Do we disagree on questions of fact? On rereading this thread, I suspect not
I think so? You seem to have indicated in a few comments that you don’t believe nonhuman animals are “self-aware” or “conscious” which strikes me as an empirical statement?
If this is true (and I give at least 30% credence that I’ve just been misunderstanding you), I’d be interested to hear why you think this. We may not end up drawing the moral line at the same place, but I think consciousness is a slippery enough subject that I at least would learn something from the conversation.
Dolphins aside, we have no reason to believe that animals are capable of thinking about themselves; of considering their own conscious awareness; of having any self-concept, much less any concept of themselves as persistent conscious entities with a past and a future; of consciously reasoning about other minds, or having any concept thereof; or of engaging in abstract reasoning or thought of any kind.
I’ve commented before that one critical difference between “speciesism” and racism or sexism or other such prejudices is that a cow can never argue for its own equal treatment; this, I have said, is not a trivial or irrelevant fact. And it’s not just a matter of not having the vocal cords to speak, or of not knowing the language, or any other such trivial obstacles to communication; a cow can’t even come close to having the concepts required to understand human behavior, human concepts, and human language.
Now, you might not think any of this is morally relevant. Fine. But I would meet with great skepticism — and, sans compelling evidence, probable outright dismissal — any claim that a cow, or a pig, or, even more laughably, a chicken, is self-aware in anything like the sense I outlined above.
(By the way, I am reluctant to commit to any position on “consciousness”, merely because the word is used in such a diverse range of ways.)
Birds lack a neocortex. But members of at least one species, the European magpie, have convincingly passed the “mirror test” [cf. “Mirror-Induced Behavior in the Magpie (Pica pica): Evidence of Self-Recognition”
http://www.plosbiology.org/article/fetchObject.action?representation=PDF&uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pbio.0060202] Most ethologists recognise passing the mirror test as evidence of a self-concept. As well as higher primates (chimpanzees, orang utans, bonobos, gorillas) members of other species who have passed the mirror test include elephants, orcas and bottlenose dolphins. Humans generally fail the mirror test below the age of eighteen months.
Could you possibly say a bit more about why the mirror test is inadequate as a test of possession of a self-concept? Either way, making self-awareness a precondition of moral status has troubling implications. For example, consider what happens to verbally competent adults when feelings intense fear turn into uncontrollable panic. In states of “blind” panic, reflective self-awareness and the capacity for any kind of meta-cognition is lost. Panic disorder is extraordinarily unpleasant. Are we to make the claim that such panic-ridden states aren’t themselves important—only the memories of such states that a traumatised subject reports when s/he regains a measure of composure and some semblance of reflective self-awareness is restored? A pig, for example, or a prelinguistic human toddler, doesn’t have the meta-cognitive capacity to self-reflect on such states. But I don’t think we are ethically entitled to induce them—any more than we are ethically entitled to waterboard a normal adult human. I would hope posthuman superintelligence can engineer such states out of existence - in human and nonhuman animals alike.
Could you possibly say a bit more about why the mirror test is inadequate as a test of possession of a self-concept?
Surely it is a reach to say that the mirror test, alone, with all of its methodological difficulties, can all by itself raise our probability estimate of a creature’s possessing self-awareness to near-certainty? I agree that it’s evidence, but calling it a test is pushing it, to say the least. To see just one reason why I might say this, consider that we can, right now, probably program a robot to pass such a test; such a robot would not be self-aware.
As for the rest of your post, I’d like to take this opportunity to object to a common mistake/ploy in such discussions:
“This general ethical principle/heuristic leads to absurdity if applied with the literal-mindedness of a particularly dumb algorithm, therefore reductio ad absurdum.”
Your argument here seems to be something like: “Adult humans are sometimes not self-aware, but we still care about them, even during those times. Is self-awareness therefore irrelevant??” No, of course it’s not. It’s a complex issue. But a chicken is never self-aware, so the point is moot.
