The original post mentions some techniques for getting people to avoid rationalizing once they’ve realized they’re doing it, but an earlier step is to get them to realize that they’re doing it.
The key to this may be that a person who is rationalizing without realizing it is arguing with him/herself without realizing it, since it’s easier to recognize (and to accept) that you’re arguing than that you’re rationalizing. Accordingly, getting people to realize that they’re rationalizing would involve getting them to realize that they’re the one that they’re arguing with.
The 5-second-level goal would be simply to get them to realize that they’re arguing, if that itself is an issue. The next step, getting them to recognize that they’re arguing with themselves, would take longer for some people.
(Rationalizing can be distinguished from people who are arguing honestly with themselves in that a rationalizer cares which “one of them” wins, and the non-rationalizer doesn’t.)
Step one: recognizing that you’re arguing:
If this is an issue, the question to ask is whether the potential rationalizer is thinking about reasons. If you’re thinking of reasons, you’re mentally arguing with someone. When you want to get a glass of water, you generally don’t think about any reasons why you should or shouldn’t. When you want to get a soda or a cup of coffee, though, you might about reasons relating to the cost and/or health of the beverage. If so, you’re arguing, whether with yourself, or with a mental representation of a friend who suggested drinking less soda/coffee, or whoever.
Step two: determining who you’re arguing with:
This step would work best as a series of questions. First, who do you think you’re arguing with? Is it a specific person? Is it a hypothetical person?
Why does this person disagree with you? What alternative position do they take, and why that one? What kind of person is it that you’re arguing with?
What exactly are this person’s arguments, that you’re arguing against?
How much do you want to win the argument with this person? Why?
Any suggestions on other questions it would be good to ask in Step two? Personally, I tend to notice it if I’m rationalizing, so I’m not entirely sure how someone who doesn’t notice would respond to these questions.
The original post talks about noticing flinches and attachments, which is similar to what I discussed above. However, I would expect it to be a lot more difficult to notice the flinch itself than it would be to notice the aftereffects, because the flinch is one moment, and the aftereffects last. (At least, when I catch myself doing it, the flinch is a single moment, and then the rationalization normalizes very quickly unless I act to counter it.)
The momentary nature of the flinch would not only make it harder to notice, but also more difficult to teach people to notice flinches.
There may well be a better approach to this than the one I suggested, but I have to think that exercises/activities that focus on the aftereffects would work better than ones that depend on catching that flinch.
The original post mentions some techniques for getting people to avoid rationalizing once they’ve realized they’re doing it, but an earlier step is to get them to realize that they’re doing it.
The key to this may be that a person who is rationalizing without realizing it is arguing with him/herself without realizing it, since it’s easier to recognize (and to accept) that you’re arguing than that you’re rationalizing. Accordingly, getting people to realize that they’re rationalizing would involve getting them to realize that they’re the one that they’re arguing with.
The 5-second-level goal would be simply to get them to realize that they’re arguing, if that itself is an issue. The next step, getting them to recognize that they’re arguing with themselves, would take longer for some people.
(Rationalizing can be distinguished from people who are arguing honestly with themselves in that a rationalizer cares which “one of them” wins, and the non-rationalizer doesn’t.)
Step one: recognizing that you’re arguing:
If this is an issue, the question to ask is whether the potential rationalizer is thinking about reasons. If you’re thinking of reasons, you’re mentally arguing with someone. When you want to get a glass of water, you generally don’t think about any reasons why you should or shouldn’t. When you want to get a soda or a cup of coffee, though, you might about reasons relating to the cost and/or health of the beverage. If so, you’re arguing, whether with yourself, or with a mental representation of a friend who suggested drinking less soda/coffee, or whoever.
Step two: determining who you’re arguing with:
This step would work best as a series of questions. First, who do you think you’re arguing with? Is it a specific person? Is it a hypothetical person?
Why does this person disagree with you? What alternative position do they take, and why that one? What kind of person is it that you’re arguing with?
What exactly are this person’s arguments, that you’re arguing against?
How much do you want to win the argument with this person? Why?
Any suggestions on other questions it would be good to ask in Step two? Personally, I tend to notice it if I’m rationalizing, so I’m not entirely sure how someone who doesn’t notice would respond to these questions.
To follow up on my post:
The original post talks about noticing flinches and attachments, which is similar to what I discussed above. However, I would expect it to be a lot more difficult to notice the flinch itself than it would be to notice the aftereffects, because the flinch is one moment, and the aftereffects last. (At least, when I catch myself doing it, the flinch is a single moment, and then the rationalization normalizes very quickly unless I act to counter it.)
The momentary nature of the flinch would not only make it harder to notice, but also more difficult to teach people to notice flinches.
There may well be a better approach to this than the one I suggested, but I have to think that exercises/activities that focus on the aftereffects would work better than ones that depend on catching that flinch.