[i]Anyway it is true that MWI does entail that there is some non-zero possibility that your next words will be in Klingon. But the possibility is so small that the universe is likely to end many, many times over before it ever happens.[/i]
This all could just be an issue of me being massively off on the probabilities, but aren’t there a greater number of possibilities that my next words will be not be in English than in English, and therefore a greater probability that what I would say would not be in English? And in this particular example, there are a number of universes that have branched off that I would have spoken Klingon. I’m not understanding the limitation that would demonstrate that there are more universes where I spoke English instead (i.e. why would there be a bell curve distribution with English sentences being the most frequently demonstrated average?)
And I do want to more clearly re-iterate that I’m not talking about Everett’s formal proof, but the purely philosophical ramifications you mention (and also, I haven’t got some earth shattering thesis waiting in the wings, I’m just describing my confusion). QM is fact, and MWI is a way of interpreting it. For whatever reason, I’m interested in that interpretation. So chalk it up to me thinking through a dumb question. I don’t believe I’ve falsified a mainstream QM theory. I do feel I’ve demonstrated to my satisfaction that I don’t fully understand the metaphysical implications of MWI. It sounds easier to just chalk it up to “it’s the equations”, but I do find the potential implications interesting.
This all could just be an issue of me being massively off on the probabilities, but aren’t there a greater number of possibilities that my next words will be not be in English than in English, and therefore a greater probability that what I would say would not be in English? And in this particular example, there are a number of universes that have branched off that I would have spoken Klingon. I’m not understanding the limitation that would demonstrate that there are more universes where I spoke English instead (i.e. why would there be a bell curve distribution with English sentences being the most frequently demonstrated average?)
Not all “possibilities”, as you describe them, are equally likely. If I enter 2+2 into my calculator, and MWI is correct, there would be some worlds in which some transistors don’t behave normally (because of thermal noise, cosmic rays, or whatever), bits flip themselves, and the calculator ends up displaying some number that isn’t “4″. The calculator can display lots of different numbers, and 4 is only one of them, but in order for any other number to appear, something weird had to have happened—and by weird, I mean “eggs unscrambling themselves” kind of weird. (Transistors are much smaller than chicken eggs, so flipped bits in a calculator are more like a microscopic egg unscrambling itself, but you get the idea.)
MWI basically says that, yes, someone will win the quantum lottery, but it won’t be you.
This and the other probability discussions above have greatly helped me to understand what MWI was getting at. I wasn’t fully grasping what the limitations were, that MWI wasn’t describing limitless possibilities happening infinitely.
but aren’t there a greater number of possibilities that my next words will be not be in English than in English, and therefore a greater probability that what I would say would not be in English?
No. So QM says that at time t every sub atomic particle in your brain has a superposition- a field which gives the possibility that that particle will be found at that location in the field. There is no end to the field but only a very small area will have a non-insignificant probability magnitude. Now scale up to the atomic level. Atoms will similarly have superpositions- these superpositions will be dictated by the superpositions of the subatomic particles which make up the atom. You can keep scaling up. The larger the scale the lower the chances of anything crazy happening is because for an entire atom to be discovered on the other side of the room every particle it is made up of would have to have tunneled ten feet at the same time to the same place. This is true for molecules that make up the entire brain mass. Whatever molecular/brain structural conditions that make you an English speaker at time t are very likely to remain in place at time t2 since their superposition is just a composite of the superpositions of their parts (well not really, my understanding is that it is way more complicated than that, suffice to say that the chances of many particles being discovered away from the peak of their wavefunction is much lower than the chance of finding a single electron outside the peak of its wavefunction).
For our purposes many worlds just says all of the possible outcomes happen. The chances you should assign to experiencing any one of these possibilities are just the chances you should assign to finding yourself in the world in which that possibility happens. Since in nearly all Everett branches you will still be speaking English (nearly all of the particles will have remained in approximately the same place) you should predict that you will never experience un mundo donde personas hablan espanol sin razones!
Heh. Right now, I’m pretty sure the QM does preclude robust, folk understandings of causation. But tell me, what is it that causation gives you that you want so badly?
