However, I have a question. How would you distinguish a case where anticipations of goodness are not matching expected consequences of goodness (aside: I think “goodness of consequences” is a less awkward / more accurate formulation here, actually), from a case where expected goodness of consequences differs from claimed expected goodness of consequences?
In other words:
Alice: You should work on Project X!
Bob: Why?
Alice: Project X is very important! If accomplished, the consequences will be [stuff]!
Bob: Really?
Alice: Yeah! Because of [reasons]!
Bob, thinking: That sounds dubious but I can’t really explain why…
Bob: I am convinced.
Bob, thinking: I am not convinced…
Alice: Great! Then you’ll work on Project X, right? Because it’s so important?
Bob, thinking: There’s no good reason for me to say no…
Bob: Of course I’ll work on Project X.
Bob, thinking: I won’t work on Project X.
Later:
Alice: Bob, why haven’t you been working on Project X?!
Bob, thinking: If I tell her that I was never convinced in the first place, that will look bad…
Bob: Uh, motivation…al… problems. My, uh, System 1. And stuff. You know how it is.
Alice: Confounded System 1! Don’t worry, Bob, I’ll figure out a way around this problem!
Bob: Great! I look forward to being able to work on Project X, which is important.
This is a reasonable point.
However, I have a question. How would you distinguish a case where anticipations of goodness are not matching expected consequences of goodness (aside: I think “goodness of consequences” is a less awkward / more accurate formulation here, actually), from a case where expected goodness of consequences differs from claimed expected goodness of consequences?
In other words:
Alice: You should work on Project X!
Bob: Why?
Alice: Project X is very important! If accomplished, the consequences will be [stuff]!
Bob: Really?
Alice: Yeah! Because of [reasons]!
Bob, thinking: That sounds dubious but I can’t really explain why…
Bob: I am convinced.
Bob, thinking: I am not convinced…
Alice: Great! Then you’ll work on Project X, right? Because it’s so important?
Bob, thinking: There’s no good reason for me to say no…
Bob: Of course I’ll work on Project X.
Bob, thinking: I won’t work on Project X.
Later:
Alice: Bob, why haven’t you been working on Project X?!
Bob, thinking: If I tell her that I was never convinced in the first place, that will look bad…
Bob: Uh, motivation…al… problems. My, uh, System 1. And stuff. You know how it is.
Alice: Confounded System 1! Don’t worry, Bob, I’ll figure out a way around this problem!
Bob: Great! I look forward to being able to work on Project X, which is important.
Bob, thinking: Phew…
Edit: See also “epistemic learned helplessness” (which, as Scott points out, is exactly the correct response much of the time).