Unfortunately, this one illustrates that there isn’t a hard-and-fast creepy definition. I was at a party, and a man was there who had been showing social but not physical interest in me was there. I was sitting on an empty sofa and he sat down right next to me so our sides were touching, which I found creepy.
But later in the evening a higher-status and more attractive man did basically the same, and I was pleased rather than creeped out. So the creepiness of an action depends on how much I like the person who does it.
Ironically, I’m now friends with the first man (who no longer hits on me) and not with the second (who has probably forgotten I exist.)
So the creepiness of an action depends on how much I like the person who does it.
I think this is a very important sentence. It illustrates how typical, colloquial usage of the word “creepy” can run afoul of the fundamental attribution error.
I don’t think that sentence can be successfully said outside LW, but not because of the FAE, more like the Just-World Fallacy and Appeal to Consequences. It would go something like this:
1) In a just world, behavior standards would not vary for men by status or attractiveness (because in a just world they would all have equal status and attractiveness, or women would not be moved by status or attractiveness).
2) Therefore, unhappiness-avoiding behavior standards should not vary by status or attractiveness (contrary to the actual fact that in an unjust world, some things will make (some) women feel uncomfortable/unhappy only if the man’s attractiveness/status is below a (varying) particular level).
3) Therefore, a woman who admits that behavior X would not make her feel creepy if a sufficiently more attractive man did it, is being unfair to lower-status men, is wrong to label the behavior “creepy”, cannot justly blame the lower-status man for doing what would be okay for a higher-status man to do, is just being shallow, is applying a double standard, etc.
4) It’s impossible to have an explicit social standard for men which says, “If you think you’re in the upper 20% of attractiveness you can sit down next to a woman touching her, otherwise this will make her feel creepy and you should avoid doing so.” This rule would not be optimal/justified in a just world, so it must not be allowed in this one either.
5) Thus if we admit that whether sitting down touching someone is “creepy” depends on how attractive they are, it will be impossible to prevent men from doing things that make women feel creeped out, or for women to be listened-to when they object, in which case women will feel creeped out, which is bad.
6) By appeal to consequences, it must not be true that a woman’s sense of creeped-out-ness can vary with a male’s attractiveness or status.
The typical resolution of a situation like this, I think, is that you have an explicit standard which says “You can’t hug people without asking”, but there will be an unspoken selective lack of prosecution (like how cops don’t get traffic tickets and white people don’t go to jail for drug crimes) when an attractive man engages in the behavior.
The typical resolution of a situation like this, I think, is that you have an explicit standard which says “You can’t hug people without asking”, but there will be an unspoken selective lack of prosecution (like how cops don’t get traffic tickets and white people don’t go to jail for drug crimes) when an attractive man engages in the behavior.
Yes, typical human hypocrisy. Not problematic for the average joe.
The typical resolution of a situation like this, I think, is that you have an explicit standard which says “You can’t hug people without asking”, but there will be an unspoken selective lack of prosecution (like how cops don’t get traffic tickets and white people don’t go to jail for drug crimes) when an attractive man engages in the behavior.
I don’t think that it’s necessary to resort to this type of hypocritical normation.
You can have the explicit rule: “Don’t do things that will typically generate negative feedback when you do them.”
Assuming that you can read feedback (which may be admittedly a problem for some people), after some calibration you would effectively avoid creeping people (except when you encounter unusual individuals, but you can always blame them for having abnormal standards).
Unfortunately, this one illustrates that there isn’t a hard-and-fast creepy definition. I was at a party, and a man was there who had been showing social but not physical interest in me was there. I was sitting on an empty sofa and he sat down right next to me so our sides were touching, which I found creepy.
But later in the evening a higher-status and more attractive man did basically the same, and I was pleased rather than creeped out. So the creepiness of an action depends on how much I like the person who does it.
Ironically, I’m now friends with the first man (who no longer hits on me) and not with the second (who has probably forgotten I exist.)
I think this is a very important sentence. It illustrates how typical, colloquial usage of the word “creepy” can run afoul of the fundamental attribution error.
I don’t think that sentence can be successfully said outside LW, but not because of the FAE, more like the Just-World Fallacy and Appeal to Consequences. It would go something like this:
1) In a just world, behavior standards would not vary for men by status or attractiveness (because in a just world they would all have equal status and attractiveness, or women would not be moved by status or attractiveness).
2) Therefore, unhappiness-avoiding behavior standards should not vary by status or attractiveness (contrary to the actual fact that in an unjust world, some things will make (some) women feel uncomfortable/unhappy only if the man’s attractiveness/status is below a (varying) particular level).
3) Therefore, a woman who admits that behavior X would not make her feel creepy if a sufficiently more attractive man did it, is being unfair to lower-status men, is wrong to label the behavior “creepy”, cannot justly blame the lower-status man for doing what would be okay for a higher-status man to do, is just being shallow, is applying a double standard, etc.
4) It’s impossible to have an explicit social standard for men which says, “If you think you’re in the upper 20% of attractiveness you can sit down next to a woman touching her, otherwise this will make her feel creepy and you should avoid doing so.” This rule would not be optimal/justified in a just world, so it must not be allowed in this one either.
5) Thus if we admit that whether sitting down touching someone is “creepy” depends on how attractive they are, it will be impossible to prevent men from doing things that make women feel creeped out, or for women to be listened-to when they object, in which case women will feel creeped out, which is bad.
6) By appeal to consequences, it must not be true that a woman’s sense of creeped-out-ness can vary with a male’s attractiveness or status.
The typical resolution of a situation like this, I think, is that you have an explicit standard which says “You can’t hug people without asking”, but there will be an unspoken selective lack of prosecution (like how cops don’t get traffic tickets and white people don’t go to jail for drug crimes) when an attractive man engages in the behavior.
Yes, typical human hypocrisy. Not problematic for the average joe.
I don’t think that it’s necessary to resort to this type of hypocritical normation.
You can have the explicit rule: “Don’t do things that will typically generate negative feedback when you do them.”
Assuming that you can read feedback (which may be admittedly a problem for some people), after some calibration you would effectively avoid creeping people (except when you encounter unusual individuals, but you can always blame them for having abnormal standards).
See also: the subsection on “new Puritanism” in the SIRC Guide to Flirting.