Well, I am trying to get you to clarify what you mean.
You don’t have to worry about refining models predicting inputs you don’t care about.
But as I said, I don’t care about inputs, except instrumentally. I care about sentient minds (or paperclips.)
Usually we are lucky if there is one good model.
Ah … no. Invisible pink unicorns and Russel’s Teapots abound. For example, what if any object passing over the cosmological horizon disappeared? Or the universe was created last Thursday, but perfectly designed to appear billions of years old? These hypotheses don’t do any worse at predicting; they just violate Occam’s Razor.
Well, I am trying to get you to clarify what you mean.
Believe me, I have tried many times in our discussions over last several months. Unfortunately we seem to be speaking different languages which happen to use the same English syntax.
Invisible pink unicorns and Russel’s Teapots abound.
Fine, I’ll clarify. You can always complicate an existing model in a trivial way, which is what all your examples are doing. I was talking about models of which one is not a trivial extension of the other with no new predictive power. That’s just silly.
Fine, I’ll clarify. You can always complicate an existing model in a trivial way, which is what all your examples are doing. I was talking about models of which one is not a trivial extension of the other with no new predictive power. That’s just silly.
Well, considering how many people seem to think that interpretations of QM other than their own are just “trivial extensions with no new predictive power”, it’s an important point.
Believe me, I have tried many times in our discussions over last several months. Unfortunately we seem to be speaking different languages which happen to use the same English syntax.
Well, it’s pretty obvious we use different definitions of “existence”. Not sure if that qualifies as a different language, as such.
That said, you seem to be having serious trouble parsing my question, so maybe there are other differences too.
Look, you understand the concept of a paperclip maximizer, yes? How would a paperclip maximizer that used your criteria for existence act differently?
EDIT: incidentally, we haven’t been discussing this “over the last several months”. We’ve been discussing it since the fifth.
Well, considering how many people seem to think that interpretations of QM other than their own are just “trivial extensions with no new predictive power”, it’s an important point.
The interpretations are usually far from trivial and most aspire to provide an inspiration for building a testable model some day. Some even have, and been falsified. That’s quite different from last thursdayism.
How would a paperclip maximizer that used your criteria for existence act differently?
Why would it? A paperclip maximizer is already instrumental, it has one goal in mind, maximizing the number of paperclips in the universe (which it presumably can measure with some sensors). It may have to develop advanced scientific concepts, like General Relativity, to be assured that the paperclips disappearing behind the cosmological horizon can still be counted toward the total, given some mild assumptions, like the Copernican principle.
Anyway, I’m quite skeptical that we are getting anywhere in this discussion.
it has one goal in mind, maximizing the number of paperclips in the universe
In which universe? It doesn’t know. And it may have uncertainty with regards to true number. There’s going to be hypothetical universes that produce same observations but have ridiculously huge amounts of invisible paperclips at stake, which are influenced by paperclipper’s actions (it may even be that the simplest extra addition that makes agent’s actions influence invisible paperclips would utterly dominate all theories starting from some length, as it leaves most length for a busy beaver like construction that makes the amount of insivisible paperclips ridiculously huge. One extra bit for a busy beaver is seriously a lot more paperclips). So given some sort of length prior that ignores size of hypothetical universe (the kind that won’t discriminate against MWI just because its big), those aren’t assigned low enough prior, and dominate it’s expected utility calculations.
The interpretations are usually far from trivial and most aspire to provide an inspiration for building a testable model some day. Some even have, and been falsified. That’s quite different from last thursdayism.
Well, I probably don’t know enough about QM to judge if they’re correct; but it’s certainly a claim made fairly regularly.
Why would it? A paperclip maximizer is already instrumental, it has one goal in mind, maximizing the number of paperclips in the universe (which it presumably can measure with some sensors). It may have to develop advanced scientific concepts, like General Relativity, to be assured that the paperclips disappearing behind the cosmological horizon can still be counted toward the total, given some mild assumptions, like the Copernican principle.
