if “Science” doubts the existence of free will then there is something wrong with Science not my clear perception of my free will (along with the clear perceptions of just about everyone alive and who has ever lived).”
Whatever the conclusion here, it will not be attained by ninja’ing “everybody’s perceptions” into natural law. Everybody perceives that heavy objects fall faster than light ones. Everybody perceives that squares A and B are different colours.
Do I need to recite the whole litany? We aren’t Aristotelians or apologists or something, we don’t get to do philosophy just by sitting back in our armchairs and imagining how the world “must” obviously be. You have to actually go and look at the world. Hence our “faith” in the lab.
Perhaps I should state it in a slightly different way. There is no reason for me or anyone else to doubt the clear perception we have of our own free will. Prove to me scientifically that it does not exist, that it is some kind of illusion that all human beings experience.
Perhaps I should state it in a slightly different way. There is no reason for me or anyone else to doubt the clear perception we have of our own free will. Prove to me scientifically that it does not exist, that it is some kind of illusion that all human beings experience.
Fair enough. I’m glad you agree it’s an empirical question.
Having got that concession from you, I’ll tell you I actually don’t agree with Chu-Carroll’s analysis. Of course everything is definition-dependent here, but in essence, I don’t think free will is an illusion. Rather, I think the opposition of determinism to free will is just mistaken. Determinism does not imply no free will. This position is called compatibilism.
What Chu-Carroll is saying is that free will is not some weird force outside physics that thaumaturgically makes an electron zig instead of zag, causing the miracle of choice. I agree up to there. So if that’s what you call free will, then it is an illusion. He then implies “there is no free will.” Indeed, not under that definition.
But that’s not what I call free will.
See Daniel Dennett’s “Elbow Room;” also search this site for “Free Will.” Eliezer has done some excellent writing on the subject.
Whatever the conclusion here, it will not be attained by ninja’ing “everybody’s perceptions” into natural law. Everybody perceives that heavy objects fall faster than light ones. Everybody perceives that squares A and B are different colours.
Do I need to recite the whole litany? We aren’t Aristotelians or apologists or something, we don’t get to do philosophy just by sitting back in our armchairs and imagining how the world “must” obviously be. You have to actually go and look at the world. Hence our “faith” in the lab.
Perhaps I should state it in a slightly different way. There is no reason for me or anyone else to doubt the clear perception we have of our own free will. Prove to me scientifically that it does not exist, that it is some kind of illusion that all human beings experience.
Fair enough. I’m glad you agree it’s an empirical question.
Having got that concession from you, I’ll tell you I actually don’t agree with Chu-Carroll’s analysis. Of course everything is definition-dependent here, but in essence, I don’t think free will is an illusion. Rather, I think the opposition of determinism to free will is just mistaken. Determinism does not imply no free will. This position is called compatibilism.
What Chu-Carroll is saying is that free will is not some weird force outside physics that thaumaturgically makes an electron zig instead of zag, causing the miracle of choice. I agree up to there. So if that’s what you call free will, then it is an illusion. He then implies “there is no free will.” Indeed, not under that definition.
But that’s not what I call free will.
See Daniel Dennett’s “Elbow Room;” also search this site for “Free Will.” Eliezer has done some excellent writing on the subject.