(1) Our “angry rhetoric, intimidation and surveillance” of Muslims in western countries benefits ISIS by giving them more recruits. (2) Our soft response to terrorism compared to, say, how Saudi Arabia deals with terrorists who threaten it, benefits ISIS by signaling that the West is weak and by not providing sufficient disincentives to potential terrorists.
Why, you look at what France and other European countries did. We know that whatever they did led to Paris and Brussels. Do you think they radicalized the Muslims by heavy-handed patrolling of Muslim neighbourhoods and being generally oppressive toward them? Or did the European policy involve averting their eyes and issuing proclamations about how Muslims should feel welcome (the term “appeasement” isn’t terribly popular)?
Paris isn’t excatly a European city that did a good job at trying to integrate it’s Muslim populations. Even before the terrorist attacks there were riots in Paris’s suburbs. France is also one of the countries that did the most surveillance.
And I suppose other countries that treat terrorists more harshly never experienced suicide bombings?
But just saying that would not be getting to the meat of your point. The question to ask is not whether what they did led to Paris and Brussels, but whether if doing something different would have prevented Paris and Brussels, or led to Berlin, Milan, and other prominent cities being bombed.
As always, I’m ready to update my beliefs, and if you can show that me sufficient proof that a heavy police presence would be more optimal than not for the sake of decreasing the resources flowing to ISIS and its ability to do suicide bombings, I’ll be happy to update.
Would you consider it to hard on Muslims or soft on Muslims if France would head the call of it’s Muslim community to require Imam’s to have a license to preach?
The government licencing practitioners of industry X helps incumbent practitioners of industry X while harming industry X’s customers. The licencing should raise the price and lower the output and innovation of the industry.
I hear you, but I don’t think the theories are opposite to each other.
Let’s take them one at a time. First, would you agree that angry rhetoric, intimidation and surveillance contributes to ISIS getting more recruits? If so, then it’s a true statement, independent of the other statement.
Regarding the second, I’m not sure the word “soft” is warranted here, as it prejudges the question in advance. The question you seem to be asking is whether our current response to terrorists signals that the West is weak and thus does not provide sufficient disincentives to terrorists. When using the word terrorists, it seems that you are speaking about the people carrying out the acts. Those people generally are prepared to die—many are either suicide bombers, or make suicide-style attacks expecting to die. Thus, using tactics such as police surveillance of neighborhoods as Cruz proposed is unlikely to provide a disincentive at all. Heck, even jailing them for life will not, or taking 10 years to kill them as our current death penalty laws stand.
Now, I can try to steelman the second theory, and talk about the people behind the suicide bombers, those who incite them—so not terrorists themselves, but ideological leaders. Having police patrol Muslim neighborhoods will do nothing to deter ideological leaders, natch—they are the radical imams in mosques, the bloggers on the internet, etc. So my point still stands on Cruz’s solution being, to say it mildly, unhelpful.
Can we do something about the radical imams? Sure! However, this is not a topic I chose to focus on in the article, and I haven’t given it sufficient consideration to make a strong and clear statement about it. I’d welcome thoughts from LWs about what can be done.
Agreed with Viliam here. No strategy is going to be morally flawless. We need to figure out what strategy will optimize for the best balance of utilons.
I suggest we talk in numbers here, as opposed to generalities. Give your estimates for what will happen with your theory, and see what other people think.
Those are minimum conditions to avoid being immediately criticized here. I probably forgot something, such as the strategy should only be a short inferential distance away from the average reader, etc.
Well, now we have at least two options: (1) kill the radical imams, and (2) do nothing and keep the status quo. Anyone is free to suggest more options.
Each option has some disadvantages. You hinted at the problems with 1, which are that if the strategy works, it is likely to go down a slippery slope. First we assassinate Osama bin Laden, then we assassinate our local jihad preacher Abdullah, then we assassinate everyone who criticizes Hillary on Facebook, and then we start building concentration camps for all wrongthinkers. A few times in history a similar thing actually happened, so it is a useful outside view to have.
But there are also problems with 2, and thousands of people are already dying as a consequence of militant islam, to say the obvious.
If you suggest that the option 2 is better than the option 1, I am interested in hearing your arguments. If you have a better option 3, I am also interested in hearing arguments for it.
Imagine something is wrong with your leg. You come to a doctor and tell him about the weird pains in your leg, and how it cramps up occasionally, etc. The doctor thinks for a moment and says: Well, now we have at least two options, (1) cut off your leg, and (2) do nothing. Would you feed that was a reasonable approach to the situation?
I hope you don’t think that the problem of dealing with a subversive movement is new. Ruling elites had to figure out what to do about them since time immemorial with regular successes and regular failures. There is no universal answer, never mind a simplistic one. Treating them with kid gloves has been tried (ask the Germans how well did that work with respect to the brown shirts), treating them harshly has been tried (ask the Romans how well did feeding Christians to the lions work). It’s complicated.
