If you endorse this reasoning, you should also accept inconsistency in the Allais Paradox. From the relevant post:
The problem with attaching a huge extra value to certainty is that one time’s certainty is another time’s probability.
The only reason that I personally would prefer the red bet to the green bet is that it’s less exploitable by a malicious experimenter: in other words, given that the experimenter gave me those options, my estimate of the green:blue distribution becomes asymmetric. All other objections in this thread are unsound.
There is a possible state of the world where I have picked “green” and it turns out that there were never any green balls in the world. It is possible to have a very strong preference to not be in that state of the world. There is nothing irrational about having a particular preference. Preferences (and utility functions) cannot be irrational.
If you endorse this reasoning, you should also accept inconsistency in the Allais Paradox.
That does not necessarily follow. The Allais Paradox is not about metauncertainty; it is about putting a special premium on “absolute certainty” that does not translate to relative certainty. Someone who values certainty could consistently choose 1A and 2A.
How many boots to the head is that preference worth? I doubt it’s worth very many to you personally, and thus your personal reluctance is due to something else.
I’m done arguing this. I usually find you pretty levelheaded, but your objections in this thread are baffling.
If you endorse this reasoning, you should also accept inconsistency in the Allais Paradox. From the relevant post:
The only reason that I personally would prefer the red bet to the green bet is that it’s less exploitable by a malicious experimenter: in other words, given that the experimenter gave me those options, my estimate of the green:blue distribution becomes asymmetric. All other objections in this thread are unsound.
There is a possible state of the world where I have picked “green” and it turns out that there were never any green balls in the world. It is possible to have a very strong preference to not be in that state of the world. There is nothing irrational about having a particular preference. Preferences (and utility functions) cannot be irrational.
That does not necessarily follow. The Allais Paradox is not about metauncertainty; it is about putting a special premium on “absolute certainty” that does not translate to relative certainty. Someone who values certainty could consistently choose 1A and 2A.
How many boots to the head is that preference worth? I doubt it’s worth very many to you personally, and thus your personal reluctance is due to something else.
I’m done arguing this. I usually find you pretty levelheaded, but your objections in this thread are baffling.