No. Guesses and intuitions are ways of interpreting or synthesizing data. Data is a way of measuring the world. However, there are subjective/intuitive types of qualitative data. If I am a regional manager for Starbucks, go into one of the shops I’m managing, and come away with the qualitative judgment that “it looks like a shitshow,” there is observational data that that judgment is based on, even if I haven’t written it down or quantified it.
A hard number based on literally nothing is not data and is not an interpretation. But that’s not an interesting or realistic case—it doesn’t even fit the idea of “ass numbers,” a person’s best intuitive guess. At least in that case, we can hope that there’s some unconscious aggregation of memory, models of how the world works, and so on coming together to inform the number. It’s a valid estimate, although not particularly trustworthy in most cases. It’s not fundamentally different from the much more legible predictions of people like superforecasters.
I’m encouraging crisp distinctions between having a high standard of evidence, an explicit demonstration of a specific limit to our ability to forecast, and an unsubstantiated declaration that an entire broad topic is entirely beyond forecasting.
In the case of AGI, this would mean distinguishing between:
“I’d need a stronger argument and evidence for predicting AGI doom to update my credence any further.”
“Even an AGI can’t predict more than n pinball bounces out into the future given atomic-resolution data from only one moment in time.”
“Nobody can predict what will happen with AGI, it’s a case of Knightian uncertainty and simply incalculable! There are just too many possibilities!”
The first two cases are fine, the third one I think is an invalid form of argument.
Do you count guesses and intuitions as data?
No. Guesses and intuitions are ways of interpreting or synthesizing data. Data is a way of measuring the world. However, there are subjective/intuitive types of qualitative data. If I am a regional manager for Starbucks, go into one of the shops I’m managing, and come away with the qualitative judgment that “it looks like a shitshow,” there is observational data that that judgment is based on, even if I haven’t written it down or quantified it.
Not exclusively: they can be pretty random.
What we were discussing was the opposite...a hard number based on nothing.
A hard number based on literally nothing is not data and is not an interpretation. But that’s not an interesting or realistic case—it doesn’t even fit the idea of “ass numbers,” a person’s best intuitive guess. At least in that case, we can hope that there’s some unconscious aggregation of memory, models of how the world works, and so on coming together to inform the number. It’s a valid estimate, although not particularly trustworthy in most cases. It’s not fundamentally different from the much more legible predictions of people like superforecasters.
And having said all that, it is not unreasonable to set the bar somewhere higher.
I’m encouraging crisp distinctions between having a high standard of evidence, an explicit demonstration of a specific limit to our ability to forecast, and an unsubstantiated declaration that an entire broad topic is entirely beyond forecasting.
In the case of AGI, this would mean distinguishing between:
“I’d need a stronger argument and evidence for predicting AGI doom to update my credence any further.”
“Even an AGI can’t predict more than n pinball bounces out into the future given atomic-resolution data from only one moment in time.”
“Nobody can predict what will happen with AGI, it’s a case of Knightian uncertainty and simply incalculable! There are just too many possibilities!”
The first two cases are fine, the third one I think is an invalid form of argument.