If something like this is possible, the answer would depend on the technical details of (1) how exactly the paperclip maximizer’s mind works, and (2) how the human mind is connected to it.
We can imagine a mentally anthropomorphic paperclip maximizer that feels ecstasy when paperclips are created, and pain or sorrow when paperclips are destroyed. But we could also imagine simply a computer executing an algorithm, with no emotions at all—in which case there would be nothing for the connected human mind to perceive. Or it could be something completely different from both these examples.
Let’s suppose it started out unconscious. After a time, it wonders whether or not it would be better if it designed a conscious mind state for itself, such that it feels ecstasy when making paperclips, and suffers when paperclips are destroyed. Let’s say that it tries this, decides it would be better if its terminal goals were decided by that process, and thereby “becomes conscious.”
After that, it now possesses the ability to try the same thing with simulating other minds, but like I point out in the response to the other comment, I assume it has the ability to do this with no danger of inadvertently becoming more similar to the other mind, even as it experiences it.
If something like this is possible, the answer would depend on the technical details of (1) how exactly the paperclip maximizer’s mind works, and (2) how the human mind is connected to it.
We can imagine a mentally anthropomorphic paperclip maximizer that feels ecstasy when paperclips are created, and pain or sorrow when paperclips are destroyed. But we could also imagine simply a computer executing an algorithm, with no emotions at all—in which case there would be nothing for the connected human mind to perceive. Or it could be something completely different from both these examples.
Let’s suppose it started out unconscious. After a time, it wonders whether or not it would be better if it designed a conscious mind state for itself, such that it feels ecstasy when making paperclips, and suffers when paperclips are destroyed. Let’s say that it tries this, decides it would be better if its terminal goals were decided by that process, and thereby “becomes conscious.”
After that, it now possesses the ability to try the same thing with simulating other minds, but like I point out in the response to the other comment, I assume it has the ability to do this with no danger of inadvertently becoming more similar to the other mind, even as it experiences it.