Eric Barnes—while appreciating the benefits of taking one box—has harsh words for the “taking one box is rational” folk.
I go on to claim that although the ideal strategy is to adopt a necessitating disposition to take only one box, it is never rational to choose only one box. I defend my answer against the alternative analysis of the paradox provided by David Gauthier, and I conclude that his understanding of the orthodox theory of rationality is mistaken.
Yes, causal decision theorists have been saying harsh words against the winners on Newcomb’s Problem since the dawn of causal decision theory. I am replying to them.
Yes, causal decision theorists have been saying harsh words against the winners on Newcomb’s Problem since the dawn of causal decision theory. I am replying to them.
Newcomb’s Problem capriciously rewards irrational people in the same way that reality capriciously rewards people who irrationally believe their choices matter.
Eric Barnes—while appreciating the benefits of taking one box—has harsh words for the “taking one box is rational” folk.
(Sigh.)
Yes, causal decision theorists have been saying harsh words against the winners on Newcomb’s Problem since the dawn of causal decision theory. I am replying to them.
Note that this is the same guy who says:
He’s drawing a distinction between a “rational action” and the actions of a “rational agent”.
Newcomb’s Problem capriciously rewards irrational people in the same way that reality capriciously rewards people who irrationally believe their choices matter.