Also:
In states of “blind” panic, reflective self-awareness and the capacity for any kind of meta-cognition is lost.
Please provide a citation for this, and I will response, as my knowledge of this topic (cognitive capacity during states of extreme panic) is not up to giving a considered answer.
Panic disorder is extraordinarily unpleasant.
Having experienced a panic attack on one or two occasions, I am inclined to agree. However, I did not lose my self-concept at those times.
Finally:
But I don’t think we are ethically entitled to induce [panic states in pigs/toddlers] - any more than we are ethically entitled to waterboard a normal adult human.
“Ethically entitled” is not a very useful phrase to use in isolation; utilitarianism[1] can only tell us which of two or more world-states to prefer. I’ve said that I prefer that dogs not be tortured, all else being equal, so if by that you mean that we ought to prefer not to induce panic states in pigs, then sure, I agree. The question is what happens when all else is not equal — which it pretty much never is.
[1] You are speaking from a utilitarian position, yes? If not, then that changes things; “ethically entitled” means something quite different to a deontologist, naturally.
Your argument here seems to be something like: “Adult humans are sometimes not self-aware, but we still care about them, even during those times. Is self-awareness therefore irrelevant??” No, of course it’s not. It’s a complex issue. But a chicken is never self-aware, so the point is moot.
Um, “Why don’t we stop caring about people who temporarily lose this supposed be-all and end-all of moral value” seems like a valid question, albeit one you hopefully are introspective enough to have an answer for.
Is the question “why don’t we temporarily stop caring about people who temporarily lose this etc.”?
If so, then maybe we should, if they really lose it. However, please tell me what actions would ensue from, or be made permissible by, a temporary cessation of caring, provided that I still care about that person after they return from this temporary loss of importance.
That depends on the details of your personal moral system, doesn’t it? As I said already, you may well be consistent on this point, but you have not explained how.
In particular, think about it in the context of whether morality is objective or subjective, what makes subjective opinions morally acceptable, and what is the role of evidence in all this.
Specifically, do you think there’s any possible evidence that could lead to you and a mother attaching the same moral importance to her baby?
Is there any evidence that could lead to the mother assigning her baby the same value as I do? Couldn’t tell you. (I’ve never been a mother.)
Vice versa? Probably not.
After all, it’s possible that two agents are in possession of the same facts, the same true beliefs, and nonetheless have different preferences. So evidence doesn’t do very much for us, here.
In any case, your objection proves too much: after all, try telling a dog owner that his dog is not morally important. For extra laughs, try telling the owner of a custom-built, lovingly-maintained hot rod that his car is not morally important. People (myself included) get attached to all manner of things.
We have to distinguish between valuing something for its own sake (i.e. persons), and valuing things that those persons value (artwork, music, babies, cars, dogs, elegant math theorems, etc.).
After all, it’s possible that two agents are in possession of the same facts, the same true beliefs, and nonetheless have different preferences. So evidence doesn’t do very much for us, here.
I quite agree, but evidently that’s a point of contention on this thread.
We have to distinguish between valuing something for its own sake (i.e. persons), and valuing things that those persons value (artwork, music, babies, cars, dogs, elegant math theorems, etc.).
That is true, but I think my quip still stands. I suspect that the mother in my example would strongly insist that the moral value of the baby is high for its own sake and not just because she happens to love the baby (along with her newly remodeled kitchen). Would you call her mistaken?
I suspect that the mother in my example would strongly insist that the moral value of the baby is high for its own sake and not just because she happens to love the baby (along with her newly remodeled kitchen). Would you call her mistaken?
Only if she agrees with me that self-awareness is a key criterion for moral relevance.
Of course, the real answer is that mothers are almost never capable of reasoning rationally about their children, especially in matters of physical harm to the child, and especially when the child is quite young. So the fact that a mother would, in fact insist on this or that isn’t terribly interesting. (She might also insist that her baby is objectively the cutest baby in the maternity ward, but so what?)
