Wei, yes my comment was less clear than I was hoping. I was talking about the distinction between ‘psychological hedonism’ and ‘hedonism’ and I also mentioned the many person versions of these theories (‘psychological utilitarianism’ and ‘utilitarianism’). Lets forget about the many person versions for the moment and just look at the simple theories.
Hedonism is the theory that the only thing good for each individual is his or her happiness. If you have two worlds, A and B and the happiness for Mary is higher in world A, then world A is better for Mary. This is a theory of what makes someone’s life go well, or to put it another way, about what is of objective value in a person’s life. It is often used as a component of an ethical theory such as utilitarianism.
Psychological hedonism is the theory that people ultimately aim to increase their happiness. Thus, if they can do one of two acts, X and Y and realise that X will increase their happiness more than Y, they will do X. This is not a theory of what makes someone’s life go well, or a theory of ethics. It is merely a theory of psychological motivation. In other words, it is a scientific hypothesis which says that people are wired up so that they are ultimately pursuing their own happiness.
There is some connection between these theories, but it is quite possible to hold one and not the other. For example, I think that hedonism is true but psychological hedonism is false. I even think this can be a good thing since people get more happiness when not directly aiming at it. Helping your lover because you love them leads to more happiness than helping them in order to get more happiness. It is also quite possible to accept psychological hedonism and not hedonism. You might think that people are motivated to increase their happiness, but that they shouldn’t be. For example, it might be best for them to live a profound life, not a happy one.
Each theory says that happiness is the utlimate thing of value in a certain sense, but these are different senses. The first is about what I would call actual value: it is about the type of value that is involved in a ‘should’ claim. It is normative. The second is about what people are actually motivated to do. It is involved in ‘would’ claims.
Eliezer has shown that he does care about some of the things that make him happy over and above the happiness they bring, however he asked:
‘The question, rather, is whether we should care about the things that make us happy, apart from any happiness they bring.’
Whether he would do something and whether he should are different things, and I’m not satisfied that he has answered the latter.
Wei, yes my comment was less clear than I was hoping. I was talking about the distinction between ‘psychological hedonism’ and ‘hedonism’ and I also mentioned the many person versions of these theories (‘psychological utilitarianism’ and ‘utilitarianism’). Lets forget about the many person versions for the moment and just look at the simple theories.
Hedonism is the theory that the only thing good for each individual is his or her happiness. If you have two worlds, A and B and the happiness for Mary is higher in world A, then world A is better for Mary. This is a theory of what makes someone’s life go well, or to put it another way, about what is of objective value in a person’s life. It is often used as a component of an ethical theory such as utilitarianism.
Psychological hedonism is the theory that people ultimately aim to increase their happiness. Thus, if they can do one of two acts, X and Y and realise that X will increase their happiness more than Y, they will do X. This is not a theory of what makes someone’s life go well, or a theory of ethics. It is merely a theory of psychological motivation. In other words, it is a scientific hypothesis which says that people are wired up so that they are ultimately pursuing their own happiness.
There is some connection between these theories, but it is quite possible to hold one and not the other. For example, I think that hedonism is true but psychological hedonism is false. I even think this can be a good thing since people get more happiness when not directly aiming at it. Helping your lover because you love them leads to more happiness than helping them in order to get more happiness. It is also quite possible to accept psychological hedonism and not hedonism. You might think that people are motivated to increase their happiness, but that they shouldn’t be. For example, it might be best for them to live a profound life, not a happy one.
Each theory says that happiness is the utlimate thing of value in a certain sense, but these are different senses. The first is about what I would call actual value: it is about the type of value that is involved in a ‘should’ claim. It is normative. The second is about what people are actually motivated to do. It is involved in ‘would’ claims.
Eliezer has shown that he does care about some of the things that make him happy over and above the happiness they bring, however he asked:
‘The question, rather, is whether we should care about the things that make us happy, apart from any happiness they bring.’
Whether he would do something and whether he should are different things, and I’m not satisfied that he has answered the latter.