It’s a matter if fact that information ontology i isn’t the established consensus in the way that evolution is. You are entitled to opinions, but not to pass off opinions as fact. There is enough confusion about physics already.
You bring in the issue of objections to information ontology The unstated argument seems to be that since there are no valid objections, there is nothing to stop it becoming the established consensus, so it is as good as.
What would a universe in which information is not fundamental look like, as opposed to one where it is? I would expect a universe where information is not fundamental to look like one where information always requires some physical, material or energetic, medium or carrier—a sheet of paper,, radio wave,a train of pulses going down T1 line. That appears to be the case.
I am not sure why you brought Bostrom in. For what it’s worth, I don’t think a Bostrom style mathematical universe is quite the same as a single universe information ontology.
But avoiding or proscribing the question of whether we have consciousness
I don’t know who you think is doing that, .or why you brought it in. Do you think .IO helps with the mind body problem? I think you need to do more than subtract the stuffiness from matter. If we could easily see how a rich conception of consciousness could supervene on pure information, we would easily be able to see how computers could have qualia, which we can’t. We need more in our ontology, not less.
If we could easily see how a rich conception of consciousness could supervene on pure information
I have to confess that I might be the one person in this business who never really understood the concept of supervenience—either “weak supervenience” or “strong supervenience.” I’ve read Chalmers, Dennett, the journals on the concept… never really “snapped-in” for me. So when the term is used, I have to just recuse myself and let those who do understand it, finish their line of thought.
To me, supevenience seems like a fuzzy way to repackage epiphenomenalism, or to finesse some kind of antinomy (for them), like, “can’t live with eliminative materialism, can’t live with dualism, can’t live with type—type identity theory, and token-token identity theory is untestable and difficult even to give logical nec and sufficient conditions for, so… lets have a new word.” So, (my unruly suspicion tells me) let’s say mental events (states, processes, whatever) “supervene” on physiological states (events, etc.)
As I say, so far, I have just had to suspend judgement and wonder if some day “supervene” will snap-in and be intuitively penetrable to me. I push all the definitions, and get to the same place—a “I don’t get it” place, but that doesn’t mean I believe the concept is itself defective. I just have to suspend judgement (like, for the last 25 years of study or so.)
We need more in our ontology, not less.
I actually believe that, too… but with a unique take: I think we all operate with a logical ontology … not in the sense of modus ponens, but in the sense that a memory space can be “logical”, meaning in this context, detached from physical memory.
Further, the construction of this logical ontology is, I think, partly culturally influenced, partly influenced by the species’ sensorium and equipment, party influenced / constructed by something like Jeff Hawkins’ prediction-expectation memory model… constructed, bequeathed culturally, and in several additional related, ways that also tune the idealized, logical ontology.
Memetics influences (in conjunction with native—although changeable—abilities in those memes’ host vectors) the genesis, maintenance, and evolution of this “logical ontology”, also. This is feed foward and feed backward. Memetics influences the logical ontology, which crystalizes into additional memetic templates that are kept, tuning further the logical ontology.
Once “established” (and it constantly evolves), this “logical” ontology is the “target” that, over time, a new (say, human, while growing up, growing old) has as the “target” data structures that it creates a virtual, phenomenological analog simulation of, and as the person gains experience, the person’s virtual reality simulation of the world converges on something that is in some way consistently isomorphically related to this “logical” idealized ontology.
So (and there is lots of neurology research that drives much of this, though it may all sound rather speculative) for me, there are TWO ontologies, BOTH of them constructed, and those are in addition to the entangled “outside world” quantum substrate, which is by definition inherently both sub-ontological (properly understood) and not sensible, (It is sub-ontological because of its nature, but is interrogatable, giving feedback helping to form boundary conditions for the idealized logical ontology (or ontologies, in different species.)
I’ll add that I think the “logical ontology” is also species dependent, unsurprisingly.
I think you and I got off on the wrong foot, maybe you found my tone too declaratory when it should have been phrased more subjunctively. I’ll take your point. But since you obviously have a philosophy competence, you will know what the following means:-- one can say my views resemble somewhat an updated quasi-Kantian model, supplemented with the idea that noumena are the inchoate quantum substrate.
