I’m well aware they could be wrong—in fact that’s my whole point. The answer depends on which moral theory is true—even though only one theory is actually true. It’s a counterfactual.
Since Aris says they’re not a moral reletavist, I suspect this is at least similar to what they intended. If it’s not, I’d still endorse it.
why would an “ethciical/moral set” be what makes a moral claim (realistically) true? Realists tend to think claims are rendered true by some sort of fact.
The position of realism + belief in such a fact is one such “ethical/moral set”, as I meant it. I think that may have come across as referring to different terminal values or something?
I believe we’ve established that shminux’s position allows for some models to be made more accurate than others by events, not beliefs in events. I think these two positions are analogous.
Whoops! You’re entirely right; I should have read the parent-tree before responding, but I was confident that I knew what the conversation was. Retracted.
Sure. Which theory will be believed to be true depends on which facts are believed to be true, and which theory is actually true will depend on which facts are actually true. But beleiving one thing to be true becuae you believe another to be tirue is non argument for relativism, although careless wording can make it seem that way.
I’m well aware they could be wrong—in fact that’s my whole point. The answer depends on which moral theory is true—even though only one theory is actually true. It’s a counterfactual.
Since Aris says they’re not a moral reletavist, I suspect this is at least similar to what they intended. If it’s not, I’d still endorse it.
why would an “ethciical/moral set” be what makes a moral claim (realistically) true? Realists tend to think claims are rendered true by some sort of fact.
The position of realism + belief in such a fact is one such “ethical/moral set”, as I meant it. I think that may have come across as referring to different terminal values or something?
Realists think claims are made true by facts, not beliefs in facts.
I believe we’ve established that shminux’s position allows for some models to be made more accurate than others by events, not beliefs in events. I think these two positions are analogous.
Different conversation ;)
We’re talking about moral realism here, sort of.
Whoops! You’re entirely right; I should have read the parent-tree before responding, but I was confident that I knew what the conversation was. Retracted.
Right, but it depends which facts are true. The answer is contingent on these disputed facts.
ETA: edited for wording.
Sure. Which theory will be believed to be true depends on which facts are believed to be true, and which theory is actually true will depend on which facts are actually true. But beleiving one thing to be true becuae you believe another to be tirue is non argument for relativism, although careless wording can make it seem that way.
Sorry, I’m having trouble parsing that :( Possibly because I’m misreading the typos?