I suspect that the mother in my example would strongly insist that the moral value of the baby is high for its own sake and not just because she happens to love the baby (along with her newly remodeled kitchen).
Same would apply to other things in SaidAchmiz’s list, too.
My point was: many people would say that the existence of the Mona Lisa is independently good, that it has value for its own sake, regardless of any individual person’s appreciation of it.
They would be talking nonsense, of course. But they would say it.
I’m not sure most people treat personhood as the end of the story. It’s not uncommon to talk about artistic virtuosity or historical significance as a source of intrinsic value: watch the framing the next time a famous painting gets stolen or a national museum gets bombed or looted in wartime.
Granted, it seems clear to me that these things are only important if there are persons to appreciate them, but the question was about popular intuitions, not LW-normative ethics.
SaidAchmiz: Babies are not morally important. Lumifer: A mother would disagree! SaidAchmiz: Yeah, but that doesn’t tell us much, because someone might also disagree with the same thing about the Mona Lisa (Implication: And there, they would clearly be wrong, so the fact that a person makes such a claim is not particularly meaningful.)
A … random person off the street would disagree? People who are cool with eating babies be rare, mate. Even rarer than people who consider the Mona Lisa morally important (by the same order of magnitude as human lives, anyway.)
Um, are you by any chance a psychopath*? This seems like a basic part of the human operating system, subjectively.
*Not a serious question, unless you are in which case this is valuable information to bear in mind.
Be careful how broadly you cast the “basic part of the human operating system” net. Even without the Typical Mind Fallacy, there are some pretty big and pretty surprising cultural differences out there. (Not that I am necessarily claiming such differences to be the cause of any disagreement in this particular case.)
As for the random person off the street… a random person off the street is likely to disagree with many utilitarian (or ethical in general) claims that your average LessWronger might make. How much weight should we give to this disagreement?
Be careful how broadly you cast the “basic part of the human operating system” net.
I try to be. But that is certainly the subjective experience of my valuing the lives of children.
As for the random person off the street… a random person off the street is likely to disagree with many utilitarian (or ethical in general) claims that your average LessWronger might make. How much weight should we give to this disagreement?
That depends on our grounds for believing we have identified their mistake, of course.
I think so? You seem to have indicated in a few comments that you don’t believe nonhuman animals are “self-aware” or “conscious” which strikes me as an empirical statement?
If this is true (and I give at least 30% credence that I’ve just been misunderstanding you), I’d be interested to hear why you think this. We may not end up drawing the moral line at the same place, but I think consciousness is a slippery enough subject that I at least would learn something from the conversation.
Ok. Yes, I think that nonhuman animals are not self-aware. (Dolphins might be an exception. This is a particularly interesting recent study.)
Dolphins aside, we have no reason to believe that animals are capable of thinking about themselves; of considering their own conscious awareness; of having any self-concept, much less any concept of themselves as persistent conscious entities with a past and a future; of consciously reasoning about other minds, or having any concept thereof; or of engaging in abstract reasoning or thought of any kind.
I’ve commented before that one critical difference between “speciesism” and racism or sexism or other such prejudices is that a cow can never argue for its own equal treatment; this, I have said, is not a trivial or irrelevant fact. And it’s not just a matter of not having the vocal cords to speak, or of not knowing the language, or any other such trivial obstacles to communication; a cow can’t even come close to having the concepts required to understand human behavior, human concepts, and human language.
Now, you might not think any of this is morally relevant. Fine. But I would meet with great skepticism — and, sans compelling evidence, probable outright dismissal — any claim that a cow, or a pig, or, even more laughably, a chicken, is self-aware in anything like the sense I outlined above.
(By the way, I am reluctant to commit to any position on “consciousness”, merely because the word is used in such a diverse range of ways.)
