I don’t know what David thinks of me, but I accept that he is clearly objectively more expert than I on this topic, given his prestigious position and many more years of focus on the topic. But given the strong usual tendency to give medicine the benefit of the doubt, my impression that David gives medicine this benefit of doubt on other topics, and his inability to point to any concrete supporting evidence, I’m willing to attribute David’s more positive assessment here to such wishful thinking, rather than to his superior intuition on this matter. How rational am I?
(I like that last touch, but I’m not giving you any modesty credit for humbly asking the question, only for actual shifts in opinion.)
Anyway, when it comes to your own disagreements, you attribute them to strictly situational factors—like a discount you apply for David’s (dispositional) tendency to “give medicine the benefit of the doubt”.
Then you look at my disagreements, and attribute them to persistent dispositional tendencies, like tribalism.
Perhaps you can see inside your own head to your oh-so-demanding specific reasons, but not see inside mine?
I really can’t back your reading, looking over the cases. Pearl, Thrun, and Aumann are all three of them Bayesians and eminent, masters in their separate ways of my chosen art. In the cases of Pearl and Aumann, I had read their work and been impressed. In Thrun’s case he had graciously agreed to present at the Singularity Summit. Pearl I humbly petitioned, and his verdict I accepted in both parts; Thrun I questioned, and came to terms with; Aumann I dismissed. Where is the tribal disposition? I do not see it, but I do see a situational difference between disagreeing with a math book, disagreeing with a math anecdote, and disagreeing with a religious profession.
Robin, I may have to call fundamental attribution error on this. You disagree with Cutler, and say:
(I like that last touch, but I’m not giving you any modesty credit for humbly asking the question, only for actual shifts in opinion.)
Anyway, when it comes to your own disagreements, you attribute them to strictly situational factors—like a discount you apply for David’s (dispositional) tendency to “give medicine the benefit of the doubt”.
Then you look at my disagreements, and attribute them to persistent dispositional tendencies, like tribalism.
Perhaps you can see inside your own head to your oh-so-demanding specific reasons, but not see inside mine?
I really can’t back your reading, looking over the cases. Pearl, Thrun, and Aumann are all three of them Bayesians and eminent, masters in their separate ways of my chosen art. In the cases of Pearl and Aumann, I had read their work and been impressed. In Thrun’s case he had graciously agreed to present at the Singularity Summit. Pearl I humbly petitioned, and his verdict I accepted in both parts; Thrun I questioned, and came to terms with; Aumann I dismissed. Where is the tribal disposition? I do not see it, but I do see a situational difference between disagreeing with a math book, disagreeing with a math anecdote, and disagreeing with a religious profession.