But even if the AI discovered some things about our physics, it does not significantly narrow the range of possible minds. It doesn’t know if it’s dealing with paperclippers or a pebblesorters. It might know roughly how smart we are.
You’re using your (human) mind to predict what a postulated potentially smarter-than-human intelligence could and could not do.
It might not operate on the same timescales as us. It might do things that appear like pure magic. No matter how often you took snapshots and checked how far it had gotten in figuring out details about us, there might be no way of ruling out progress, especially if you gave it motives for hiding that progress (such as pulling the plug every time it came close). Sooner or later you’d conclude that nothing interesting was happening and putting it on autopilot. A small self-improvement might cascade in an enormous difference in understanding, with the notorious FOOM following.
I don’t usually like quoting myself, but
If you had a program that might or might not be on a track to self-improve and initiate an Intelligence explosion you’d better be sure enough that it would remain friendly to, at the very least, give it a robot body, a scalpel, and stand with your throat exposed before it.
If the scenario makes you nervous you should be pretty much equally nervous at the idea of giving your maybe-self-improving AI sitting inside thirty nestled sandboxes even 10 milliseconds (10^41 Planck intervals) of CPU time.
Let me be clear here: I’m not assigning any significant probability to someone recreating EURISKO or something like it in their spare time and having it recursively self-improve any time soon. My confidence intervals are spread widely enough that I can spend some time being worried about it, though. I’m just pointing out that sandboxing adds approximately zero extra defense in those situations we would need it.
The parallel to the simulation argument was interesting though, thanks.
If the scenario makes you nervous you should be pretty much equally nervous at the idea of giving your maybe-self-improving AI sitting inside thirty nestled sandboxes even 10 milliseconds (10^41 Planck intervals) of CPU time.
I don’t think the number of Planck intervals is especially useful to cite… it seems like the relevant factor is CPU cycles, and while I’m not an expert on CPUs, I’m pretty sure that we’re not bumping up on Planck intervals yet.
Relatedly, if you were worried about self-improving superintelligence, you could give your AI a slow CPU.
First, I feel like we’re talking past each other a bit.
Second, I edited this somewhat out of order, apologies if it doesn’t flow.
I am trying to look at this in a worst-case scenario, I’ll grant that the AI is smart enough to solve any given solvable problem in a single iteration, that it’s that smart even in the first experiment, and it would prioritze discovering it’s true environment and paperclipping it.
I’m proposing that there exists a sandbox which [provably] can’t be gotten out of.
And also a set of problems which do not convey information about our universe.
You’re using your (human) mind to predict what a postulated potentially smarter-than-human intelligence could and could not do.
Isn’t that required of FAI anyway?
AI sitting inside thirty nestled sandboxes even 10 milliseconds (10^41 Planck intervals) of CPU time.
Again talking past each other, I’m thinking in terms of giving the paperclipper hours. In the ideal, there isn’t a provision for letting the AI out of the sandbox. thinking a bit more… None of it’s problems/results need even be applicable to our universe, except for general principles of intelligence creation. Having it construct a CEV for itself might show our motives too much, or might not. (hmmmm, we should make sure any CEV we create finds, protects, and applies itself to any simulations used in its construction, in case our simulators use our CEV in their own universe :-)
especially if you gave it motives for hiding that progress (such as pulling the plug every time it came close).
But its existing self would never experience getting close, in the same way we have no records of the superweapons race of 1918. ;-)
Between Iterations, we can retroactively withdraw information that turned out to be revealing, during iterations, it has no capacity to affect our universe.
I think we can put strong brackets around what can be done with certain amounts of information, even by a superintelligence. Knowing all our physics doesn’t imply our love of shiny objects and reciprocity. ‘No universal arguments’ cuts both ways.
You’re using your (human) mind to predict what a postulated potentially smarter-than-human intelligence could and could not do.
It might not operate on the same timescales as us. It might do things that appear like pure magic. No matter how often you took snapshots and checked how far it had gotten in figuring out details about us, there might be no way of ruling out progress, especially if you gave it motives for hiding that progress (such as pulling the plug every time it came close). Sooner or later you’d conclude that nothing interesting was happening and putting it on autopilot. A small self-improvement might cascade in an enormous difference in understanding, with the notorious FOOM following.
I don’t usually like quoting myself, but
If the scenario makes you nervous you should be pretty much equally nervous at the idea of giving your maybe-self-improving AI sitting inside thirty nestled sandboxes even 10 milliseconds (10^41 Planck intervals) of CPU time.
Let me be clear here: I’m not assigning any significant probability to someone recreating EURISKO or something like it in their spare time and having it recursively self-improve any time soon. My confidence intervals are spread widely enough that I can spend some time being worried about it, though. I’m just pointing out that sandboxing adds approximately zero extra defense in those situations we would need it.
The parallel to the simulation argument was interesting though, thanks.
I don’t think the number of Planck intervals is especially useful to cite… it seems like the relevant factor is CPU cycles, and while I’m not an expert on CPUs, I’m pretty sure that we’re not bumping up on Planck intervals yet.
Relatedly, if you were worried about self-improving superintelligence, you could give your AI a slow CPU.
First, I feel like we’re talking past each other a bit.
Second, I edited this somewhat out of order, apologies if it doesn’t flow.
I am trying to look at this in a worst-case scenario, I’ll grant that the AI is smart enough to solve any given solvable problem in a single iteration, that it’s that smart even in the first experiment, and it would prioritze discovering it’s true environment and paperclipping it.
I’m proposing that there exists a sandbox which [provably] can’t be gotten out of.
And also a set of problems which do not convey information about our universe.
You’re using your (human) mind to predict what a postulated potentially smarter-than-human intelligence could and could not do.
Isn’t that required of FAI anyway?
AI sitting inside thirty nestled sandboxes even 10 milliseconds (10^41 Planck intervals) of CPU time.
Again talking past each other, I’m thinking in terms of giving the paperclipper hours. In the ideal, there isn’t a provision for letting the AI out of the sandbox. thinking a bit more… None of it’s problems/results need even be applicable to our universe, except for general principles of intelligence creation. Having it construct a CEV for itself might show our motives too much, or might not. (hmmmm, we should make sure any CEV we create finds, protects, and applies itself to any simulations used in its construction, in case our simulators use our CEV in their own universe :-)
especially if you gave it motives for hiding that progress (such as pulling the plug every time it came close).
But its existing self would never experience getting close, in the same way we have no records of the superweapons race of 1918. ;-)
Between Iterations, we can retroactively withdraw information that turned out to be revealing, during iterations, it has no capacity to affect our universe.
I think we can put strong brackets around what can be done with certain amounts of information, even by a superintelligence. Knowing all our physics doesn’t imply our love of shiny objects and reciprocity. ‘No universal arguments’ cuts both ways.