Anyway, I suspect you mis-spoke here, and intended to say that moral realists claim that (certain) moral statements are true, rather than just that they have truth values (“false” is a truth value, after all).
Err, right, yes, that’s what I meant. Error theorists do of course also claim that moral statements have truth values.
Moral realists are usually defending a whole suite of theses—not just that some moral statements are true, but that they are true objectively and that certain sorts of agents are under some sort of obligation to adhere to them.
True enough, though I guess I’d prefer to talk about a single well-specified claim than a “usually” cluster in philosopher-space.
Err, right, yes, that’s what I meant. Error theorists do of course also claim that moral statements have truth values.
True enough, though I guess I’d prefer to talk about a single well-specified claim than a “usually” cluster in philosopher-space.