of Descarte’s approach… God is definitionally perfectly good, which implies existence (since something good that doesn’t exist isn’t as good as something good that does), therefore God exists.
Huh. That modal trick is devious. But it doesn’t work. I can assume an entity that does something easily measurable (e.g. gives Christmas present to children worldwide), and then slap on a necessary existence clause; but that doesn’t necessarily mean that I can expect Santa later this year.
I think the ‘necessary existence’ clause requires a better justification in orderto be Templeton-worthy.
Well now, here’s a devious approach, which would probably appeal to me if I ever needed to make a career as a philosopher of religion.
Let’s suppose a theist wants to “prove” that God—by his favourite definition—exists. For instance he could define a type G, whereby an entity g is of type G if and only if g is omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good and so on, and has all those characteristics essentially and necessarily. Something like that. Then the theist finds a set of premises P, with some intuitive support, such that P ⇒ There is an uncaused cause.
And then he adds one other premise “Every entity that is not of type G has a cause” into the recipe to form a new set P’. He cranks the handle, and then P’ ⇒ There is an entity of type G. Job done!
Just in case someone accuses him of “begging the question” or “assuming what he set out to prove” he then pulls out the modal trick. He just claims that it is possible that P’ is true. This leads to the conclusion that “It is possible that there is an entity of type G”. And then, remembering he’s defined G so it includes necessary existence (if such a being is possible at all, it must exist), he can still conclude “There is a being of type G”. Job done even better!
Can I have the Templeton Prize now please?
The modal trick reminds me of Descarte’s approach… God is definitionally perfectly good, which implies existence (since something good that doesn’t exist isn’t as good as something good that does), therefore God exists.
ZZZZzzzzzz....
A closer parallel is Plantinga’s “victorious ontological argument”.
That one was from the late 20th century, not the 17th. All rather sad really...
Huh. That modal trick is devious. But it doesn’t work. I can assume an entity that does something easily measurable (e.g. gives Christmas present to children worldwide), and then slap on a necessary existence clause; but that doesn’t necessarily mean that I can expect Santa later this year.
I think the ‘necessary existence’ clause requires a better justification in orderto be Templeton-worthy.