FWIW, my understanding of shminux’s account does not assert that “all we have are disconnected inputs,” as inputs might well be connected.
That said, it doesn’t seem to have anything to say about how inputs can be connected, or indeed about how inputs arise at all, or about what they are inputs into. I’m still trying to wrap my brain around that part.
ETA: oops. I see shminux already replied to this. But my reply is subtly different, so I choose to leave it up.
I don’t see how someone could admit that their inputs are connected in the sense of being caused by a common source that orders. them without implicitly admitting to a real external world.
But I acknowledge that saying inputs are connected in the sense that they reliably recur in particular patterns, and saying that inputs are connected in the sense of being caused by a common source that orders them, are two distinct claims, and one might accept that the former is true (based on observation) without necessarily accepting that the latter is true.
I don’t have a clear sense of what such a one might then say about how inputs come to reliably recur in particular patterns in the first place, but often when I lack a clear sense of how X might come to be in the absence of Y, it’s useful to ask “How, then, does X come to be?” rather than to insist that Y must be present.
One can of course only say that inputs have occurred in patterns up till now. Realists can explain why they would continue to do so on the basis of the Common Source meta-model, anti realists cannot.
At the risk of repeating myself: I agree that I don’t currently understand how an instrumentalist could conceivably explain how inputs come to reliably recur in particular patterns. You seem content to conclude thereby that they cannot explain such a thing, which may be true. I am not sufficiently confident in the significance of my lack of understanding to conclude that just yet.
FWIW, my understanding of shminux’s account does not assert that “all we have are disconnected inputs,” as inputs might well be connected.
That said, it doesn’t seem to have anything to say about how inputs can be connected, or indeed about how inputs arise at all, or about what they are inputs into. I’m still trying to wrap my brain around that part.
ETA: oops. I see shminux already replied to this. But my reply is subtly different, so I choose to leave it up.
I don’t see how someone could admit that their inputs are connected in the sense of being caused by a common source that orders. them without implicitly admitting to a real external world.
Nor do I.
But I acknowledge that saying inputs are connected in the sense that they reliably recur in particular patterns, and saying that inputs are connected in the sense of being caused by a common source that orders them, are two distinct claims, and one might accept that the former is true (based on observation) without necessarily accepting that the latter is true.
I don’t have a clear sense of what such a one might then say about how inputs come to reliably recur in particular patterns in the first place, but often when I lack a clear sense of how X might come to be in the absence of Y, it’s useful to ask “How, then, does X come to be?” rather than to insist that Y must be present.
One can of course only say that inputs have occurred in patterns up till now. Realists can explain why they would continue to do so on the basis of the Common Source meta-model, anti realists cannot.
At the risk of repeating myself: I agree that I don’t currently understand how an instrumentalist could conceivably explain how inputs come to reliably recur in particular patterns. You seem content to conclude thereby that they cannot explain such a thing, which may be true. I am not sufficiently confident in the significance of my lack of understanding to conclude that just yet.