A way of reconciling the two sides of the debate about Newcomb’s problem acknowledges that a rational person should prepare for the problem by cultivating a disposition to one-box. Then whenever the problem arises, the disposition will prompt a prediction of one-boxing and afterwards the act of one-boxing (still freely chosen). Causal decision theory may acknowledge the value of this preparation. It may conclude that cultivating a disposition to one-box is rational although one-boxing itself is irrational. Hence, if in Newcomb’s problem an agent two-boxes, causal decision theory may concede that the agent did not rationally prepare for the problem. It nonetheless maintains that two-boxing itself is rational. Although two-boxing is not the act of a maximally rational agent, it is rational given the circumstances of Newcomb’s problem.
The basic idea of forming a disposition to one-box has been around for a while. Here’s another one:
Prior to entering Newcomb’s Problem, it is rational to form the disposition to one-box.
Realistic decision theory: rules for nonideal agents … by Paul Weirich − 2004
This stronger view employs a disposition-based
conception of rationality; it holds that what should be directly
assessed for ‘rationality’ is dispositions to choose rather than
choices themselves. Intuitively, there is a lot to be said for the
disposition to choose one-box in Newcomb’s problem – people
who go into Newcomb’s problem with this disposition reliably
come out much richer than people who instead go in with the
disposition to choose two-boxes. Similarly, the disposition to
cooperate in a psychologically-similar prisoners’ dilemma
reliably fares much better in this scenario than does the
disposition to defect. A disposition-based conception of
rationality holds that these intuitive observations about
dispositions capture an important insight into the nature of
practical rationality.
I don’t see any reason for thinking this fellow’s work represents “crippleware”.
It seems to me that he agrees with you regarding actions, but differs about terminology.
Here’s the CDT explanation of the terminology:
The basic idea of forming a disposition to one-box has been around for a while. Here’s another one:
Realistic decision theory: rules for nonideal agents … by Paul Weirich − 2004
...and another one:
“DISPOSITION-BASED DECISION THEORY”