You can definitely have mutable state on chain. I think you’re confusing the immutable nature of the transaction history with the mutable latest chain state.
But what if a court issues an order to alter the transaction history? (Or some other change that conflicts with any feature that requires consistency over time of said blockchain) In the US that surely is within the power of the supreme court as practically everything is, and probably the state supreme courts too.
That would be outside the power of an on-chain court (generally speaking), but I don’t see why that’s a big deal. You can give the court the authority to make new transactions, and I don’t really see any case where it’s imperative that the transaction history be altered rather than a new rollback transaction being issued.
Since in the US the top court is prohibited from being an ‘on chain court’ by its constitution, and will not recognize judicial authority in any lower court that disobeys it, and likewise for every other state and country I know of… why would we care about the decisions of an ‘on chain court’?
Btw I’m not saying that I can see a case why that ever would be necessary but then again the folks whose opinions are considered as final judgement can make surprising decisions.
It does seem that option 3 is what is being proposed. I agree that if some solution could be designed to make the whole idea acceptable to the legal authorities, then the further implementation seems entirely credible from a technical view. Though I really am not sure in that case why the additional complexity of an ‘on chain system’ is necessary, a centralized database would do everything proposed. And any further benefits would be negated by the central control and trust required for such ‘on chain systems’ to be realized. e.g. someone dissatisfied with any transaction could always bypass whatever technical implementation by going to the legal authorities directly, or appeal from the ‘on chain courts’ to the superior authority, etc.
After further reflection, these are pretty good reasons for preferring crypto to a central database, though I think in practice the costs of a central authority managing a database would have to be really high for serious people to prefer the on-chain solution. Which brings us to cost, the closest real world example I can think of to the proposal is the Reedy Creek Improvement District and even that is actually not quite as independent. Considering that it took nearly all the influence of a large company in 1966 to secure, and it was a close call at that, how do you imagine something similar could be secured in the present day, when the competition for land and access to real estate information is so much greater? Even the entire value of Bitcoin+Ethereum couldn’t buy that much contiguous land in any desirable locale in the US, without eminent domain authority. Let alone the special legal regimes. The alternative of converting any existing city in a developed country would be a massive political fight, probably the biggest since the 60s.
In the end I think your last paragraph explains everything. The proposal presumes that a parallel legal system governing property rights would even be allowed in the first place. Considering that in every nation I can think of property rights are guaranteed by a constitution, or a crown or something else equally difficult to change, this seems to be about as likely as any other activist proposal getting a supermajority to change the constitution. In practice, if crypto property rights were ever to come about, it would have to be in either a city state like Singapore or Monaco, or in a watered down form where the ‘on chain system’ is a bit of sprinkling to make the city seem high tech and futuristic. Your right to not be too hopeful about on chain real estate. It seems to be better to start with some smaller, manageable, nexus of improvements.
Good points. Also it may be possible to build such a city on a remote island or in the middle of a desert. Jurisdictions may even compete for the privilege if $X billions of annual tax dollars could be guaranteed. If all the crypto billionaires pooled together to build a small city that may be enough capital.
You can definitely have mutable state on chain. I think you’re confusing the immutable nature of the transaction history with the mutable latest chain state.
But what if a court issues an order to alter the transaction history? (Or some other change that conflicts with any feature that requires consistency over time of said blockchain) In the US that surely is within the power of the supreme court as practically everything is, and probably the state supreme courts too.
That would be outside the power of an on-chain court (generally speaking), but I don’t see why that’s a big deal. You can give the court the authority to make new transactions, and I don’t really see any case where it’s imperative that the transaction history be altered rather than a new rollback transaction being issued.
Since in the US the top court is prohibited from being an ‘on chain court’ by its constitution, and will not recognize judicial authority in any lower court that disobeys it, and likewise for every other state and country I know of… why would we care about the decisions of an ‘on chain court’?
Btw I’m not saying that I can see a case why that ever would be necessary but then again the folks whose opinions are considered as final judgement can make surprising decisions.
It does seem that option 3 is what is being proposed. I agree that if some solution could be designed to make the whole idea acceptable to the legal authorities, then the further implementation seems entirely credible from a technical view. Though I really am not sure in that case why the additional complexity of an ‘on chain system’ is necessary, a centralized database would do everything proposed. And any further benefits would be negated by the central control and trust required for such ‘on chain systems’ to be realized. e.g. someone dissatisfied with any transaction could always bypass whatever technical implementation by going to the legal authorities directly, or appeal from the ‘on chain courts’ to the superior authority, etc.
After further reflection, these are pretty good reasons for preferring crypto to a central database, though I think in practice the costs of a central authority managing a database would have to be really high for serious people to prefer the on-chain solution. Which brings us to cost, the closest real world example I can think of to the proposal is the Reedy Creek Improvement District and even that is actually not quite as independent. Considering that it took nearly all the influence of a large company in 1966 to secure, and it was a close call at that, how do you imagine something similar could be secured in the present day, when the competition for land and access to real estate information is so much greater? Even the entire value of Bitcoin+Ethereum couldn’t buy that much contiguous land in any desirable locale in the US, without eminent domain authority. Let alone the special legal regimes. The alternative of converting any existing city in a developed country would be a massive political fight, probably the biggest since the 60s.
In the end I think your last paragraph explains everything. The proposal presumes that a parallel legal system governing property rights would even be allowed in the first place. Considering that in every nation I can think of property rights are guaranteed by a constitution, or a crown or something else equally difficult to change, this seems to be about as likely as any other activist proposal getting a supermajority to change the constitution. In practice, if crypto property rights were ever to come about, it would have to be in either a city state like Singapore or Monaco, or in a watered down form where the ‘on chain system’ is a bit of sprinkling to make the city seem high tech and futuristic. Your right to not be too hopeful about on chain real estate. It seems to be better to start with some smaller, manageable, nexus of improvements.
Good points. Also it may be possible to build such a city on a remote island or in the middle of a desert. Jurisdictions may even compete for the privilege if $X billions of annual tax dollars could be guaranteed. If all the crypto billionaires pooled together to build a small city that may be enough capital.