I can’t think of better arguments agains souls than the one on offer. It is among the most observation-based arguments we have and observation-based arguments are usually much stronger than a priori reasoning.
Soul --> Pineal Gland --> Broca’s Area --> Grammatical Language Production
The problem with this (and related theories) is that the soul believers believe that the soul itself can live and think without the body. Much of thinking is mediated by language. I don’t think a believer in soul would accept that their soul after death will be incapable of thought until God provides it a substitute pineal gland.
As I see it, the likelihood of the evidence being considered here (local brain damage causes specific behavioral deficits) on either of these theories is as high as it is on physicalism.
Yes, enough complicated theories postulating brain-dependent souls can survive the argument without harm. But these theories are standing pretty low a priori—as I have said above, ordinary believers believe in a brain independent soul, rather than in complex non-beliefs specifically constructed to make existence of soul untestable.
It is among the most observation-based arguments we have and observation-based arguments are usually much stronger than a priori reasoning.
Well, yes, except that the observations being called on here don’t actually differentiate between soul theories and non-soul theories. That was the whole point of my remark: both kinds of theory save the phenomena.
The problem with this (and related theories) is that the soul believers believe that the soul itself can live and think without the body. Much of thinking is mediated by language. I don’t think a believer in soul would accept that their soul after death will be incapable of thought until God provides it a substitute pineal gland.
This just looks like a non sequitur to me. If the soul thinks on its own but only gets to communicate to other souls via a body, you get the same observational consequences. If souls have their own language of thought, then thinking might still be mediated by language and yet that mediation not require a body. (On a side note, medieval theologian-philosophers had a very serious argument about whether dis-embodied souls could sense anything. I don’t think it’s a huge stretch from “a soul requires a body in order to have sensations” to “a soul requires a body in order to think anything.” One question you might want to ask here is whether you are interested in going after the best possible soul theory or going after the probably-confused beliefs of typical soul-believers.)
I agree with your last remark—that soul theories are less probable a priori. But that wasn’t the issue that Richard was raising. The question is how the evidence of specific functional losses due to specific, localized brain damage bears on soul theories (or dualism more generally). Evidence only comes in through the likelihood. Simplicity arguments are, I think, good arguments against souls: souls get shaved right off by Ockham’s razor. But simplicity arguments are not arguments from evidence, they are arguments from method. That is, the evidence could be equally likely on two different hypotheses but one of them could still be preferred—not because it fails to save the phenomena but because it requires extra machinery in order to do so.
If the soul thinks on its own but only gets to communicate to other souls via a body, you get the same observational consequences. If souls have their own language of thought, then thinking might still be mediated by language and yet that mediation not require a body.
I haven’t said “thinking is mediated by language, therefore souls need body to think”. I have said “if souls need body to understand and actively use language, then souls need body to think”.
One question you might want to ask here is whether you are interested in going after the best possible soul theory or going after the probably-confused beliefs of typical soul-believers.
To answer your question reliably I’d need to know what do you mean by “the best possible soul theory”. If it means “the theory which is most carefully crafted to avoid contradiction with observational evidence”, then I am probably more interested in beliefs of typical soul-believers. Moreover, I wouldn’t call the overfitted soul theory “best” and the ordinary beliefs “confused”; this creates impression that theology clears up confusion of folk religion. My opinion is that theology only replaces simple confusion with elaborate confusion of greater magnitude.
I wonder whether anybody would start believing in soul if the idea was first presented to them in form of “the best soul theory”.
What I mean is just to give your opponent the best possible position reasonably consistent with his or her assertions. In other words, be charitable. The reason is that if you knock down a weak version of your opponent’s thesis, you leave the stronger versions on the table. Why not knock them all down by taking on the strongest possible version of your opponent’s thesis?
Moreover, I wouldn’t call the overfitted soul theory “best” and the ordinary beliefs “confused”; this creates impression that theology clears up confusion of folk religion. My opinion is that theology only replaces simple confusion with elaborate confusion of greater magnitude.
