I don’t know if Justin Fisher’s work exactly replicates your own conclusions. However it seems to have much the same motivations, and to have reached many of the same conclusions.
FWIW, it took me about 15 minutes to find that paper in a literature search.
Violation of desire reflection would be a sufficient condition for violation of dynamic consistency, which in turn is a sufficient condition to violate reflective consistency. I don’t see a necessity link.
I don’t know if Justin Fisher’s work exactly replicates your own conclusions. However it seems to have much the same motivations, and to have reached many of the same conclusions.
FWIW, it took me about 15 minutes to find that paper in a literature search.
Another relevant paper:
“No regrets: or: Edith Piaf revamps decision theory”.
That one seems to have christened what you tend to refer to as “consistency under reflection” as “desire reflection”.
I don’t seem to like either term very much—but currently don’t have a better alternative to offer.
Violation of desire reflection would be a sufficient condition for violation of dynamic consistency, which in turn is a sufficient condition to violate reflective consistency. I don’t see a necessity link.