Then the coalition faces a choice of the exact value of x. Smaller values of x correspond to a more intellectually dishonest strategy, requiring only a small inconvenience before resorting to obfuscatory tactics. Larger values of x correspond to more intellectual honesty: in the limit as x → ∞, we just get, “Speak the truth, even if your voice trembles (full stop).”
I don’t think that a one-parameter x% trade-off between truth-telling and social capital accurately reflects the coalitional map for a couple reasons
x% is a ratio y:z between intellectual dishonesty and social capital, roughly speaking. The organization would need to reach a shared agreement about what it means y% more intellectually dishonest and what it means to get z% more social capital. Otherwise, there will be too much intra-coalition noise to separate the values of coalition members from the trade-offs they think they are making
This also means coalition members can strategically mis-estimate their level of honesty or the value of the gained social capital higher or lower depending on their individual values—deliberately obfuscating values in the organization
Different coalitions have different opportunities for making x% trade-offs and people can generally freely enter and exit coalitions. My impression is that this differential pressure and the observed frequency with which you make x% trade-offs relative to alternative coalitions is what determines of the values of those who enter and exit the coalition—not x% itself. This means
x% isn’t a good Schelling point because I don’t really think it’s the parameter that is affecting the values of those involved in a colaition
slippery slopes are more likely to be caused by external things like the kind of trade-offs available to a coalition—as opposed to the values of the coalition itself
social capital with external sources isn’t usually the main organizational bottle-neck. People might be willing to make an x% trade-off but first they would probably exhaust all opportunities that don’t require them to make such a trade-off. And attention is finite. This means that a lot of pressure has to be applied before people actually begin to notice the x% . Maybe it’s a Schelling point at equilibrium but I don’t think it moves very quickly
In the absence of distinguished salient intermediate points along the uniformly continuous trade-off between maximally accurate world-models and sucking up to the Emperor, the only Schelling points are x = ∞ (tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth) and x = 0 (do everything short of outright lying to win grants). In this model, the tension between these two “attractors” for coordination may tend to promote coalitional schisms.
I think it’s more likely that, as you select for people who make x% trade-offs for your coalition’s benefit, you’ll also tend to select for people who make x% trade-offs against your coalitions benefit (unless your coalition is exclusively true-believers). This means that there’s a point before infinity where you have to maintain some organizational that provides coalition non-members with good world models or else your coalition members will fail to coordinate your coalition into having a good world-model itself.
I don’t think that a one-parameter x% trade-off between truth-telling and social capital accurately reflects the coalitional map for a couple reasons
x% is a ratio y:z between intellectual dishonesty and social capital, roughly speaking. The organization would need to reach a shared agreement about what it means y% more intellectually dishonest and what it means to get z% more social capital. Otherwise, there will be too much intra-coalition noise to separate the values of coalition members from the trade-offs they think they are making
This also means coalition members can strategically mis-estimate their level of honesty or the value of the gained social capital higher or lower depending on their individual values—deliberately obfuscating values in the organization
Different coalitions have different opportunities for making x% trade-offs and people can generally freely enter and exit coalitions. My impression is that this differential pressure and the observed frequency with which you make x% trade-offs relative to alternative coalitions is what determines of the values of those who enter and exit the coalition—not x% itself. This means
x% isn’t a good Schelling point because I don’t really think it’s the parameter that is affecting the values of those involved in a colaition
slippery slopes are more likely to be caused by external things like the kind of trade-offs available to a coalition—as opposed to the values of the coalition itself
social capital with external sources isn’t usually the main organizational bottle-neck. People might be willing to make an x% trade-off but first they would probably exhaust all opportunities that don’t require them to make such a trade-off. And attention is finite. This means that a lot of pressure has to be applied before people actually begin to notice the x% . Maybe it’s a Schelling point at equilibrium but I don’t think it moves very quickly
I think it’s more likely that, as you select for people who make x% trade-offs for your coalition’s benefit, you’ll also tend to select for people who make x% trade-offs against your coalitions benefit (unless your coalition is exclusively true-believers). This means that there’s a point before infinity where you have to maintain some organizational that provides coalition non-members with good world models or else your coalition members will fail to coordinate your coalition into having a good world-model itself.