Or perhaps to correct that, in my model there are two “noumenal” realms: one is the “logical ontology” I referred to, a logical data structure, and the other is the one below that, and below ALL ontologies, which is the quantum substrate, necessarily “subontological.”
But my theory (there is more than I have just shot through quickly right now) handles species-relative qualia and the species-relative logical ontologies across species.
Remaining issues include : how qualia are generated. And the same question for the sense of self. I have ideas how to solve these, and the indexical 1st person problem, connected with the basis problem. Neurology studies of default mode network behavior and architecture, its malfunction, and metacognition, epilepsy, etc, help a lot.
Think this is speculative? You should read neruologists these days, especially the better, data driven ones. (Perhaps you already know, and you will thus see where I derive some of my supporting research.)
Anyway, always, always, I am trying to solve all this in the general case—first, across biological conscious species (a bird has a different “logical” ontology than people, as well as a different phenomenological reality that, to varying degrees of precision, “represents” or maps to, or has a recurrent resonance with that species’ logical ontology) -- and then trying to solve it for any general mind in mind space. that has to live in this universe.
It all sounds like hand waving, perhaps. But this is scarcely an abstract. There are many puzzle pieces to the theory, and every piece of it has lots of specific research. It all is progressively falling together into an integrated system. I need geffen graphs, white boards, to explain it, since its a whole theory, so I can’t squeeze it into one post. Besides, this is Bostrom’s show.
I’ll write my own book when the time comes—not saying it is right, but it is a promising effort so far, and it seems to work better, the farther I push it.
When it is far enough along, I can test it on a vlog, and see if people can find problems. If so, I will revise, backtrack, and try again. I intend to spend the rest of my life doing this, so discovered errors are just part of revision and refinement.
But first I have to finish, then present it methodically and carefully, so it can be evaluated by others. No space here for that.
Thanks for your previous thoughts, and your caution against sounding too certain. I am really NOT that certain, of course, of anything. I was just thinking out loud, as they say.
A growing consensus isn’t a done deal.
It’s a matter if fact that information ontology i isn’t the established consensus in the way that evolution is. You are entitled to opinions, but not to pass off opinions as fact. There is enough confusion about physics already.
You bring in the issue of objections to information ontology The unstated argument seems to be that since there are no valid objections, there is nothing to stop it becoming the established consensus, so it is as good as.
What would a universe in which information is not fundamental look like, as opposed to one where it is? I would expect a universe where information is not fundamental to look like one where information always requires some physical, material or energetic, medium or carrier—a sheet of paper,, radio wave,a train of pulses going down T1 line. That appears to be the case.
I am not sure why you brought Bostrom in. For what it’s worth, I don’t think a Bostrom style mathematical universe is quite the same as a single universe information ontology.
I don’t know who you think is doing that, .or why you brought it in. Do you think .IO helps with the mind body problem? I think you need to do more than subtract the stuffiness from matter. If we could easily see how a rich conception of consciousness could supervene on pure information, we would easily be able to see how computers could have qualia, which we can’t. We need more in our ontology, not less.
I have to confess that I might be the one person in this business who never really understood the concept of supervenience—either “weak supervenience” or “strong supervenience.” I’ve read Chalmers, Dennett, the journals on the concept… never really “snapped-in” for me. So when the term is used, I have to just recuse myself and let those who do understand it, finish their line of thought.
To me, supevenience seems like a fuzzy way to repackage epiphenomenalism, or to finesse some kind of antinomy (for them), like, “can’t live with eliminative materialism, can’t live with dualism, can’t live with type—type identity theory, and token-token identity theory is untestable and difficult even to give logical nec and sufficient conditions for, so… lets have a new word.”
So, (my unruly suspicion tells me) let’s say mental events (states, processes, whatever) “supervene” on physiological states (events, etc.)
As I say, so far, I have just had to suspend judgement and wonder if some day “supervene” will snap-in and be intuitively penetrable to me. I push all the definitions, and get to the same place—a “I don’t get it” place, but that doesn’t mean I believe the concept is itself defective. I just have to suspend judgement (like, for the last 25 years of study or so.)
