for all minds (at or under a trillion bits etc.), a generalization of the form m:X(m) has a one in two to the trillionth chance of being true for each mind.
That’s not what it says; compare the emphasis in both quotes.
If we restrict ourselves to minds specifiable in a trillion bits or less, then each universal generalization “All minds m: X(m)” has two to the trillionth chances to be false, while each existential generalization “Exists mind m: X(m)” has two to the trillionth chances to be true.
Sorry, I may have misunderstood and presumed that ‘two to the trillionth chances to be false’ meant ‘one in two to the trillionth chances to be true’. That may be wrong, but it doesn’t affect my argument at all: EY’s argument for the implausibility of m:A(m) is that claims of the form m:X(m) are all implausible. His argument to the effect that all claims of the form m:X(m) are implausible is itself a claim of the form m:X(m).
That’s not what it says; compare the emphasis in both quotes.
Sorry, I may have misunderstood and presumed that ‘two to the trillionth chances to be false’ meant ‘one in two to the trillionth chances to be true’. That may be wrong, but it doesn’t affect my argument at all: EY’s argument for the implausibility of m:A(m) is that claims of the form m:X(m) are all implausible. His argument to the effect that all claims of the form m:X(m) are implausible is itself a claim of the form m:X(m).