Birds lack a neocortex. But members of at least one species, the European magpie, have convincingly passed the “mirror test” [cf. “Mirror-Induced Behavior in the Magpie (Pica pica): Evidence of Self-Recognition” http://www.plosbiology.org/article/fetchObject.action?representation=PDF&uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pbio.0060202] Most ethologists recognise passing the mirror test as evidence of a self-concept. As well as higher primates (chimpanzees, orang utans, bonobos, gorillas) members of other species who have passed the mirror test include elephants, orcas and bottlenose dolphins. Humans generally fail the mirror test below the age of eighteen months.
You are right, the mirror test is evidence of self-concept. I do not take it to be nearly sufficient evidence, but it is evidence.
This supports my view that very young humans are not self-aware (and therefore not morally important) either.
Could you possibly say a bit more about why the mirror test is inadequate as a test of possession of a self-concept? Either way, making self-awareness a precondition of moral status has troubling implications. For example, consider what happens to verbally competent adults when feelings intense fear turn into uncontrollable panic. In states of “blind” panic, reflective self-awareness and the capacity for any kind of meta-cognition is lost. Panic disorder is extraordinarily unpleasant. Are we to make the claim that such panic-ridden states aren’t themselves important—only the memories of such states that a traumatised subject reports when s/he regains a measure of composure and some semblance of reflective self-awareness is restored? A pig, for example, or a prelinguistic human toddler, doesn’t have the meta-cognitive capacity to self-reflect on such states. But I don’t think we are ethically entitled to induce them—any more than we are ethically entitled to waterboard a normal adult human. I would hope posthuman superintelligence can engineer such states out of existence - in human and nonhuman animals alike.
Surely it is a reach to say that the mirror test, alone, with all of its methodological difficulties, can all by itself raise our probability estimate of a creature’s possessing self-awareness to near-certainty? I agree that it’s evidence, but calling it a test is pushing it, to say the least. To see just one reason why I might say this, consider that we can, right now, probably program a robot to pass such a test; such a robot would not be self-aware.
As for the rest of your post, I’d like to take this opportunity to object to a common mistake/ploy in such discussions:
“This general ethical principle/heuristic leads to absurdity if applied with the literal-mindedness of a particularly dumb algorithm, therefore reductio ad absurdum.”
Your argument here seems to be something like: “Adult humans are sometimes not self-aware, but we still care about them, even during those times. Is self-awareness therefore irrelevant??” No, of course it’s not. It’s a complex issue. But a chicken is never self-aware, so the point is moot.
Also:
Please provide a citation for this, and I will response, as my knowledge of this topic (cognitive capacity during states of extreme panic) is not up to giving a considered answer.
Having experienced a panic attack on one or two occasions, I am inclined to agree. However, I did not lose my self-concept at those times.
Finally:
“Ethically entitled” is not a very useful phrase to use in isolation; utilitarianism[1] can only tell us which of two or more world-states to prefer. I’ve said that I prefer that dogs not be tortured, all else being equal, so if by that you mean that we ought to prefer not to induce panic states in pigs, then sure, I agree. The question is what happens when all else is not equal — which it pretty much never is.
[1] You are speaking from a utilitarian position, yes? If not, then that changes things; “ethically entitled” means something quite different to a deontologist, naturally.
Um, “Why don’t we stop caring about people who temporarily lose this supposed be-all and end-all of moral value” seems like a valid question, albeit one you hopefully are introspective enough to have an answer for.
Is the question “why don’t we temporarily stop caring about people who temporarily lose this etc.”?
If so, then maybe we should, if they really lose it. However, please tell me what actions would ensue from, or be made permissible by, a temporary cessation of caring, provided that I still care about that person after they return from this temporary loss of importance.
That depends on the details of your personal moral system, doesn’t it? As I said already, you may well be consistent on this point, but you have not explained how.
Try telling a mother that her baby is not morally important.
(I would recommend some training in running and ducking before doing that...)
I find the idea that babies aren’t morally important highly unlikely, but did you have to pick the most biased possible example?
