When people speak about politics, they often get funny in the head, so the credibility of what they say is extremely low. Something similar seems to happen in anthropology—the “foreign people” are used as a canvas to illustrate our political opinions. Therefore the credibility of anything related to anthropology should be also very low… unless accompanied with a lot of data. By which I mean: if you say that X is true for people everywhere, you better show me you did real experiments in different cultures. Also, if you tell me that X is different.
I liked your analysis of the “attractors”, but the “anthropology is a mind-killer” seems under-justified. More talk about politics really does seem to do harm by causing people to break into factions. Are you arguing that anthropology talk creates factions? Or does it just manifest factions that already exist?
You don’t seem to me to have picked out anything particularly dangerous about anthropology talk. It does often serve as a “canvas to illustrate our political opinions”, but the same can be said of any subject where people mostly talk and think in a “far” mode.
For what it is worth, I think Villiam_Bur is completely right that personal identity (as Graham means the term) is the mindkiller. Thus, all personal identity discussion should be viewed with exactly the skepticism of political discussion.
The problem is that discussions of these types of topic seem to incorrectly assume that they are not discussing personal identity, and so don’t need to be wary of the mindkiller.
There’s a potential issue in keeping your identity small; I’ve noticed it within myself: I dislike people who don’t. It annoys the hell out of me, and I regard them as part of the outgroup.
Which suggests to me that “keeping your identity small” (“individualism,” loosely speaking) is part of my identity.
I’m not sure if this is an actual problem, so for now I simply keep it in the back of my mind as a potential biasing factor.
Which suggests to me that “keeping your identity small” (“individualism,” loosely speaking) is part of my identity.
I think incorporating Graham’s lesson is valuable to being rational.
That said, I don’t think “individualism” is the only way to keep your identity small. For example, a collectivist is perfectly capable of having a small identity.
On the one hand, having fewer identifiers seems a useful definition; it means fewer potential points of bias.
On the other, having fewer -shared- identifiers -also- seems a useful definition; it means fewer potential agents you are going to share a bias with. From the individualist perspective, you want the most accurate information for yourself, and you’re less likely to regard ideas from the ingroup with sufficient criticism. But from the collectivist perspective, you want the most accurate information for your group, which suggests that the rationalist collectivist doesn’t include the collective as part of their identity.
In this context, individualist and collectivist are labels that describe an agent’s preferred social arrangements and social norms. There’s nothing about keeping one’s identity small that prohibits one from having a higher priority for group preferences than individual preferences.
Are you arguing that anthropology talk creates factions? Or does it just manifest factions that already exist?
It provides justifications for them. It allows existing factions to pretend they are fact-based, by creating a (possibly fictional) description of foreign people which confirms the map of the world used by the faction. This will make other people join the faction, even if they originally just wanted to see the territory as it is.
As an example, if I am part of a faction that worships unicorns, I can gain more followers by publishing a textbook describing a foreign society which worships unicorns and therefore has no wars and violence, and a lot of cookies. Now when you know how much happiness unicorn worship brings, you are more likely to join us. And you know it must be true, because it was taught at a university.
if you say that X is true for people everywhere, you better show me you did real experiments in different cultures. Also, if you tell me that X is different.
That’s very reasonable standard, but I don’t think people apply it consistently in this part of concept-space. I agree that people go funny in the head when dealing with personal identity, so one should be more critical of assertions about the universality (or distinctiveness) of a particular identity.
For example, this comment makes an assertion that certain types of effective self-improvement universally have particular properties that some people find undesirable. The universality of that property can (and is) challenged on an empirical basis, but such a possible change was not addressed—or even acknowledged as possible.
Further, sometimes people use your personal-identity-is-the-mindkiller point as a fully general counter-argument to policy positions they don’t like.
When people speak about politics, they often get funny in the head, so the credibility of what they say is extremely low. Something similar seems to happen in anthropology—the “foreign people” are used as a canvas to illustrate our political opinions. Therefore the credibility of anything related to anthropology should be also very low… unless accompanied with a lot of data. By which I mean: if you say that X is true for people everywhere, you better show me you did real experiments in different cultures. Also, if you tell me that X is different.
I liked your analysis of the “attractors”, but the “anthropology is a mind-killer” seems under-justified. More talk about politics really does seem to do harm by causing people to break into factions. Are you arguing that anthropology talk creates factions? Or does it just manifest factions that already exist?
You don’t seem to me to have picked out anything particularly dangerous about anthropology talk. It does often serve as a “canvas to illustrate our political opinions”, but the same can be said of any subject where people mostly talk and think in a “far” mode.
For what it is worth, I think Villiam_Bur is completely right that personal identity (as Graham means the term) is the mindkiller. Thus, all personal identity discussion should be viewed with exactly the skepticism of political discussion.
The problem is that discussions of these types of topic seem to incorrectly assume that they are not discussing personal identity, and so don’t need to be wary of the mindkiller.
There’s a potential issue in keeping your identity small; I’ve noticed it within myself: I dislike people who don’t. It annoys the hell out of me, and I regard them as part of the outgroup.
Which suggests to me that “keeping your identity small” (“individualism,” loosely speaking) is part of my identity.
I’m not sure if this is an actual problem, so for now I simply keep it in the back of my mind as a potential biasing factor.
I think incorporating Graham’s lesson is valuable to being rational.
That said, I don’t think “individualism” is the only way to keep your identity small. For example, a collectivist is perfectly capable of having a small identity.
Now I ponder what “small” means, exactly.
On the one hand, having fewer identifiers seems a useful definition; it means fewer potential points of bias.
On the other, having fewer -shared- identifiers -also- seems a useful definition; it means fewer potential agents you are going to share a bias with. From the individualist perspective, you want the most accurate information for yourself, and you’re less likely to regard ideas from the ingroup with sufficient criticism. But from the collectivist perspective, you want the most accurate information for your group, which suggests that the rationalist collectivist doesn’t include the collective as part of their identity.
Unless I miss an alternative logic?
I don’t think Graham expects one’s identifiers not be shared with others. He’s arguing the point more in line with your first definition, in that the more aspects you add to your personal identity, the more sources of bias one must avoid. As Graham says, “all other things being equal, the best plan is to let as few things into your identity as possible.”
In this context, individualist and collectivist are labels that describe an agent’s preferred social arrangements and social norms. There’s nothing about keeping one’s identity small that prohibits one from having a higher priority for group preferences than individual preferences.
It provides justifications for them. It allows existing factions to pretend they are fact-based, by creating a (possibly fictional) description of foreign people which confirms the map of the world used by the faction. This will make other people join the faction, even if they originally just wanted to see the territory as it is.
As an example, if I am part of a faction that worships unicorns, I can gain more followers by publishing a textbook describing a foreign society which worships unicorns and therefore has no wars and violence, and a lot of cookies. Now when you know how much happiness unicorn worship brings, you are more likely to join us. And you know it must be true, because it was taught at a university.
That’s very reasonable standard, but I don’t think people apply it consistently in this part of concept-space. I agree that people go funny in the head when dealing with personal identity, so one should be more critical of assertions about the universality (or distinctiveness) of a particular identity.
For example, this comment makes an assertion that certain types of effective self-improvement universally have particular properties that some people find undesirable. The universality of that property can (and is) challenged on an empirical basis, but such a possible change was not addressed—or even acknowledged as possible.
Further, sometimes people use your personal-identity-is-the-mindkiller point as a fully general counter-argument to policy positions they don’t like.