I am not going to develop a strategy for fighting islamists here, but I strongly suspect that a successful strategy would have the following attributes:
Not expressible in a single sentence. Or a single paragraph.
Has many parts, in particular both carrots and sticks
Changes with time, specifically in response to feedback
Somewhat localized—the US solutions are unlikely to be exactly like the European solutions.
Is patient and doesn’t expect to fix everything in a month
Why do you expect trivially simple solutions to complex problems?
I expect that in order to solve any complex problem, there must be an actionable first step. Otherwise, the problem is likely to get unsolved. (Unless some solution appears randomly in the future.)
In this situation, as the first step I would probably try to establish an organization aimed at reducing islamic terrorism. Maybe just a department within some existing secret service.
Maybe it already happened.
Saying “it’s difficult” may be perfectly true, but doesn’t bring us any closer to solving the problem.
I expect that in order to solve any complex problem, there must be an actionable first step.
Sure. Usually it should be “understand what’s happening”.
Saying “it’s difficult” may be perfectly true, but doesn’t bring us any closer to solving the problem.
Who is “us”? I am not going to solve that problem. Neither are you. The appropriate national security agencies aren’t terrible interested in your or mine (or the whole LW’s) opinions.
One of the reasons why politics is discouraged on LW is that in almost all cases you just talk about it, but do not actually do (and cannot do) anything.
I’d be careful of the first two—there are trade-offs to making them into martyrs. Doesn’t mean it shouldn’t be done, but we need to consider carefully the trade-offs and evaluate the pros and cons of doing each.
Totally on board with discrediting them and making fun of them publicly.
Between these two—what we can call the “hard” pole and the “soft” pole—I’d suggest a “middle” course of putting up barriers to their ability to make an impact. For example, if a radical imam is identified, we can have super-steep fines for each instance of radicalizing speech. Or we can revoke permits for them to have a mosque. Or we can have attacks on the blogs of radical muslims. This has the benefit of making it much less likely for them to be perceived as martyrs, and if they complain they can be easily portrayed as whiners and sore losers.
Consider two theories:
(1) Our “angry rhetoric, intimidation and surveillance” of Muslims in western countries benefits ISIS by giving them more recruits.
(2) Our soft response to terrorism compared to, say, how Saudi Arabia deals with terrorists who threaten it, benefits ISIS by signaling that the West is weak and by not providing sufficient disincentives to potential terrorists.
How do you determine which is right?
Why, you look at what France and other European countries did. We know that whatever they did led to Paris and Brussels. Do you think they radicalized the Muslims by heavy-handed patrolling of Muslim neighbourhoods and being generally oppressive toward them? Or did the European policy involve averting their eyes and issuing proclamations about how Muslims should feel welcome (the term “appeasement” isn’t terribly popular)?
Paris isn’t excatly a European city that did a good job at trying to integrate it’s Muslim populations. Even before the terrorist attacks there were riots in Paris’s suburbs. France is also one of the countries that did the most surveillance.
And I suppose other countries that treat terrorists more harshly never experienced suicide bombings?
But just saying that would not be getting to the meat of your point. The question to ask is not whether what they did led to Paris and Brussels, but whether if doing something different would have prevented Paris and Brussels, or led to Berlin, Milan, and other prominent cities being bombed.
As always, I’m ready to update my beliefs, and if you can show that me sufficient proof that a heavy police presence would be more optimal than not for the sake of decreasing the resources flowing to ISIS and its ability to do suicide bombings, I’ll be happy to update.
Correlation / Causation?
Evidence.
But do note that the OP explicitly asserts causation between police presence and radicalization.
Are you assuming they’re mutually exclusive? Why?
I was, but perhaps I shouldn’t have.
Would you consider it to hard on Muslims or soft on Muslims if France would head the call of it’s Muslim community to require Imam’s to have a license to preach?
Hard on them since with limited competition the Imam’s would put less effort into their work.
Basically limiting competition of a trade means being hard on the trade?
The government licencing practitioners of industry X helps incumbent practitioners of industry X while harming industry X’s customers. The licencing should raise the price and lower the output and innovation of the industry.
Saudi Arabia pays the terrorists to move their operations to other countries. That isn’t exactly being soft on terrorism.
I hear you, but I don’t think the theories are opposite to each other.
Let’s take them one at a time. First, would you agree that angry rhetoric, intimidation and surveillance contributes to ISIS getting more recruits? If so, then it’s a true statement, independent of the other statement.
Regarding the second, I’m not sure the word “soft” is warranted here, as it prejudges the question in advance. The question you seem to be asking is whether our current response to terrorists signals that the West is weak and thus does not provide sufficient disincentives to terrorists. When using the word terrorists, it seems that you are speaking about the people carrying out the acts. Those people generally are prepared to die—many are either suicide bombers, or make suicide-style attacks expecting to die. Thus, using tactics such as police surveillance of neighborhoods as Cruz proposed is unlikely to provide a disincentive at all. Heck, even jailing them for life will not, or taking 10 years to kill them as our current death penalty laws stand.