Those are not incompatible. A soul theory could be the best of its kind and still be a worthless pile of confusion. My point, again, is just to give the opponent the best shot possible at being right (without, of course, just making him or her a physicalist).
The problem with this (and related theories) is that the soul believers believe that the soul itself can live and think without the body. Much of thinking is mediated by language. I don’t think a believer in soul would accept that their soul after death will be incapable of thought until God provides it a substitute pineal gland.
Actually, the concept of soul without language makes more sense on its own and fits more religious traditions (especially if you abandon literal translations) than souls that have language.
I can’t think of better arguments agains souls than the one on offer. It is among the most observation-based arguments we have and observation-based arguments are usually much stronger than a priori reasoning.
The problem with this (and related theories) is that the soul believers believe that the soul itself can live and think without the body. Much of thinking is mediated by language. I don’t think a believer in soul would accept that their soul after death will be incapable of thought until God provides it a substitute pineal gland.
Yes, enough complicated theories postulating brain-dependent souls can survive the argument without harm. But these theories are standing pretty low a priori—as I have said above, ordinary believers believe in a brain independent soul, rather than in complex non-beliefs specifically constructed to make existence of soul untestable.
Well, yes, except that the observations being called on here don’t actually differentiate between soul theories and non-soul theories. That was the whole point of my remark: both kinds of theory save the phenomena.
This just looks like a non sequitur to me. If the soul thinks on its own but only gets to communicate to other souls via a body, you get the same observational consequences. If souls have their own language of thought, then thinking might still be mediated by language and yet that mediation not require a body. (On a side note, medieval theologian-philosophers had a very serious argument about whether dis-embodied souls could sense anything. I don’t think it’s a huge stretch from “a soul requires a body in order to have sensations” to “a soul requires a body in order to think anything.” One question you might want to ask here is whether you are interested in going after the best possible soul theory or going after the probably-confused beliefs of typical soul-believers.)
I agree with your last remark—that soul theories are less probable a priori. But that wasn’t the issue that Richard was raising. The question is how the evidence of specific functional losses due to specific, localized brain damage bears on soul theories (or dualism more generally). Evidence only comes in through the likelihood. Simplicity arguments are, I think, good arguments against souls: souls get shaved right off by Ockham’s razor. But simplicity arguments are not arguments from evidence, they are arguments from method. That is, the evidence could be equally likely on two different hypotheses but one of them could still be preferred—not because it fails to save the phenomena but because it requires extra machinery in order to do so.
I haven’t said “thinking is mediated by language, therefore souls need body to think”. I have said “if souls need body to understand and actively use language, then souls need body to think”.
To answer your question reliably I’d need to know what do you mean by “the best possible soul theory”. If it means “the theory which is most carefully crafted to avoid contradiction with observational evidence”, then I am probably more interested in beliefs of typical soul-believers. Moreover, I wouldn’t call the overfitted soul theory “best” and the ordinary beliefs “confused”; this creates impression that theology clears up confusion of folk religion. My opinion is that theology only replaces simple confusion with elaborate confusion of greater magnitude.
I wonder whether anybody would start believing in soul if the idea was first presented to them in form of “the best soul theory”.
What I mean is just to give your opponent the best possible position reasonably consistent with his or her assertions. In other words, be charitable. The reason is that if you knock down a weak version of your opponent’s thesis, you leave the stronger versions on the table. Why not knock them all down by taking on the strongest possible version of your opponent’s thesis?
Those are not incompatible. A soul theory could be the best of its kind and still be a worthless pile of confusion. My point, again, is just to give the opponent the best shot possible at being right (without, of course, just making him or her a physicalist).
There are certainly theologians who have posited that souls do not do anything so crass as ‘thinking’, but I can’t think of a reference at the moment.
Actually, the concept of soul without language makes more sense on its own and fits more religious traditions (especially if you abandon literal translations) than souls that have language.