I don’t see how this is relevant to my argument. I’m just pointing out that your definition doesn’t track the concept you (probably) have in mind; I wasn’t saying anything empirical* at all.
Larks, by analogy, could a racist acknowledge that, other things being equal, conscious beings of equivalent sentience deserve equal care and respect, but race is one of the things that has to be equal? If you think the
“other things being equal” caveat dilutes the definition of speciesism so it’s worthless, perhaps drop it—I was just trying to spike some guns.
If we drop the caveat, anti-speciesism is obviously false. For example, moral, successful people deserve more respect than immoral unsuccessful people, even if both are of equal sentience.
If we drop the caveat, anti-speciesism is obviously false. For example, moral, successful people deserve more respect than immoral unsuccessful people, even if both are of equal sentience.
There are plenty of people who would disagree with that. But what do you mean by “respect”, and on what grounds do you give it or withhold it?
I don’t see how this is relevant to my argument. I’m just pointing out that your definition doesn’t track the concept you (probably) have in mind; I wasn’t saying anything empirical* at all.
*other than about the topology of concept-space.
Larks, by analogy, could a racist acknowledge that, other things being equal, conscious beings of equivalent sentience deserve equal care and respect, but race is one of the things that has to be equal? If you think the “other things being equal” caveat dilutes the definition of speciesism so it’s worthless, perhaps drop it—I was just trying to spike some guns.
If we drop the caveat, anti-speciesism is obviously false. For example, moral, successful people deserve more respect than immoral unsuccessful people, even if both are of equal sentience.
There are plenty of people who would disagree with that. But what do you mean by “respect”, and on what grounds do you give it or withhold it?