Thanks, again, this is the type of explanation that helps me to much better understand the possibilities MWI was addressing. And causation just gives me the reasonable expectation that physics models, biology theories, do adequately model our world without worrying about spooking action throwing too big of a monkey wrench into things.
Hi Jack,
[i]Anyway it is true that MWI does entail that there is some non-zero possibility that your next words will be in Klingon. But the possibility is so small that the universe is likely to end many, many times over before it ever happens.[/i]
This all could just be an issue of me being massively off on the probabilities, but aren’t there a greater number of possibilities that my next words will be not be in English than in English, and therefore a greater probability that what I would say would not be in English? And in this particular example, there are a number of universes that have branched off that I would have spoken Klingon. I’m not understanding the limitation that would demonstrate that there are more universes where I spoke English instead (i.e. why would there be a bell curve distribution with English sentences being the most frequently demonstrated average?)
And I do want to more clearly re-iterate that I’m not talking about Everett’s formal proof, but the purely philosophical ramifications you mention (and also, I haven’t got some earth shattering thesis waiting in the wings, I’m just describing my confusion). QM is fact, and MWI is a way of interpreting it. For whatever reason, I’m interested in that interpretation. So chalk it up to me thinking through a dumb question. I don’t believe I’ve falsified a mainstream QM theory. I do feel I’ve demonstrated to my satisfaction that I don’t fully understand the metaphysical implications of MWI. It sounds easier to just chalk it up to “it’s the equations”, but I do find the potential implications interesting.
Not all “possibilities”, as you describe them, are equally likely. If I enter 2+2 into my calculator, and MWI is correct, there would be some worlds in which some transistors don’t behave normally (because of thermal noise, cosmic rays, or whatever), bits flip themselves, and the calculator ends up displaying some number that isn’t “4″. The calculator can display lots of different numbers, and 4 is only one of them, but in order for any other number to appear, something weird had to have happened—and by weird, I mean “eggs unscrambling themselves” kind of weird. (Transistors are much smaller than chicken eggs, so flipped bits in a calculator are more like a microscopic egg unscrambling itself, but you get the idea.)
MWI basically says that, yes, someone will win the quantum lottery, but it won’t be you.
This and the other probability discussions above have greatly helped me to understand what MWI was getting at. I wasn’t fully grasping what the limitations were, that MWI wasn’t describing limitless possibilities happening infinitely.
No. So QM says that at time t every sub atomic particle in your brain has a superposition- a field which gives the possibility that that particle will be found at that location in the field. There is no end to the field but only a very small area will have a non-insignificant probability magnitude. Now scale up to the atomic level. Atoms will similarly have superpositions- these superpositions will be dictated by the superpositions of the subatomic particles which make up the atom. You can keep scaling up. The larger the scale the lower the chances of anything crazy happening is because for an entire atom to be discovered on the other side of the room every particle it is made up of would have to have tunneled ten feet at the same time to the same place. This is true for molecules that make up the entire brain mass. Whatever molecular/brain structural conditions that make you an English speaker at time t are very likely to remain in place at time t2 since their superposition is just a composite of the superpositions of their parts (well not really, my understanding is that it is way more complicated than that, suffice to say that the chances of many particles being discovered away from the peak of their wavefunction is much lower than the chance of finding a single electron outside the peak of its wavefunction).
For our purposes many worlds just says all of the possible outcomes happen. The chances you should assign to experiencing any one of these possibilities are just the chances you should assign to finding yourself in the world in which that possibility happens. Since in nearly all Everett branches you will still be speaking English (nearly all of the particles will have remained in approximately the same place) you should predict that you will never experience un mundo donde personas hablan espanol sin razones!
Heh. Right now, I’m pretty sure the QM does preclude robust, folk understandings of causation. But tell me, what is it that causation gives you that you want so badly?
Thanks, again, this is the type of explanation that helps me to much better understand the possibilities MWI was addressing. And causation just gives me the reasonable expectation that physics models, biology theories, do adequately model our world without worrying about spooking action throwing too big of a monkey wrench into things.
Sure. And don’t worry about causation, you can inference and make predictions just fine without it.