Even the typical usage of “invested in a job” suggests a reason that someone would not want to be out of the job, as opposed to forcing them to stay when they do want to be out.
Okay, I think I get what you’re saying more here. But the distinction that feels important is something like: “if a system manipulates you in such a way that, initially, you thought you were getting a good deal, but upon reflection you got a bad deal and now it’s hard to change your mind about that deal”, that’s something that feels more appropriate to me to treat as an artificial barrier-to-exit, than as a mere sunk cost + opportunity cost.
I think there’s a spectrum of barriers-to-exit, ranging from mild trivial inconveniences to “literally a slave owner will shoot you if you try to escape.” I think most jobs have some nontrivial barrier in the form of inertia/inconvenience (which indeed affects the job market).
I think there’s some flaw in term “super-perfect-competition” in that in implies some spectrum from imperfect-perfect-superperfect, and in fact situations can be a mixture of “how perfect the competition is” plus “how high the barriers to exit are”, which varying effects depending how high each one is. (At the beginning, Zvi notes that [upper]-middle-management is nowhere near “Contract Drafting Em” levels of bad, but still bad enough to see particular effects.”
I’m not actually that sold on the claim, but the barrier to exit thing still seems like a meaningful part of the model.
But the distinction that feels important is something like: “if a system manipulates you in such a way that, initially, you thought you were getting a good deal, but upon reflection you got a bad deal and now it’s hard to change your mind about that deal”
I totally agree. That’s pointing to something very interesting. It has nothing whatsoever to do with competition, and I think trying to frame this whole thing in terms of competition and barriers to exit is making a complete mess of a potentially interesting idea.
Okay, that sentiment makes sense (although “nothing whatsoever to do with competition” still sounds false, even if the active ingredient is the manipulation, and it wasn’t necessary to hypothesize “super-perfect competition”, regular competition still clearly plays a role.
I think the confusion is in treating competition as an single attribute rather than a set of relationships between different entities. Specifying the competitive dimensions, and who is competing for what, will probably resolve it. Generally, competition sucks for competitors and is good for customers. Every transaction has two sides.
Companies are competing for employees. This competition is good for employees (and irksome for companies), and there’s a puzzle about why a person would stay in a toxic environment rather than going to a nicer one. My hypothesis is that the perceived rewards (including perhaps-incorrect estimates of future promotions) are actually there and those that stay are making a choice, rather than being trapped.
Employees are competing with each other for positions. This is bad for the losers, good for the winners, and good for the companies, to the extent that the dimensions of competition are actually aligned with what the business needs. My hypothesis is that the competition in these cases is on illegible dimensions, so it’s unclear (from outside, and perhaps from inside and below, unlikely from inside and above) that it’s good for anyone.
Companies are competing with each other for customer money. Depending on how much customers pay attention and how agile they are, there may be more or less slack in this competition, and that may lead to better or weaker alignment between company needs and employee competition dimensions.
The contradiction I don’t get in the analysis so far is the simultaneous claim that competition is so fierce that it’s gone beyond actual competition into some overfitted mechanism (super-competitive), AND that it’s mostly a problem in orgs that have enough slack to not really care about this waste.
Okay, I think I get what you’re saying more here. But the distinction that feels important is something like: “if a system manipulates you in such a way that, initially, you thought you were getting a good deal, but upon reflection you got a bad deal and now it’s hard to change your mind about that deal”, that’s something that feels more appropriate to me to treat as an artificial barrier-to-exit, than as a mere sunk cost + opportunity cost.
I think there’s a spectrum of barriers-to-exit, ranging from mild trivial inconveniences to “literally a slave owner will shoot you if you try to escape.” I think most jobs have some nontrivial barrier in the form of inertia/inconvenience (which indeed affects the job market).
I think there’s some flaw in term “super-perfect-competition” in that in implies some spectrum from imperfect-perfect-superperfect, and in fact situations can be a mixture of “how perfect the competition is” plus “how high the barriers to exit are”, which varying effects depending how high each one is. (At the beginning, Zvi notes that [upper]-middle-management is nowhere near “Contract Drafting Em” levels of bad, but still bad enough to see particular effects.”
I’m not actually that sold on the claim, but the barrier to exit thing still seems like a meaningful part of the model.
I totally agree. That’s pointing to something very interesting. It has nothing whatsoever to do with competition, and I think trying to frame this whole thing in terms of competition and barriers to exit is making a complete mess of a potentially interesting idea.
Okay, that sentiment makes sense (although “nothing whatsoever to do with competition” still sounds false, even if the active ingredient is the manipulation, and it wasn’t necessary to hypothesize “super-perfect competition”, regular competition still clearly plays a role.
I think the confusion is in treating competition as an single attribute rather than a set of relationships between different entities. Specifying the competitive dimensions, and who is competing for what, will probably resolve it. Generally, competition sucks for competitors and is good for customers. Every transaction has two sides.
Companies are competing for employees. This competition is good for employees (and irksome for companies), and there’s a puzzle about why a person would stay in a toxic environment rather than going to a nicer one. My hypothesis is that the perceived rewards (including perhaps-incorrect estimates of future promotions) are actually there and those that stay are making a choice, rather than being trapped.
Employees are competing with each other for positions. This is bad for the losers, good for the winners, and good for the companies, to the extent that the dimensions of competition are actually aligned with what the business needs. My hypothesis is that the competition in these cases is on illegible dimensions, so it’s unclear (from outside, and perhaps from inside and below, unlikely from inside and above) that it’s good for anyone.
Companies are competing with each other for customer money. Depending on how much customers pay attention and how agile they are, there may be more or less slack in this competition, and that may lead to better or weaker alignment between company needs and employee competition dimensions.
The contradiction I don’t get in the analysis so far is the simultaneous claim that competition is so fierce that it’s gone beyond actual competition into some overfitted mechanism (super-competitive), AND that it’s mostly a problem in orgs that have enough slack to not really care about this waste.