Now, I can try to steelman the second theory, and talk about the people behind the suicide bombers, those who incite them—so not terrorists themselves, but ideological leaders. Having police patrol Muslim neighborhoods will do nothing to deter ideological leaders, natch—they are the radical imams in mosques, the bloggers on the internet, etc. So my point still stands on Cruz’s solution being, to say it mildly, unhelpful.
Can we do something about the radical imams? Sure! However, this is not a topic I chose to focus on in the article, and I haven’t given it sufficient consideration to make a strong and clear statement about it. I’d welcome thoughts from LWs about what can be done.
Put them in prison. Assassinate them. Discredit them. Make fun of them publicly. All of the above.
First they came for the radical imams and I didn’t say anything because I wasn’t an imam...
Feel free to suggest a better strategy. (Note: It must work reliably, and it must be morally flawless.)
Agreed with Viliam here. No strategy is going to be morally flawless. We need to figure out what strategy will optimize for the best balance of utilons.
I suggest we talk in numbers here, as opposed to generalities. Give your estimates for what will happen with your theory, and see what other people think.
Interesting conditions you set.
Those are minimum conditions to avoid being immediately criticized here. I probably forgot something, such as the strategy should only be a short inferential distance away from the average reader, etc.
Ah. No, I don’t think they would help you much with avoiding criticism :-/
But I’m not sure what you expected when your suggestion for dealing with people who speak words you don’t like is “Just kill them”.
Well, now we have at least two options: (1) kill the radical imams, and (2) do nothing and keep the status quo. Anyone is free to suggest more options.
Each option has some disadvantages. You hinted at the problems with 1, which are that if the strategy works, it is likely to go down a slippery slope. First we assassinate Osama bin Laden, then we assassinate our local jihad preacher Abdullah, then we assassinate everyone who criticizes Hillary on Facebook, and then we start building concentration camps for all wrongthinkers. A few times in history a similar thing actually happened, so it is a useful outside view to have.
But there are also problems with 2, and thousands of people are already dying as a consequence of militant islam, to say the obvious.
If you suggest that the option 2 is better than the option 1, I am interested in hearing your arguments. If you have a better option 3, I am also interested in hearing arguments for it.
Imagine something is wrong with your leg. You come to a doctor and tell him about the weird pains in your leg, and how it cramps up occasionally, etc. The doctor thinks for a moment and says: Well, now we have at least two options, (1) cut off your leg, and (2) do nothing. Would you feed that was a reasonable approach to the situation?
I hope you don’t think that the problem of dealing with a subversive movement is new. Ruling elites had to figure out what to do about them since time immemorial with regular successes and regular failures. There is no universal answer, never mind a simplistic one. Treating them with kid gloves has been tried (ask the Germans how well did that work with respect to the brown shirts), treating them harshly has been tried (ask the Romans how well did feeding Christians to the lions work). It’s complicated.
I am not going to develop a strategy for fighting islamists here, but I strongly suspect that a successful strategy would have the following attributes:
Not expressible in a single sentence. Or a single paragraph.
Has many parts, in particular both carrots and sticks
Changes with time, specifically in response to feedback
Somewhat localized—the US solutions are unlikely to be exactly like the European solutions.
Is patient and doesn’t expect to fix everything in a month
Why do you expect trivially simple solutions to complex problems?
I expect that in order to solve any complex problem, there must be an actionable first step. Otherwise, the problem is likely to get unsolved. (Unless some solution appears randomly in the future.)
In this situation, as the first step I would probably try to establish an organization aimed at reducing islamic terrorism. Maybe just a department within some existing secret service.
Maybe it already happened.
Saying “it’s difficult” may be perfectly true, but doesn’t bring us any closer to solving the problem.
Sure. Usually it should be “understand what’s happening”.
Who is “us”? I am not going to solve that problem. Neither are you. The appropriate national security agencies aren’t terrible interested in your or mine (or the whole LW’s) opinions.
One of the reasons why politics is discouraged on LW is that in almost all cases you just talk about it, but do not actually do (and cannot do) anything.
I’d be careful of the first two—there are trade-offs to making them into martyrs. Doesn’t mean it shouldn’t be done, but we need to consider carefully the trade-offs and evaluate the pros and cons of doing each.
Totally on board with discrediting them and making fun of them publicly.
Between these two—what we can call the “hard” pole and the “soft” pole—I’d suggest a “middle” course of putting up barriers to their ability to make an impact. For example, if a radical imam is identified, we can have super-steep fines for each instance of radicalizing speech. Or we can revoke permits for them to have a mosque. Or we can have attacks on the blogs of radical muslims. This has the benefit of making it much less likely for them to be perceived as martyrs, and if they complain they can be easily portrayed as whiners and sore losers.