I assume that there is some line you would draw, be it at individual neurons, or cellular structures, or molecules, or individual atoms, beyond which you would say, “these types of things don’t make choices.” If so, how would you reply to the question: in what sense can a system built out of components that don’t make choices be said to make choices?
[grin] Cyan, I actually do believe that even subatomic particles, in some limited sense, can be said to make choices. I do agree with you that choice can’t arise out of choiceless components.
If you’re curious about what it might mean for an electron to make a choice, and you have a high tolerance for whimsy, I recommend the book Reenchantment without Supernaturalism. The philosophy isn’t very rigorous, and it’s rather out of date, but it’s the only one I know of that (a) takes physics seriously, (b) takes logic seriously, and (c) accounts for my intuition that I make choices without (d) dismissing that intuition as an illusion.
Quantum amplitudes evolve deterministically, and it’s generally held that quantum systems either decohere deterministically or collapse randomly. How does this permit subatomic particles to be said to make choices, even in a limited sense?
Is there a more easily accessible explanation of the argument in the book? (I’m not going to shell out for it.)
Not that I know of, although it might be in a good public library. Sorry about that; I know it’s unfair to ask you to look in an obscure book to get the basic drift of a contrarian argument; that sort of thing is rarely worth people’s time. If you happen to live near Boston, Miami, or San Francisco, which are places I’ll be over the next few months, then I’ll be happy to lend you my copy.
I don’t know nearly enough quantum physics to give you an intelligent answer to your question about amplitudes and systems in my own words. Again, sorry about that.
If you happen to live near Boston, Miami, or San Francisco...
Nope. Oh well, at least the exchange served to clarify that you really do consider choice ontologically fundamental, and not just a useful category for practical purposes.
I assume that there is some line you would draw, be it at individual neurons, or cellular structures, or molecules, or individual atoms, beyond which you would say, “these types of things don’t make choices.” If so, how would you reply to the question: in what sense can a system built out of components that don’t make choices be said to make choices?
[grin] Cyan, I actually do believe that even subatomic particles, in some limited sense, can be said to make choices. I do agree with you that choice can’t arise out of choiceless components.
If you’re curious about what it might mean for an electron to make a choice, and you have a high tolerance for whimsy, I recommend the book Reenchantment without Supernaturalism. The philosophy isn’t very rigorous, and it’s rather out of date, but it’s the only one I know of that (a) takes physics seriously, (b) takes logic seriously, and (c) accounts for my intuition that I make choices without (d) dismissing that intuition as an illusion.
Quantum amplitudes evolve deterministically, and it’s generally held that quantum systems either decohere deterministically or collapse randomly. How does this permit subatomic particles to be said to make choices, even in a limited sense?
Is there a more easily accessible explanation of the argument in the book? (I’m not going to shell out for it.)
Not that I know of, although it might be in a good public library. Sorry about that; I know it’s unfair to ask you to look in an obscure book to get the basic drift of a contrarian argument; that sort of thing is rarely worth people’s time. If you happen to live near Boston, Miami, or San Francisco, which are places I’ll be over the next few months, then I’ll be happy to lend you my copy.
I don’t know nearly enough quantum physics to give you an intelligent answer to your question about amplitudes and systems in my own words. Again, sorry about that.
Nope. Oh well, at least the exchange served to clarify that you really do consider choice ontologically fundamental, and not just a useful category for practical purposes.