Is this a rebuttal, or merely a snarky quip?
If the latter, then carry on. If the former, please elaborate.
Both. I like multiple levels of meaning.
In particular, think about it in the context of whether morality is objective or subjective, what makes subjective opinions morally acceptable, and what is the role of evidence in all this.
Specifically, do you think there’s any possible evidence that could lead to you and a mother attaching the same moral importance to her baby?
Is there any evidence that could lead to the mother assigning her baby the same value as I do? Couldn’t tell you. (I’ve never been a mother.)
Vice versa? Probably not.
After all, it’s possible that two agents are in possession of the same facts, the same true beliefs, and nonetheless have different preferences. So evidence doesn’t do very much for us, here.
In any case, your objection proves too much: after all, try telling a dog owner that his dog is not morally important. For extra laughs, try telling the owner of a custom-built, lovingly-maintained hot rod that his car is not morally important. People (myself included) get attached to all manner of things.
We have to distinguish between valuing something for its own sake (i.e. persons), and valuing things that those persons value (artwork, music, babies, cars, dogs, elegant math theorems, etc.).
I quite agree, but evidently that’s a point of contention on this thread.
That is true, but I think my quip still stands. I suspect that the mother in my example would strongly insist that the moral value of the baby is high for its own sake and not just because she happens to love the baby (along with her newly remodeled kitchen). Would you call her mistaken?
Only if she agrees with me that self-awareness is a key criterion for moral relevance.
Of course, the real answer is that mothers are almost never capable of reasoning rationally about their children, especially in matters of physical harm to the child, and especially when the child is quite young. So the fact that a mother would, in fact insist on this or that isn’t terribly interesting. (She might also insist that her baby is objectively the cutest baby in the maternity ward, but so what?)
Same would apply to other things in SaidAchmiz’s list, too.
I don’t think that is true. For a dog, maybe, for a hot rod, definitely not.
What about for the Mona Lisa?
Things are not persons and their price or symbolism does not affect that.
My point was: many people would say that the existence of the Mona Lisa is independently good, that it has value for its own sake, regardless of any individual person’s appreciation of it.
They would be talking nonsense, of course. But they would say it.
Just like the mother with the baby.
Edit: Also what Nornagest said.
I’m not sure most people treat personhood as the end of the story. It’s not uncommon to talk about artistic virtuosity or historical significance as a source of intrinsic value: watch the framing the next time a famous painting gets stolen or a national museum gets bombed or looted in wartime.
Granted, it seems clear to me that these things are only important if there are persons to appreciate them, but the question was about popular intuitions, not LW-normative ethics.
The question of whether the aesthetic value of beautiful objects can be terminal is an interesting but unrelated question.
Unrelated to what...?
The discussion has gone like so:
SaidAchmiz: Babies are not morally important.
Lumifer: A mother would disagree!
SaidAchmiz: Yeah, but that doesn’t tell us much, because someone might also disagree with the same thing about the Mona Lisa (Implication: And there, they would clearly be wrong, so the fact that a person makes such a claim is not particularly meaningful.)
A … random person off the street would disagree? People who are cool with eating babies be rare, mate. Even rarer than people who consider the Mona Lisa morally important (by the same order of magnitude as human lives, anyway.)
Um, are you by any chance a psychopath*? This seems like a basic part of the human operating system, subjectively.
*Not a serious question, unless you are in which case this is valuable information to bear in mind.
Be careful how broadly you cast the “basic part of the human operating system” net. Even without the Typical Mind Fallacy, there are some pretty big and pretty surprising cultural differences out there. (Not that I am necessarily claiming such differences to be the cause of any disagreement in this particular case.)
As for the random person off the street… a random person off the street is likely to disagree with many utilitarian (or ethical in general) claims that your average LessWronger might make. How much weight should we give to this disagreement?
I try to be. But that is certainly the subjective experience of my valuing the lives of children.
That depends on our grounds for believing we have identified their mistake, of course.