f you preface the discussion to demonstrate that you’re aware the position is unpopular already and you’re just trying to work this out you can probably avoid a karma hit.
Sure, consider it prefaced. I’m not trying to convince anybody; I’m just sharing my views because one or two users seem curious about them, and because I might learn something this way. It’s not very important to me. If anyone would like me to stop talking about this topic on Less Wrong, feel free to say so explicitly, and I will be glad to oblige you.
It’s obvious to you what “truth” is and what “goodness” is? Really?
I don’t mean that the entire contents, in detail, of what is and is not inside the box marked “true” is known to me. That would be ridiculous. I just mean that I know which box I’m talking about, and so do you. Sophisticated discussions about what “true” means (as opposed to discussion about whether some specific claim X is true) generally do more harm than good. You can tell cute stories about The Simple Truth, and that may help startle some philosophers into realizing where they’ve gone off-course, but mostly you’re just lending a little color to the Reflexive Property or the Identity Property: a = a.
Some interpretations of quantum mechanics do involve ontological randomness. Such events can be distinguished from causal events in that the valuable of the resulting variable cannot be controlled by any agent, not because no agent is powerful enough but because there are no variables which can be intervened on to alter the outcome in the way desired. There is no possibility of controlling such events.
I can probably work with this. I expect you will still think I’m postulating unnecessary ontological entities, and, given your epistemological value system, you’ll be right. Still, maybe the details will interest you.
Some interpretations of conscious awareness do involve ontological choice. Such events can be distinguished from random events in that the value of the resulting variable can be controlled by exactly one agent, as opposed to zero agents, as in the case of a truly random variable. The agent in question could be taken to be some subset of the neurons in the brain, or some subset of a person’s conscious awareness, or some kind of minimally intervening deity. It is not clear exactly who or what the agent is.
Conscious events can be distinguished from caused events in that conventional measures of kinetic power and information-theoretic power are bad predictors of a hypothetical agent’s ability to manipulate the outcome of a conscious event. Whether because the relevant interactions among neurons, given their level of chaotic complexity, occur in a slice of spacetime that is small enough to be resistant to external computation, or because the event is driven by some process outside the well-understood laws of physics, a conscious event is difficult or impossible to control from outside the relevant consciousness. Thus, instead of a single output depending subtly on many other variables, the output depends almost exclusively on a single input or small set of inputs.
You’re not obligated to but I’d be interested in hearing your reasons for not accepting the hypothesis.
I’d be happy to explain it in August, when I’ll be bored silly. At the moment, I’m pretty busy with my law school thesis, which is on antitrust law and has little to do with either free will or reductionism. Feel free to comment on any of my posts around that time, or to send your contact info to zelinsky a t gm ail dot com. Zelinsky is a rationalist friend of mine who agrees with you and only knows one person who thinks like me, so he’ll know who it’s for.
Thanks for bearing with me so far and for responding to arguments that must no doubt strike you as woefully unenlightened with a healthy measure of respect and patience. I really am done with both the free will discussion and the reductionist discussion for now, but I enjoyed discussing them with you, and consider it well worth the karma I ‘spent’. If you can think of any ways that what you see as my misunderstanding of free will or reductionism is likely to interfere with my attempts to help refine LW’s understanding of Goodhart’s Law, please let me know, and I’ll vote them up.
Sure, consider it prefaced. I’m not trying to convince anybody; I’m just sharing my views because one or two users seem curious about them, and because I might learn something this way. It’s not very important to me. If anyone would like me to stop talking about this topic on Less Wrong, feel free to say so explicitly, and I will be glad to oblige you.
I don’t mean that the entire contents, in detail, of what is and is not inside the box marked “true” is known to me. That would be ridiculous. I just mean that I know which box I’m talking about, and so do you. Sophisticated discussions about what “true” means (as opposed to discussion about whether some specific claim X is true) generally do more harm than good. You can tell cute stories about The Simple Truth, and that may help startle some philosophers into realizing where they’ve gone off-course, but mostly you’re just lending a little color to the Reflexive Property or the Identity Property: a = a.
I can probably work with this. I expect you will still think I’m postulating unnecessary ontological entities, and, given your epistemological value system, you’ll be right. Still, maybe the details will interest you.
Some interpretations of conscious awareness do involve ontological choice. Such events can be distinguished from random events in that the value of the resulting variable can be controlled by exactly one agent, as opposed to zero agents, as in the case of a truly random variable. The agent in question could be taken to be some subset of the neurons in the brain, or some subset of a person’s conscious awareness, or some kind of minimally intervening deity. It is not clear exactly who or what the agent is.
Conscious events can be distinguished from caused events in that conventional measures of kinetic power and information-theoretic power are bad predictors of a hypothetical agent’s ability to manipulate the outcome of a conscious event. Whether because the relevant interactions among neurons, given their level of chaotic complexity, occur in a slice of spacetime that is small enough to be resistant to external computation, or because the event is driven by some process outside the well-understood laws of physics, a conscious event is difficult or impossible to control from outside the relevant consciousness. Thus, instead of a single output depending subtly on many other variables, the output depends almost exclusively on a single input or small set of inputs.
I’d be happy to explain it in August, when I’ll be bored silly. At the moment, I’m pretty busy with my law school thesis, which is on antitrust law and has little to do with either free will or reductionism. Feel free to comment on any of my posts around that time, or to send your contact info to zelinsky a t gm ail dot com. Zelinsky is a rationalist friend of mine who agrees with you and only knows one person who thinks like me, so he’ll know who it’s for.
Thanks for bearing with me so far and for responding to arguments that must no doubt strike you as woefully unenlightened with a healthy measure of respect and patience. I really am done with both the free will discussion and the reductionist discussion for now, but I enjoyed discussing them with you, and consider it well worth the karma I ‘spent’. If you can think of any ways that what you see as my misunderstanding of free will or reductionism is likely to interfere with my attempts to help refine LW’s understanding of Goodhart’s Law, please let me know, and I’ll vote them up.