Huw Price is one of my favorite contemporary philosophers. Here is his list of publications, which has interesting papers on decision theory, causation, the arrow of time, the interpretation of quantum mechanics, naturalism, and truth.
I second the recommendation. His work on the arrow of time is classic, of course, but I’d particularly encourage people to read his stuff on naturalism and truth, especially the papers collected in his book Naturalism Without Mirrors (most of which are available for download on his website, I think). A very useful (and, in my opinion, largely correct) counterpoint to the LW orthodoxy on these subjects.
For a quick introduction to his approach, try his three Descartes lectures, available here.
I read NWM as well as a number of his other papers earlier this year, and while I enjoyed them a great deal I still struggle to understand the basic motivations for and plausibility/coherence of anti-representationalism/global expressionism. Why not rest content with commonsensical expressionism within restricted domains (culture/psychology/morals)? Total metaphysical and scientific expressionism make little sense to me; it seems obvious that there must be some underlying medium that governs our “discursive practices”. I haven’t read FFT (waiting on the 2nd ed) but I don’t see a semantic/truth theory trumping my confidence in science as a method of representational success.
Would appreciate pointers, thoughts or conversation.
Huw Price is one of my favorite contemporary philosophers. Here is his list of publications, which has interesting papers on decision theory, causation, the arrow of time, the interpretation of quantum mechanics, naturalism, and truth.
I second the recommendation. His work on the arrow of time is classic, of course, but I’d particularly encourage people to read his stuff on naturalism and truth, especially the papers collected in his book Naturalism Without Mirrors (most of which are available for download on his website, I think). A very useful (and, in my opinion, largely correct) counterpoint to the LW orthodoxy on these subjects.
For a quick introduction to his approach, try his three Descartes lectures, available here.
Thanks for that.
I read NWM as well as a number of his other papers earlier this year, and while I enjoyed them a great deal I still struggle to understand the basic motivations for and plausibility/coherence of anti-representationalism/global expressionism. Why not rest content with commonsensical expressionism within restricted domains (culture/psychology/morals)? Total metaphysical and scientific expressionism make little sense to me; it seems obvious that there must be some underlying medium that governs our “discursive practices”. I haven’t read FFT (waiting on the 2nd ed) but I don’t see a semantic/truth theory trumping my confidence in science as a method of representational success.
Would appreciate pointers, thoughts or conversation.