I actually believe that, too… but with a unique take: I think we all operate with a logical ontology … not in the sense of modus ponens, but in the sense that a memory space can be “logical”, meaning in this context, detached from physical memory.
Further, the construction of this logical ontology is, I think, partly culturally influenced, partly influenced by the species’ sensorium and equipment, party influenced / constructed by something like Jeff Hawkins’ prediction-expectation memory model… constructed, bequeathed culturally, and in several additional related, ways that also tune the idealized, logical ontology.
Memetics influences (in conjunction with native—although changeable—abilities in those memes’ host vectors) the genesis, maintenance, and evolution of this “logical ontology”, also. This is feed foward and feed backward. Memetics influences the logical ontology, which crystalizes into additional memetic templates that are kept, tuning further the logical ontology.
Once “established” (and it constantly evolves), this “logical” ontology is the “target” that, over time, a new (say, human, while growing up, growing old) has as the “target” data structures that it creates a virtual, phenomenological analog simulation of, and as the person gains experience, the person’s virtual reality simulation of the world converges on something that is in some way consistently isomorphically related to this “logical” idealized ontology.
So (and there is lots of neurology research that drives much of this, though it may all sound rather speculative) for me, there are TWO ontologies, BOTH of them constructed, and those are in addition to the entangled “outside world” quantum substrate, which is by definition inherently both sub-ontological (properly understood) and not sensible, (It is sub-ontological because of its nature, but is interrogatable, giving feedback helping to form boundary conditions for the idealized logical ontology (or ontologies, in different species.)
I’ll add that I think the “logical ontology” is also species dependent, unsurprisingly.
I think you and I got off on the wrong foot, maybe you found my tone too declaratory when it should have been phrased more subjunctively. I’ll take your point. But since you obviously have a philosophy competence, you will know what the following means:-- one can say my views resemble somewhat an updated quasi-Kantian model, supplemented with the idea that noumena are the inchoate quantum substrate.
Or perhaps to correct that, in my model there are two “noumenal” realms: one is the “logical ontology” I referred to, a logical data structure, and the other is the one below that, and below ALL ontologies, which is the quantum substrate, necessarily “subontological.”
But my theory (there is more than I have just shot through quickly right now) handles species-relative qualia and the species-relative logical ontologies across species.
Remaining issues include : how qualia are generated. And the same question for the sense of self. I have ideas how to solve these, and the indexical 1st person problem, connected with the basis problem. Neurology studies of default mode network behavior and architecture, its malfunction, and metacognition, epilepsy, etc, help a lot.
Think this is speculative? You should read neruologists these days, especially the better, data driven ones. (Perhaps you already know, and you will thus see where I derive some of my supporting research.)
Anyway, always, always, I am trying to solve all this in the general case—first, across biological conscious species (a bird has a different “logical” ontology than people, as well as a different phenomenological reality that, to varying degrees of precision, “represents” or maps to, or has a recurrent resonance with that species’ logical ontology) -- and then trying to solve it for any general mind in mind space. that has to live in this universe.
It all sounds like hand waving, perhaps. But this is scarcely an abstract. There are many puzzle pieces to the theory, and every piece of it has lots of specific research. It all is progressively falling together into an integrated system. I need geffen graphs, white boards, to explain it, since its a whole theory, so I can’t squeeze it into one post. Besides, this is Bostrom’s show.
I’ll write my own book when the time comes—not saying it is right, but it is a promising effort so far, and it seems to work better, the farther I push it.
When it is far enough along, I can test it on a vlog, and see if people can find problems. If so, I will revise, backtrack, and try again. I intend to spend the rest of my life doing this, so discovered errors are just part of revision and refinement.
But first I have to finish, then present it methodically and carefully, so it can be evaluated by others. No space here for that.
Thanks for your previous thoughts, and your caution against sounding too certain. I am really NOT that certain, of course, of anything. I was just thinking out loud, as they say.
this week is pretty much closed..… cheers...
Supervenience is not a claim like epiphenonenalism, it is a set of constraints that represent some broad naturalists conclusions.