Let’s say it simplifies the equations not to model the paperclips as paperclips—it might be sufficient to treat them as a homogeneous mass of metal, for example. Does this mean that they do not, in fact, exist? Should a paperclipper avoid this at all costs, because it’s equivalent to them disappearing?
Removing the territory/map distinction means something that wants to change the territory could end up changing the map … doesn’t it?
I’m wondering because I care about people, but it’s often simpler to model people without treating them as, well, sentient.
Anyway, I’m quite skeptical that we are getting anywhere in this discussion.
Well, I’ve been optimistic that I’d clarified myself pretty much every comment now, so I have to admit I’m updating downwards on that.
Well, I am trying to get you to clarify what you mean.
But as I said, I don’t care about inputs, except instrumentally. I care about sentient minds (or paperclips.)
Ah … no. Invisible pink unicorns and Russel’s Teapots abound. For example, what if any object passing over the cosmological horizon disappeared? Or the universe was created last Thursday, but perfectly designed to appear billions of years old? These hypotheses don’t do any worse at predicting; they just violate Occam’s Razor.
Believe me, I have tried many times in our discussions over last several months. Unfortunately we seem to be speaking different languages which happen to use the same English syntax.
Fine, I’ll clarify. You can always complicate an existing model in a trivial way, which is what all your examples are doing. I was talking about models of which one is not a trivial extension of the other with no new predictive power. That’s just silly.
Well, considering how many people seem to think that interpretations of QM other than their own are just “trivial extensions with no new predictive power”, it’s an important point.
Well, it’s pretty obvious we use different definitions of “existence”. Not sure if that qualifies as a different language, as such.
That said, you seem to be having serious trouble parsing my question, so maybe there are other differences too.
Look, you understand the concept of a paperclip maximizer, yes? How would a paperclip maximizer that used your criteria for existence act differently?
EDIT: incidentally, we haven’t been discussing this “over the last several months”. We’ve been discussing it since the fifth.
The interpretations are usually far from trivial and most aspire to provide an inspiration for building a testable model some day. Some even have, and been falsified. That’s quite different from last thursdayism.
Why would it? A paperclip maximizer is already instrumental, it has one goal in mind, maximizing the number of paperclips in the universe (which it presumably can measure with some sensors). It may have to develop advanced scientific concepts, like General Relativity, to be assured that the paperclips disappearing behind the cosmological horizon can still be counted toward the total, given some mild assumptions, like the Copernican principle.
Anyway, I’m quite skeptical that we are getting anywhere in this discussion.
In which universe? It doesn’t know. And it may have uncertainty with regards to true number. There’s going to be hypothetical universes that produce same observations but have ridiculously huge amounts of invisible paperclips at stake, which are influenced by paperclipper’s actions (it may even be that the simplest extra addition that makes agent’s actions influence invisible paperclips would utterly dominate all theories starting from some length, as it leaves most length for a busy beaver like construction that makes the amount of insivisible paperclips ridiculously huge. One extra bit for a busy beaver is seriously a lot more paperclips). So given some sort of length prior that ignores size of hypothetical universe (the kind that won’t discriminate against MWI just because its big), those aren’t assigned low enough prior, and dominate it’s expected utility calculations.
Well, I probably don’t know enough about QM to judge if they’re correct; but it’s certainly a claim made fairly regularly.
Let’s say it simplifies the equations not to model the paperclips as paperclips—it might be sufficient to treat them as a homogeneous mass of metal, for example. Does this mean that they do not, in fact, exist? Should a paperclipper avoid this at all costs, because it’s equivalent to them disappearing?
Removing the territory/map distinction means something that wants to change the territory could end up changing the map … doesn’t it?
I’m wondering because I care about people, but it’s often simpler to model people without treating them as, well, sentient.
Well, I’ve been optimistic that I’d clarified myself pretty much every comment now, so I have to admit I’m updating downwards on that.