So far, “Disposition-Based Decision Theory” (and its apparently-flawed precursor) is the only thing I have seen that apparently claims to address and solve the same problem that is under discussion in this forum:
I suppose there’s also a raft of CDT enthusiasts, who explain why two-boxing is actually not a flaw in their system, and that they have no objections to the idea of agents who one-box. In their case, the debate appears to be over terminology: what does the word “rational” actually mean—is it about choosing the best action from the available options? Or does it mean something else?
Are there other attempts at a solution? Your turn for some references, I feel.
Marion Ledwig’s thesis appears to be an overview of Newcomb’s Problem from 2000. That’s from before the disposition-based decision theory I referenced was worked out—and there’s minimal coverage.
Are you suggesting that there are some proposed solutions to the problem of building a decision theory that “does the right thing” somewhere in there, that pre-date disposition-based decision theory?
The main thesis there (in the section “Newcomb’s Problem as a Game against Nature”) seems to go against what many people think here—and is more along the lines of CDT.
Anyway, since it’s a 300 page thesis, perhaps you would like to be more specific.
Or maybe you are just waving in the general direction of the existing literature. In which case, I fail to see how that addresses my point.
“Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation” dates from 1985. That seems rather unlikely to have relevant coverage either. Again, it came too early—before the first attempts at a solution that I’m aware of.
People have been trying to solve the problem since the day it was presented, and it’s pretty clear that you don’t understand which parts of this particular solution are supposed to be novel. The main novel idea is the incorporation of logical uncertainty into Pearl-style causal graphs and the formulation of the counterfactuals as surgery over those causal graphs.
The idea that rationalists should make lots of money, versus the idea that rationalists should appear very reasonable, has been a central point of controversy from the beginning.
Talking about dispositions and precommitments has been going on since the beginning.
If you’re going to start waving judgments of novelty around, then read the literature.
One problem here is that the “particular solution” tha I am apparently expected to be understanding the novelty of hasn’t actually been published. Instead what we have is some notes.
The problem I was considering involves finding a method which obtains the “right” answer to problems like Newcomb’s problem and The Smoking Problem with a decision theory. If you are trying to solve some other problem, that’s fine.
So far, “Disposition-Based Decision Theory” (and its apparently-flawed precursor) is the only thing I have seen that apparently claims to address and solve the same problem that is under discussion in this forum:
I suppose there’s also a raft of CDT enthusiasts, who explain why two-boxing is actually not a flaw in their system, and that they have no objections to the idea of agents who one-box. In their case, the debate appears to be over terminology: what does the word “rational” actually mean—is it about choosing the best action from the available options? Or does it mean something else?
Are there other attempts at a solution? Your turn for some references, I feel.
“Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation” (the edited volume) will give you a feel for the basics, as will reading Marion Ledwig’s thesis paper.
Marion Ledwig’s thesis appears to be an overview of Newcomb’s Problem from 2000. That’s from before the disposition-based decision theory I referenced was worked out—and there’s minimal coverage.
Are you suggesting that there are some proposed solutions to the problem of building a decision theory that “does the right thing” somewhere in there, that pre-date disposition-based decision theory?
The main thesis there (in the section “Newcomb’s Problem as a Game against Nature”) seems to go against what many people think here—and is more along the lines of CDT.
Anyway, since it’s a 300 page thesis, perhaps you would like to be more specific.
Or maybe you are just waving in the general direction of the existing literature. In which case, I fail to see how that addresses my point.
“Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation” dates from 1985. That seems rather unlikely to have relevant coverage either. Again, it came too early—before the first attempts at a solution that I’m aware of.
People have been trying to solve the problem since the day it was presented, and it’s pretty clear that you don’t understand which parts of this particular solution are supposed to be novel. The main novel idea is the incorporation of logical uncertainty into Pearl-style causal graphs and the formulation of the counterfactuals as surgery over those causal graphs.
The idea that rationalists should make lots of money, versus the idea that rationalists should appear very reasonable, has been a central point of controversy from the beginning.
Talking about dispositions and precommitments has been going on since the beginning.
If you’re going to start waving judgments of novelty around, then read the literature.
One problem here is that the “particular solution” tha I am apparently expected to be understanding the novelty of hasn’t actually been published. Instead what we have is some notes.
The problem I was considering involves finding a method which obtains the “right” answer to problems like Newcomb’s problem and The Smoking Problem with a decision theory. If you are trying to solve some other problem, that’s fine.